Reflexive Decision and Game Theory

现代决策和博弈论中所阐述的经济人范式，塑造了我们社会科学的广泛部分。这些理论被视为提供了一个基本完整的规范性理想，因此作为行为经济学，心理经济学和神经经济学的关键参考点，试图克服这些理论的经验不足。与这一主流相反，本项目认为博弈和决策理论在规范上是有缺陷的，因此试图改进经济人的规范理想，从而转移经验批评的攻击点。该项目通过以一种形式上严格的方式将“自反性上升”概念化和理论化来做到这一点。根据它，一个人不仅考虑她可能的行动及其可能的后果，而且考虑她可能的（未来）决策情况，这需要这些行动。这将提供一个系统化的所谓的动态选择，一个系统化的治疗（前）承诺，广泛讨论的literature，特别是一个新的基本均衡的概念博弈论，这承诺一种新的治疗合作，实际上是一个统一的非合作和合作博弈论。

The paradigm of homo oeconomicus, as explicated in modern decision and game theory, shapes extensive parts of our social sciences. These theories count as delivering a basically complete normative ideal and hence serve as the critical reference point of behavioral, psycho-, and neuroeconomics, which attempt to overcome the empirical deficiencies of those theories. In contrast to this mainstream, the present project takes game and decision theory to be normatively deficient and thus attempts to improve the normative ideal of a homo oeconomicus and to thereby shift the point of attack of empirical criticism. The project does so by conceptualizing and theorizing `reflexive ascent' in a formally rigorous way. According to it, a person considers not only her possible actions and their possible consequences, but also her possible (future) decision situations, which entail those actions. This will provide a systematization of so-called dynamic choice, a systematic treatment of (pre-)commitment, as widely discussed in the litersture, and in particular a new fundamental equilibrium concept for game theory, which promises a novel treatment of cooperation and indeed a unification of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory.