Evaluating Scientific Realism: A New Generation of Historical Case Studies

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Thirty years ago, Larry Laudan transformed the realism debate with his seminal 1981 paper 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism'. His innovation was to highlight a long list of episodes from the history of science which seem to suggest that any successful explanations and predictions issuing from a scientific theory should not persuade us that the theory is true, or even approximately true. Since then Laudan's historical cases have been carefully assessed, and as a result the pendulum has gradually swung back in the realist's favour. Realists claim that each case on Laudan's list is either irrelevant (eg. because not successful enough to warrant a realist commitment), or that when one looks at the scientific posits which really *did work* to bring about scientific successes, the posits are indeed true or approximately true (according to current thinking).This new project addresses a very specific, very popular scientific realist position, which has been developed in direct response to Laudan's challenge:When a scientific theory (broadly construed) brings about substantial scientific successes (eg. novel predictions), then the elements of that theory which *did the work* to bring about those successes are very likely at least approximately true.This position survives Laudan's examples, but that hardly means that there are not *further* examples in the history of science which show this new realist position to be wrongheaded. The blunt truth is, as things stand *nobody has any idea whether or not there are a significant number of episodes in the history of science which together contradict this modern realist position*. This fundamental gap in our knowledge will be remedied by this new project. By introducing a range of new case studies to the literature it will establish a solid starting point from which the noted realist position will become properly assessed in light of the historical record.Essential to properly establish the new cases is a novel collaboration between philosophers, historians, and scientists. Philosophers and historians of science have been working together at least since the 1960s, but historians have never been explicitly asked for help in searching for new relevant case studies. And yet the breadth of knowledge and specific research skills of historians of science are invaluable when it comes to finding and presenting historical case studies - suitably interpreted, in their cultural context - as evidence for/against scientific realism.In addition philosophers can also benefit from the knowledge and specific research skills of scientists. This possibility has been completely overlooked in the debate as conducted over the past thirty years, but pertinent case studies are sometimes discussed in scientific literature quite foreign to the philosopher. This project will actively engage relevant scientists. And by bringing together relevant philosophers, historians, and scientists, a novel nucleus of individuals will be formed who could effectively work together in a major follow-up project, where the newly identified case studies would be thoroughly assessed.At its heart this project is exploratory: given the current dynamics of the realism debate there is urgent need to explore the history of science in a way that hasn't been systematically attempted before. A search for new case studies has been warranted for some time, since extensive testing of philosophical positions (if possible) is epistemically imperative just as it is for scientific positions. But right now the proposed scoping exercise is especially urgent, since we have at hand a very explicit, established realist position which defines the type of historical case study which would be relevant. Until this position has been tested, we can't know the true nature and value of scientific research: whether it is essentially cumulative or not is still in doubt. And science by itself does nothing to help us answer this question.