Understanding individual differences in trait perception and theory of mind

心理理论（Theory of mind, ToM）是一种表征自己和他人心理状态的能力（Premack & Woodruff, 1978）。长期以来，人们一直认为，神经正常的个体拥有一个专门用于这些表征的神经模块，而在自闭症的情况下，这个模块缺失或有缺陷（Baron-Cohen, 2000; Frith, 1994）。然而，自闭症成人的心智理论缺陷已被证明很难通过实验来证明（例如，Dziobek等人，2006;happ<s:1>, 1995），这就对全有或全无的模块化方法提出了质疑。我的项目旨在建立一个由经验数据支持的心理状态推断的综合理论模型。在先前的工作基础上，已经证明了特质判断和心理状态推断之间的关系（Conway et al., 2020），我将进行一系列实验来阐明做出准确的特质判断并将其转化为心理状态推断所涉及的认知过程。有了这个框架，我将确定所提出的心智理论缺陷是否确实存在于自闭症中，如果存在，那么是哪种特定的认知机制构成了它们的基础。同样，我将探讨心理健康状况中的社会认知困难，如抑郁症，检查心理理论缺陷如何解释某些思维模式和由此产生的症状。

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to represent the mental states of oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). It has long been proposed that neurotypical individuals possess a neural module dedicated to these representations, and that this module is missing or defective in the case of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Frith, 1994). However, Theory of Mind deficits in autistic adults have proven difficult to demonstrate experimentally (e.g., Dziobek et al., 2006; Happé, 1995), calling into question the all-or-nothing modular approach. My project seeks to build a comprehensive theoretical model of mental state inference supported by empirical data. Building upon previous work, which has demonstrated a relationship between trait judgements and mental state inferences (Conway et al., 2020), I will conduct a series of experiments to elucidate the cognitive processes involved in making accurate trait judgements and translating them into mental state inferences. With this framework established, I will determine whether proposed Theory of Mind deficits do indeed exist in autism and, if so, which specific cognitive mechanisms underlie them. Similarly, I will explore social-cognitive difficulties in mental health conditions, such as depression, examining how Theory of Mind deficits may explain certain patterns of thinking and resultant symptomology.