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Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Challenge from the History of Science

当代科学实在论与科学史的挑战

基本信息

批准号：
AH/L011646/1
负责人：
Peter Vickers
金额：
$ 27.31万
依托单位：
Durham University
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2014
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2014 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FL011646%2F1
关键词：
Contemporary Scientific Realism Challenge History

项目摘要

Of the things very distant from immediate human concerns - the very small, the very distant, events in the distant past, processes happening over very long periods of time - it is commonly assumed that science can, and does, give us knowledge. Perhaps science got many things wrong in the past, but it is assumed that many/most contemporary scientific theories are definitely on the right lines, if not plain true; this is scientific realism. But what makes us so sure we are right now, when we have been wrong so often in the past? If genuine scientific practice can readily lead to false theories of the very small, the very distant, etc., doesn't that cast significant doubt on what is today commonly referred to as 'scientific knowledge'?Philosophers of science have spent more than thirty years refining their response to this challenge. This project addresses one of the most sophisticated contemporary scientific realist positions, summarised by the following claim:When a scientific theory (broadly construed) brings about substantial scientific successes (e.g. novel predictions), then the elements of that theory which *did the work* to bring about those successes are very likely at least approximately true.Call this selective scientific realism. Despite deep issues concerning several of the key concepts here, there is widespread agreement that selective scientific realism can be tested by the history of science. That is, one can look to specific episodes in the history of science to see whether they support this claim. One can think of the position as analogous to a scientific theory which has been put forward, warranting extensive and thorough tests. But the position has not been thoroughly tested by the historical record: philosophers have focused on the same few cases for the past thirty years. In addition, philosophers have not adequately tracked the contemporary realist responses; in particular, they have not adequately concerned themselves with identifying the components of the theory that were responsible for novel predictive success.This lacuna in the literature is addressed by this project. By analysing and assessing a range of new cases identified in previous work by the PI and Co-I, it will make a step-change contribution to assessing the viability of selective scientific realism. More precisely, the guiding research question (GRQ) will be as follows:GRQ: Which cases in the history of science threaten selective realism, and which substantive versions of selective realism (if any) are capable of addressing those cases?The reference to different 'versions' is necessary, since there are different takes on what should be meant by 'did the work', 'approximately true', and so on. The specific historical episodes to be initially considered have been selected by the PI and Co-I from previous work. The most promising candidates to move the debate forward significantly can be divided into three groups: (i) cases from thermodynamics, (ii) cases from the history of chemistry, and (iii) cases from the history of biology and medicine. These have also been selected according to the historical work that has already been done, and is currently being done. For example, Ben Marsden (Aberdeen) is currently completing a major work on the history of thermodynamics, and Holger Maehle (Durham) has recently been at the forefront of relevant work in the history of medicine, concerning drug receptors. And Kyle Stanford has recently introduced two fascinating examples from the history of biology, but the philosopher is yet to draw on a wealth of historical work which has been done on these cases.

对于那些与人类直接关系非常遥远的事物--非常小的、非常遥远的、遥远的过去的事件、发生在很长一段时间内的过程--人们通常认为科学能够而且确实给我们知识。也许科学在过去做错了很多事情，但假设许多/大多数当代科学理论肯定是正确的，如果不是完全正确的话;这就是科学实在论。但是，当我们过去经常犯错时，是什么让我们如此确信我们现在是正确的呢？如果真正的科学实践很容易导致非常微小、非常遥远等等的错误理论，这难道不是对今天通常所说的“科学知识”产生了重大的怀疑吗？科学哲学家们花了30多年的时间来完善他们对这一挑战的回应。这个项目解决了当代最复杂的科学实在论立场之一，概括为以下主张：当一个科学理论（广义解释）带来实质性的科学成功（例如新的预测）时，那么该理论中的那些为这些成功做工作的元素很可能至少是近似正确的。尽管这里的几个关键概念存在深刻的问题，但人们普遍认为，选择性科学实在论可以通过科学史来检验。也就是说，人们可以看看科学史上的具体事件，看看它们是否支持这一说法。人们可以把这一立场看作是类似于一种科学理论，这种理论是经过广泛而彻底的检验而提出来的。但这一立场并没有得到历史记录的彻底检验：在过去的30年里，哲学家们一直专注于同样的几个案例。此外，哲学家没有充分跟踪当代现实主义的反应，特别是，他们没有充分关注自己识别的理论，负责新的预测成功的组成部分。通过分析和评估PI和Co-I在以前的工作中确定的一系列新案例，它将为评估选择性科学现实主义的可行性做出逐步改变的贡献。更确切地说，指导性研究问题（GRQ）将如下：GRQ：科学史上哪些案例威胁到选择实在论，以及选择实在论的哪些实质性版本（如果有的话）能够解决这些案例？参考不同的“版本”是必要的，因为对于“做了工作”、“近似真实”等的含义有不同的理解。最初考虑的具体历史事件是由PI和Co-I从以前的工作中选择的。最有希望推动辩论向前发展的候选人可以分为三类：（i）热力学案例，（ii）化学史案例，（iii）生物学和医学史案例。这些也是根据已经完成和正在进行的历史工作选择的。例如，本马斯登（阿伯丁）目前正在完成一项重大工作的历史热力学，和霍尔格Maehle（达勒姆）最近一直在前沿的相关工作在历史上的医学，有关药物受体。凯尔斯坦福大学最近介绍了两个生物学史上的迷人例子，但这位哲学家还没有从大量的历史工作中汲取经验。