Emerging Themes in 21st Century meta-ethics: Evaluative and Normative Language

这一研究网络将为规范性和评价性语言的研究开辟新的方向。规范性和评价性语言包括“好”、“坏”、“可取”、“不公平”、“应该”、“必须”和“应该”等词。在过去的十年里，在探索所谓的元伦理学混合理论的方向上出现了一个明显的趋势。根据这些理论，这些词既描述了它们的主题，也表达了对它的评价态度。不幸的是，那些研究这些理论的人很少持续关注其他似乎能够同时描述一个主题并表达对它的评价态度的词语（例如，污语和贬义的语言）。这是一个缺点，因为理解这些词是如何工作的，将对元伦理学非常感兴趣，以确定规范性和评价性语言是否以同样的双重方式起作用。先前元伦理学工作的狭隘焦点的第二个方面是，哲学家倾向于只关注规范性和评估性语言在中心伦理环境中使用时的功能。因此，例如，研究伦理“必然”的哲学家往往忽略了它与出现在可能性和必然性主张中的“必然”的关系。有时，这种狭隘的关注是基于一种假设，即伦理学中使用的术语具有独特的含义。但其他时候，这种假设却没有被注意到。最近，一些元伦理学家，包括那些我们计划参与这个网络的人，通过观察这些术语在非伦理话语中是如何使用的，对这一假设提出了挑战。它也来自于其他哲学和语言学领域的工作人员，他们开始研究诸如上下文敏感性和态度表达等特征，以及它们在规范性和评价性术语和其他表达中的应用。这导致了从元伦理学到元规范的关注范围的扩大，因为哲学家们对这些术语的非伦理使用感兴趣并与之协调，并且越来越意识到语言哲学和语言学的工作应该对元伦理问题承担责任。这一研究网络将为规范性和评价性语言的研究开辟新的方向。一些关键的研究问题和主题是：(1)规范性判断（例如，酷刑是错误的判断）似乎与非规范性判断（例如，桌子是圆的判断）有很大的不同。但是什么让它们与众不同呢？是他们的主题，他们在思考和行动中扮演的角色，还是别的什么？它们是信仰，还是欲望，两者的结合，还是别的什么？(2)规范性话语（如断言“酷刑是错误的”）似乎与非规范性话语（如断言巴黎是法国首都）大不相同。这种差异是否证明了将它们的意义与更平淡的事实性话语区别对待？(3)如果规范性判断在某种程度上结合了信念和欲望，或者规范性话语的意义在某种程度上不同于平淡的事实陈述所具有的意义，那么污言秽语和贬义性语言是否为规范性判断和主张提供了有用的类比？但是，贬义词的特征是否破坏了这种平行关系？(4)规范性判断如何与模态判断（关于可能性和必要性的判断）联系起来。例如，在“你必须公平待人”和“万物涨落”中，“必须”的用法有什么联系吗？或者在“你不能这样对待人”和“电子不能比光速快”中，“不能”的用法有什么联系吗？

This research network will be a stimulus for new directions in the study of normative and evaluative language. Normative and evaluative language includes words like 'good', 'bad', 'desirable', 'unfair', 'ought', 'must', and 'should'. Over the past decade there has been a clear trend in the direction of exploring so-called hybrid theories in meta-ethics. According to these theories, these words both describe their subject and express evaluative attitudes towards it. Unfortunately, those working on such theories have given little sustained attention to other words that seem to be capable of simultaneously describing a subject and expressing evaluative attitudes towards it (slurs and pejorative language for example). This is a shortcoming because an understanding of how these words work will be of great interest to meta-ethics in determining whether normative and evaluative language functions in this same dual manner.A second aspect of the narrow focus of previous work in meta-ethics is that philosophers have tended to only focus on how normative and evaluative language functions when used in centrally ethical contexts. Thus, for example, philosophers working on the ethical 'must' have tended to ignore how it relates to the 'must' that appears in claims about possibility and necessity. Sometimes this narrow focus was based on the assumption that the terms used in ethics have unique meanings. But other times the assumption goes unnoticed.Recently some metaethicists, including those we plan to involve in this network, have challenged this assumption by looking at how these terms work when used in non-ethical discourse. It has also come from people working in other areas of philosophy and in linguistics who have started to examine features such as context-sensitivity and attitude expression and their application to normative and evaluative terms and other expressions. This has led to a broadening in focus from meta-ethics to the meta-normative, as philosophers become interested in and attuned to the non-ethical uses of these terms, and an increasing awareness that the work in philosophy of language and linguistics should be brought to bear upon meta-ethical questions.This research network will be a stimulus for new directions in the study of normative and evaluative language. Some of the key research questions and themes are:(1) Normative judgements (e.g. judgements that torture is wrong) seem quite different from non-normative judgements (e.g. judgements that the table is round). But what makes them distinctive? Is it their subject matter, the role they play in thinking and action, or something else? Are they beliefs, or desires, some combination of the two, or something else?(2) Normative utterances (e.g. assertions of 'torture is wrong') seem quite different from non-normative utterances (e.g. assertions that Paris is the capital of France). Does this difference warrant treating their meaning as being of a different sort from more prosaically factual kinds of utterances?(3) If normative judgements somehow combine beliefs and desires, or if the meaning of normative utterances is somehow different from the kind of meaning that prosaically factual statements have, do slurs and pejorative language provide a useful parallel for normative judgements and claims? But are there features of pejorative terms that undermine this parallel?(4) How do normative judgements relate to modal judgements (judgements about possibility and necessity). For example, is there any connection between the respective uses of 'must' in 'you must treat people fairly' and 'everything that goes up must come down', or the respective uses of 'cannot' in 'you cannot treat people like this' and 'electrons cannot travel faster than the speed of light'.