Reflexive Rationality: A Theory of Dynamic Choice

动态选择的问题是在设想进入决策情境时如何计划和理性行事的问题，在这种情境中，一个人可能已经任意改变了信念和愿望，而不仅仅是像传统假设的那样，信念通过信息改变。我的建议是通过用所谓的自反式决策模型来表示决策情况来解决这个非常一般的问题，这些模型不仅包含行动(和机会)节点，而且还包含决策节点，从而代表代理对她未来可能出现的情况的想法。该提案将为相关理论发展许多错综复杂的细节。它还会辩称，再少也不行。因此，它将把各种各样的思想、模型和文献整合到一个统一的账户中：时间偏好、内生偏好变化、复杂选择、(预先)承诺、自我控制、果断选择等。它将适用于迄今几乎没有考虑过的新现象。这种自反性理性理论也将对社会背景产生影响，即博弈论，它导致了一种新的均衡，即所谓的依赖均衡，以及它们的附属理论。因此，它也将能够为所谓的共同或我们意图的解释奠定基础。

The problem of dynamic choice is the problem how to plan and to behave rationally when envisaging to get into decision situations in which one may have arbitrarily changed beliefs and desires and not only, as traditionally assumed, beliefs changed through information. My proposal will be to solve this very general problem by representing decision situations by socalled reflexive decision models that contain not only action (and chance) nodes, but also decision nodes and thus represent the agent’s thoughts about her possible future situations. The proposal will develop many intricate details of the appertaining theory. And it will argue that no less will do. Thereby it will integrate a wide variety of ideas, models, and literature into one unified account: on time preferences, endogenous preference change, sophisticated choice, (pre-)commitment, self-control, resolute choice, etc. And it will be applicable to new phenomena hitherto hardly considered. This theory of reflexive rationality will have consequences for social contexts as well, i.e. for game theory, where it leads to a new kind of equilibria, so-called dependency equilibria, and their appertaining theory. It will thus as well be able to lay foundations to an account of so-called joint or we-intentions.