Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Challenge from the History of Science

对于那些与人类的直接关注相距甚远的事情——那些发生在遥远的过去的非常微小、非常遥远的事件，发生在很长一段时间内的过程——人们通常认为科学能够，而且确实给了我们知识。也许科学在过去犯了很多错误，但人们认为，许多/大多数当代科学理论绝对是正确的，如果不是完全正确的话；这就是科学现实主义。但是，是什么让我们如此确信我们现在是正确的，而我们过去却经常犯错？如果真正的科学实践可以很容易地导致非常小的、非常遥远的等等错误的理论，这不是对今天通常被称为“科学知识”的东西产生了重大的怀疑吗？科学哲学家们花了30多年的时间来完善他们对这一挑战的回应。这个项目提出了当代最复杂的科学现实主义立场之一，总结如下：当一个科学理论（广泛解释）带来实质性的科学成功（例如新颖的预测）时，那么该理论中导致这些成功的要素很可能至少是近似正确的。我们把这称为选择性的科学现实主义。尽管这里的几个关键概念存在深刻的问题，但人们普遍认为，选择性科学实在论可以通过科学史来检验。也就是说，人们可以查看科学史上的特定事件，看看它们是否支持这一说法。我们可以把这个立场看作是一种科学理论，它已经被提出，需要广泛而彻底的检验。但这一观点并没有得到历史记录的彻底检验：在过去的三十年里，哲学家们一直专注于同样的几个案例。此外，哲学家们没有充分追踪当代现实主义的反应；特别是，他们没有充分地关注于识别理论的组成部分，这些组成部分负责新颖的预测成功。该项目解决了文献中的这一空白。通过分析和评估PI和Co-I在以前的工作中确定的一系列新案例，它将对评估选择性科学现实主义的可行性做出逐步改变的贡献。更准确地说，指导性研究问题（GRQ）将如下：GRQ：科学史上哪些案例威胁到选择性现实主义，哪些选择性现实主义的实质性版本（如果有的话）能够解决这些案例？提及不同的“版本”是必要的，因为对于“完成了工作”、“近似正确”等的含义存在不同的理解。最初要考虑的具体历史事件是由PI和Co-I从以前的工作中选择的。最有希望推动这场辩论的候选人可以分为三组：(i)热力学案例，（ii）化学历史案例，（iii）生物学和医学史案例。这些也是根据已经完成和正在完成的历史工作选择的。例如，Ben Marsden（阿伯丁）目前正在完成一项关于热力学历史的重要工作，Holger Maehle（达勒姆）最近在医学史上有关药物受体的相关工作中走在了前列。凯尔·斯坦福（Kyle Stanford）最近介绍了生物学史上两个引人入胜的例子，但这位哲学家还没有充分利用关于这些案例的大量历史著作。

Of the things very distant from immediate human concerns - the very small, the very distant, events in the distant past, processes happening over very long periods of time - it is commonly assumed that science can, and does, give us knowledge. Perhaps science got many things wrong in the past, but it is assumed that many/most contemporary scientific theories are definitely on the right lines, if not plain true; this is scientific realism. But what makes us so sure we are right now, when we have been wrong so often in the past? If genuine scientific practice can readily lead to false theories of the very small, the very distant, etc., doesn't that cast significant doubt on what is today commonly referred to as 'scientific knowledge'?Philosophers of science have spent more than thirty years refining their response to this challenge. This project addresses one of the most sophisticated contemporary scientific realist positions, summarised by the following claim:When a scientific theory (broadly construed) brings about substantial scientific successes (e.g. novel predictions), then the elements of that theory which *did the work* to bring about those successes are very likely at least approximately true.Call this selective scientific realism. Despite deep issues concerning several of the key concepts here, there is widespread agreement that selective scientific realism can be tested by the history of science. That is, one can look to specific episodes in the history of science to see whether they support this claim. One can think of the position as analogous to a scientific theory which has been put forward, warranting extensive and thorough tests. But the position has not been thoroughly tested by the historical record: philosophers have focused on the same few cases for the past thirty years. In addition, philosophers have not adequately tracked the contemporary realist responses; in particular, they have not adequately concerned themselves with identifying the components of the theory that were responsible for novel predictive success.This lacuna in the literature is addressed by this project. By analysing and assessing a range of new cases identified in previous work by the PI and Co-I, it will make a step-change contribution to assessing the viability of selective scientific realism. More precisely, the guiding research question (GRQ) will be as follows:GRQ: Which cases in the history of science threaten selective realism, and which substantive versions of selective realism (if any) are capable of addressing those cases?The reference to different 'versions' is necessary, since there are different takes on what should be meant by 'did the work', 'approximately true', and so on. The specific historical episodes to be initially considered have been selected by the PI and Co-I from previous work. The most promising candidates to move the debate forward significantly can be divided into three groups: (i) cases from thermodynamics, (ii) cases from the history of chemistry, and (iii) cases from the history of biology and medicine. These have also been selected according to the historical work that has already been done, and is currently being done. For example, Ben Marsden (Aberdeen) is currently completing a major work on the history of thermodynamics, and Holger Maehle (Durham) has recently been at the forefront of relevant work in the history of medicine, concerning drug receptors. And Kyle Stanford has recently introduced two fascinating examples from the history of biology, but the philosopher is yet to draw on a wealth of historical work which has been done on these cases.