The effects for accounting regulation for business combinations on firm behaviours and stock pricing : a theory and tests

本研究实证检验了(1)投资者如何根据会计信息形成预期；(2)企业如何选择会计和确认时机。讨论了企业合并的监管设置。首先，我确认报表和资产负债表信息的补充作用。我发现盈余-账面价值（有趋势）模型更好地解释了1967-2001年期间在东京证券交易所上市的531家公司的股价水平和变化。其次，对1964-2001年TSE公司的面板分析表明：(1)成长型公司倾向于保守会计计量而不是收入确认延迟；(2)面临更严重股息政策冲突的公司倾向于选择更保守的会计计量；(3)管理者倾向于低估收益而不是净资产。我的集体证据为企业合并提供了监管解释。在平等的基础上进行合并，由于没有建立管理控制权，利益相关者之间存在严重的冲突。在这种情况下，理性的利益相关者更倾向于保守的会计，不会高估资产，例如，池化法。采用池化法必须具备一定的条件，限制盈余管理。

This research empirically examines (1)how investors are forming the expectation based on accounting information, and (2)how a firm selects the accounting and recognition timing. I discuss the regulation setting of business combinations. First, I confirm a supplementary role of the statement and balance sheet information. I find that the earnings-book value (with tome trend) model better explained the level and change of stock prices in 531 firms which had been listed in the TSE (Tokyo Stock Exchange) for the period of 1967-2001. Second, the panel analysis of TSE firms in 1964-2001, shows that (1)the growth firms prefer conservative accounting measurement to income recognition delay, (2)firms facing more severe conflicts over devidend policy tend to select more conservative accounting, (3)a manager tends underestimate earnings rather than net assets. My collective evidence provides a regulatory explanation for business combinations. A merger on an equal basis has the severe conflicts among stakeholders because the management control has not established. In such case, rational stakeholders would prefer conservative accounting that could not overestimate assets, for example, the pooling method. The use of pooling method must certain conditions that limit earnings management.