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Evaluating Scientific Realism: A New Generation of Historical Case Studies

评估科学现实主义：新一代历史案例研究

基本信息

批准号：
AH/J011142/1
负责人：
Peter Vickers
金额：
$ 2.65万
依托单位：
Durham University
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2012 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FJ011142%2F1
关键词：
Evaluating Scientific Realism New Generation

项目摘要

Thirty years ago, Larry Laudan transformed the realism debate with his seminal 1981 paper 'A Confutation of Convergent Realism'. His innovation was to highlight a long list of episodes from the history of science which seem to suggest that any successful explanations and predictions issuing from a scientific theory should not persuade us that the theory is true, or even approximately true. Since then Laudan's historical cases have been carefully assessed, and as a result the pendulum has gradually swung back in the realist's favour. Realists claim that each case on Laudan's list is either irrelevant (eg. because not successful enough to warrant a realist commitment), or that when one looks at the scientific posits which really *did work* to bring about scientific successes, the posits are indeed true or approximately true (according to current thinking).This new project addresses a very specific, very popular scientific realist position, which has been developed in direct response to Laudan's challenge:When a scientific theory (broadly construed) brings about substantial scientific successes (eg. novel predictions), then the elements of that theory which *did the work* to bring about those successes are very likely at least approximately true.This position survives Laudan's examples, but that hardly means that there are not *further* examples in the history of science which show this new realist position to be wrongheaded. The blunt truth is, as things stand *nobody has any idea whether or not there are a significant number of episodes in the history of science which together contradict this modern realist position*. This fundamental gap in our knowledge will be remedied by this new project. By introducing a range of new case studies to the literature it will establish a solid starting point from which the noted realist position will become properly assessed in light of the historical record.Essential to properly establish the new cases is a novel collaboration between philosophers, historians, and scientists. Philosophers and historians of science have been working together at least since the 1960s, but historians have never been explicitly asked for help in searching for new relevant case studies. And yet the breadth of knowledge and specific research skills of historians of science are invaluable when it comes to finding and presenting historical case studies - suitably interpreted, in their cultural context - as evidence for/against scientific realism.In addition philosophers can also benefit from the knowledge and specific research skills of scientists. This possibility has been completely overlooked in the debate as conducted over the past thirty years, but pertinent case studies are sometimes discussed in scientific literature quite foreign to the philosopher. This project will actively engage relevant scientists. And by bringing together relevant philosophers, historians, and scientists, a novel nucleus of individuals will be formed who could effectively work together in a major follow-up project, where the newly identified case studies would be thoroughly assessed.At its heart this project is exploratory: given the current dynamics of the realism debate there is urgent need to explore the history of science in a way that hasn't been systematically attempted before. A search for new case studies has been warranted for some time, since extensive testing of philosophical positions (if possible) is epistemically imperative just as it is for scientific positions. But right now the proposed scoping exercise is especially urgent, since we have at hand a very explicit, established realist position which defines the type of historical case study which would be relevant. Until this position has been tested, we can't know the true nature and value of scientific research: whether it is essentially cumulative or not is still in doubt. And science by itself does nothing to help us answer this question.

30年前，拉里·劳丹（Larry Laudan）在1981年发表了开创性的论文《对收敛现实主义的困惑》（A Confutation of Convergent Realism），从而改变了现实主义的争论。他的创新之处在于突出了科学史上的一长串情节，这些情节似乎表明，任何成功的解释和预测都不应该说服我们相信这个理论是正确的，甚至是近似正确的。从那时起，劳丹的历史案例得到了仔细的评估，结果钟摆逐渐摆回到了对现实主义者有利的位置。现实主义者声称，劳丹清单上的每一个案例要么是无关紧要的（例如，因为没有成功到足以保证一个现实主义的承诺），或者当一个人看到真正 * 工作 * 带来科学成功的科学假设时，这些假设确实是正确的或近似正确的这个新项目提出了一个非常具体、非常流行的科学实在论立场，它是直接回应劳丹的挑战而发展起来的：当一个科学理论（广义上的解释）带来了实质性的科学成功（例如，新的预言），那么理论中的元素，* 做工作 * 带来这些成功很可能至少大约是正确的。这一立场生存劳丹的例子，但这并不意味着没有 * 进一步 * 的例子在科学史上表明这种新的现实主义立场是错误的。坦率的事实是，就目前的情况而言，没有人知道科学史上是否有大量的事件与现代实在论的立场相矛盾。这个新项目将弥补我们知识上的这一根本差距。通过在文献中引入一系列新的案例研究，它将建立一个坚实的起点，从这个起点出发，著名的现实主义立场将根据历史记录得到正确的评估。正确建立新案例的关键是哲学家、历史学家和科学家之间的新颖合作。至少从20世纪60年代开始，哲学家和科学史家就一直在合作，但历史学家从未被明确要求帮助寻找新的相关案例研究。然而，在寻找和呈现历史案例研究（在其文化背景下进行适当的解释）作为支持/反对科学实在论的证据时，科学史学家的知识广度和具体研究技能是无价的。此外，哲学家也可以受益于科学家的知识和具体研究技能。在过去30年的辩论中，这种可能性被完全忽视了，但有关的案例研究有时在哲学家完全陌生的科学文献中讨论。该项目将积极吸引相关科学家参与。通过将相关的哲学家、历史学家和科学家聚集在一起，将形成一个新的个人核心，他们可以在一个重大的后续项目中有效地合作，在这个项目中，新发现的案例研究将得到彻底的评估。考虑到现实主义辩论的当前动态，迫切需要以一种尚未系统化的方式探索科学史。以前尝试过。寻找新的案例研究已经有一段时间了，因为对哲学立场（如果可能的话）的广泛测试在认识上是必要的，就像对科学立场一样。但现在，拟议的范围界定工作尤为紧迫，因为我们手头有一个非常明确的、既定的现实主义立场，它定义了相关的历史案例研究的类型。在这一立场得到检验之前，我们无法知道科学研究的真正性质和价值：它本质上是否是累积性的，仍然是个疑问。科学本身并不能帮助我们回答这个问题。