Semantic plasticity in relation to the vagueness debate

1研究问题我们的很多词都是“语义可塑性的”。这一特征可以解释一些令人费解的现象，比如我们在模糊的边缘情况下的无知。但最近的研究表明，这也为怀疑论提供了新的论据。本论文将是对语义可塑性及其意义的首次持续考察。研究背景很多词(如“沙拉”)的词义都会发生变化。发生这种情况的一种方式是，如果这些词的意思不断地以微小的方式变化，从长远来看，累积起来就是重大的变化。假设一个词在语义上是可塑性的，条件是：a.一个词的用法上的微小差异会导致它的语义值的变化(大致就是它的意思)；b.说话者无法察觉到这些细微的差异。SP被用来对令人费解的现象提供理论上中立的解释。关于模糊谓词(例如“秃顶”)的一个基本事实是，我们不能故意区分秃顶和非秃顶之间的界限，但如何解释这种无知呢？SP对“秃头”的理解意味着，即使我有一个真实的信念，比如说，“秃头”会挑出头发不超过2178根的人，但这个信念很容易就是错误的，因为用法很容易有轻微的、无法察觉的不同。知识需要一个安全真实的信念，因此语义可塑性预示着在这种情况下的无知。然而，SP威胁着我们许多基本信念的安全性。例如，由于“人”的语义可塑性，“我是一个人”所表达的信念是不安全的。假设在一个可能的封闭世界中，“人”没有挑出我，而是挑出了一个与我重叠的对象O。然后，我在那个世界说出的“我是一个人”是假的，因为“我”挑出了我，“人”挑出了O，但我与O是不同的。我们有独立的理由相信，许多词满足SP，这是一个主要的模糊理论的核心。尽管如此，直接涉及这些问题的文献很少，谜题的增长速度快于令人满意的反应。霍桑(2006)提出了SP对涉及“人”和“真”的信念的安全性提出的问题。Sennet(2012)和Kearns 8 Magidor(2008)认为，SP对模糊的认识论解释是一个问题。曼利(MS)指出，道德术语的语义可塑性与支持道德现实主义的直觉相冲突。Hawthorne和Dorr(2014)认为，SP给反事实和跨时态的演讲报告带来了问题。3研究方法我的项目的总体目标将是提出一个语义可塑性的概念，以避免对基本信念的怀疑，并仍然允许我们处理模糊性。在构建这一概念的过程中，我将做以下几个方面的工作：第一章，分析为什么存在语义可塑性。我的假设是，如果我们不接受威廉姆森(1994)的这一命题，语义可塑性也会出现。该命题认为，意义叠加于社区中所有说话者的使用。我还将分析SP和语义整体论之间的联系。反对语义整体论的最流行的论点是，整体意义是不稳定的。我的直觉是，整体意义的不稳定实际上是由SP造成的。第二章，将SP与模糊性联系起来。SP被认为对保留经典逻辑(认识论)的模糊性观点提出了问题。我的假设是，SP引起的问题也会出现在对模糊的非经典处理上。第三章，SP和亚理性学。我将调查在有问题的情况下，是否可以引用参考磁性来稳定由于SP引起的含义的变化。我将调查这样一种假设，即威廉姆斯(即将出版)的形而上学通缩参考磁学的最新发展使这种解决方案具有吸引力。我还会将SP与翻译的不确定性联系在一起：我的直觉是，SP提出的问题的一些看似天真的解决方案(例如在霍桑(2006)中提出的)会遇到翻译的不确定性问题。

1 Research Question Many of our words are "semantically plastic". This feature can explain puzzling phenomena such as our ignorance in borderline cases of vagueness. But recent work suggests it also generates a new argument for scepticism. This thesis will be the first sustained examination of semantic plasticity (SP) and its implications. 2 Research Context Many words (e.g. "salad") undergo shifts in meaning. One way this can happen is if the meaning of such words is constantly changing in minor ways that add up, over the long term, to a major shift. Let a word be semantically plastic if: a. small differences in the word's usage result in a shift in its semantic value (roughly, its meaning); and b. speakers cannot detect these small differences.SP has been used to provide theoretically-neutral explanations of puzzling phenomena. A basic fact about vague predicates (e.g. "bald") is that we cannot knowingly identify a cut-off between the bald and the not bald, but what explains this ignorance? SP for "bald" implies that even if I had a true belief, say, that "bald" picks out people with 2,178 hairs or less, the belief could easily be false, since usage could easily be slightly and undetectably different. Knowledge requires a belief that is safely true, so semantic plasticity predicts ignorance in such cases.However, SP threatens the safety of many of our basic beliefs. For instance, due to semantic plasticity of "person", the belief expressed by "I am a person" is not safe. Say that in a close possible world, "person" doesn't pick out me but picks out an object O that overlaps me. Then "I am a person" uttered by me at that world is false as "I" picks out me and "person" picks out O, but I am distinct from O.We have independent reason to believe that many words satisfy SP, and it is central to one of the leading theories of vagueness. Despite this the literature directly engaging with these issues is small and the puzzles have been growing faster than satisfying responses. Hawthorne (2006) presents the problem that SP poses for safety of beliefs involving 'person' and 'true'. Sennet (2012) and Kearns 8 Magidor (2008) argue that SP presents a problem for the epistemicist account of vagueness. Manley (MS) shows that semantic plasticity of moral terms conflicts with intuitions favouring moral realism. Hawthorne and Dorr (2014) argue that SP poses a problem for counterfactual and cross-temporal speech reports. 3 Research Approach The overarching aim of my project will be to work out a conception of semantic plasticity that avoids scepticism about basic beliefs and still allows us to deal with vagueness. In working out this conception, I shall do the following: Chapter 1. Provide an analysis of why there is semantic plasticity. My hypothesis is that semantic plasticity arises also if we don't accept the thesis from Williamson (1994) that meaning supervenes on use of all speakers in the community. I shall also analyse the connection between SP and semantic holism. The most popular argument against semantic holism is that holistic meaning is unstable. My intuition is that the instability of holistic meaning is actually due to SP.Chapter 2. Connect SP and vagueness. SP is said to pose problems for the view of vagueness which preserves classical logic (epistemicism). My hypothesis is that problems arise due to SP will also arise on non-classical treatments of vagueness.Chapter 3. SP and metasemantics. I shall investigate whether reference magnetism can be invoked to stabilise the shiftiness of meaning due to SP in problematic cases. I will investigate the hypothesis that recent developments of the metaphysically deflationary reference magnetism by Williams (forthcoming) make such solutions appealing. I will also connect SP with indeterminacy of translation: my intuition is that some innocently-looking solutions to problems posed by SP (e.g. presented in Hawthorne (2006)) run into problems with indeterminacy of translation.