Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Challenge from the History of Science

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Of the things very distant from immediate human concerns - the very small, the very distant, events in the distant past, processes happening over very long periods of time - it is commonly assumed that science can, and does, give us knowledge. Perhaps science got many things wrong in the past, but it is assumed that many/most contemporary scientific theories are definitely on the right lines, if not plain true; this is scientific realism. But what makes us so sure we are right now, when we have been wrong so often in the past? If genuine scientific practice can readily lead to false theories of the very small, the very distant, etc., doesn't that cast significant doubt on what is today commonly referred to as 'scientific knowledge'?Philosophers of science have spent more than thirty years refining their response to this challenge. This project addresses one of the most sophisticated contemporary scientific realist positions, summarised by the following claim:When a scientific theory (broadly construed) brings about substantial scientific successes (e.g. novel predictions), then the elements of that theory which *did the work* to bring about those successes are very likely at least approximately true.Call this selective scientific realism. Despite deep issues concerning several of the key concepts here, there is widespread agreement that selective scientific realism can be tested by the history of science. That is, one can look to specific episodes in the history of science to see whether they support this claim. One can think of the position as analogous to a scientific theory which has been put forward, warranting extensive and thorough tests. But the position has not been thoroughly tested by the historical record: philosophers have focused on the same few cases for the past thirty years. In addition, philosophers have not adequately tracked the contemporary realist responses; in particular, they have not adequately concerned themselves with identifying the components of the theory that were responsible for novel predictive success.This lacuna in the literature is addressed by this project. By analysing and assessing a range of new cases identified in previous work by the PI and Co-I, it will make a step-change contribution to assessing the viability of selective scientific realism. More precisely, the guiding research question (GRQ) will be as follows:GRQ: Which cases in the history of science threaten selective realism, and which substantive versions of selective realism (if any) are capable of addressing those cases?The reference to different 'versions' is necessary, since there are different takes on what should be meant by 'did the work', 'approximately true', and so on. The specific historical episodes to be initially considered have been selected by the PI and Co-I from previous work. The most promising candidates to move the debate forward significantly can be divided into three groups: (i) cases from thermodynamics, (ii) cases from the history of chemistry, and (iii) cases from the history of biology and medicine. These have also been selected according to the historical work that has already been done, and is currently being done. For example, Ben Marsden (Aberdeen) is currently completing a major work on the history of thermodynamics, and Holger Maehle (Durham) has recently been at the forefront of relevant work in the history of medicine, concerning drug receptors. And Kyle Stanford has recently introduced two fascinating examples from the history of biology, but the philosopher is yet to draw on a wealth of historical work which has been done on these cases.