Evaluating Scientific Realism: A New Generation of Historical Case Studies

30年前，拉里·劳丹（Larry Laudan）在1981年发表了一篇开创性的论文《收敛现实主义的争论》（A contation of Convergent realism），改变了现实主义的争论。他的创新之处在于突出了科学史上的一长串事件，这些事件似乎表明，任何来自科学理论的成功解释和预测都不应该说服我们该理论是正确的，甚至是近似正确的。从那以后，人们对劳丹的历史案例进行了仔细的评估，结果，钟摆逐渐回到了现实主义者的一边。现实主义者声称劳丹列出的每一个案例要么无关紧要(例如；因为没有成功到足以保证一个现实主义的承诺)，或者当一个人看到那些真正“起作用”带来科学成功的科学假设时，这些假设确实是正确的或近似正确的（根据当前的思维）。这个新项目提出了一个非常具体、非常受欢迎的科学现实主义立场，它是直接回应劳丹的挑战而发展起来的：当一个科学理论（广泛解释）带来实质性的科学成功时(例如：新颖的预测)，那么导致这些成功的理论要素很可能至少是近似正确的。这种立场在劳丹的例子中幸存了下来，但这并不意味着科学史上没有“进一步”的例子表明这种新的现实主义立场是错误的。坦率的事实是，就目前的情况来看，没有人知道科学史上是否有大量的事件与现代现实主义的立场相矛盾。这个新项目将弥补我们知识上的这一根本差距。通过向文献中引入一系列新的案例研究，它将建立一个坚实的起点，从这个起点出发，著名的现实主义立场将根据历史记录得到适当的评估。正确确立新案例的关键是哲学家、历史学家和科学家之间的新颖合作。至少从20世纪60年代起，哲学家和科学史家就一直在一起工作，但在寻找新的相关案例研究方面，历史学家从未被明确要求帮助。然而，在发现和呈现历史案例研究——在它们的文化背景下进行适当的解释——作为支持或反对科学现实主义的证据时，科学历史学家的知识广度和具体研究技能是无价的。此外，哲学家也可以从科学家的知识和具体的研究技能中受益。在过去三十年的辩论中，这种可能性被完全忽视了，但是在科学文献中讨论的相关案例研究对哲学家来说是非常陌生的。本项目将积极吸引相关科学家参与。通过将相关的哲学家、历史学家和科学家聚集在一起，将形成一个新的个人核心，他们可以在一个重大的后续项目中有效地合作，在这个项目中，新确定的案例研究将得到彻底的评估。这个项目的核心是探索性的：考虑到当前现实主义辩论的动态，迫切需要以一种以前没有系统尝试过的方式探索科学史。寻找新的案例研究已经有一段时间了，因为对哲学立场（如果可能的话）的广泛测试在认识论上是必要的，就像对科学立场一样。但现在提议的范围界定工作尤为紧迫，因为我们手头有一个非常明确的、既定的现实主义立场，它定义了相关的历史案例研究类型。在这一观点得到验证之前，我们无法知道科学研究的真正性质和价值：它是否本质上是累积的，仍然是一个疑问。科学本身并不能帮助我们回答这个问题。

Thirty years ago, Larry Laudan transformed the realism debate with his seminal 1981 paper 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism'. His innovation was to highlight a long list of episodes from the history of science which seem to suggest that any successful explanations and predictions issuing from a scientific theory should not persuade us that the theory is true, or even approximately true. Since then Laudan's historical cases have been carefully assessed, and as a result the pendulum has gradually swung back in the realist's favour. Realists claim that each case on Laudan's list is either irrelevant (eg. because not successful enough to warrant a realist commitment), or that when one looks at the scientific posits which really *did work* to bring about scientific successes, the posits are indeed true or approximately true (according to current thinking).This new project addresses a very specific, very popular scientific realist position, which has been developed in direct response to Laudan's challenge:When a scientific theory (broadly construed) brings about substantial scientific successes (eg. novel predictions), then the elements of that theory which *did the work* to bring about those successes are very likely at least approximately true.This position survives Laudan's examples, but that hardly means that there are not *further* examples in the history of science which show this new realist position to be wrongheaded. The blunt truth is, as things stand *nobody has any idea whether or not there are a significant number of episodes in the history of science which together contradict this modern realist position*. This fundamental gap in our knowledge will be remedied by this new project. By introducing a range of new case studies to the literature it will establish a solid starting point from which the noted realist position will become properly assessed in light of the historical record.Essential to properly establish the new cases is a novel collaboration between philosophers, historians, and scientists. Philosophers and historians of science have been working together at least since the 1960s, but historians have never been explicitly asked for help in searching for new relevant case studies. And yet the breadth of knowledge and specific research skills of historians of science are invaluable when it comes to finding and presenting historical case studies - suitably interpreted, in their cultural context - as evidence for/against scientific realism.In addition philosophers can also benefit from the knowledge and specific research skills of scientists. This possibility has been completely overlooked in the debate as conducted over the past thirty years, but pertinent case studies are sometimes discussed in scientific literature quite foreign to the philosopher. This project will actively engage relevant scientists. And by bringing together relevant philosophers, historians, and scientists, a novel nucleus of individuals will be formed who could effectively work together in a major follow-up project, where the newly identified case studies would be thoroughly assessed.At its heart this project is exploratory: given the current dynamics of the realism debate there is urgent need to explore the history of science in a way that hasn't been systematically attempted before. A search for new case studies has been warranted for some time, since extensive testing of philosophical positions (if possible) is epistemically imperative just as it is for scientific positions. But right now the proposed scoping exercise is especially urgent, since we have at hand a very explicit, established realist position which defines the type of historical case study which would be relevant. Until this position has been tested, we can't know the true nature and value of scientific research: whether it is essentially cumulative or not is still in doubt. And science by itself does nothing to help us answer this question.