Rethinking reality's structure: An investigation of fundamentality and a defence of interdependence

我的论文将批判形而上学的基础主义，发展一种连贯主义的替代方案。基础主义的观点是，现实的基础是最小的可能对象：根本的是不能进一步分割的东西。基础主义主导了西方形而上学的追问。我将探索它的文化偶然性，利用印度哲学的洞察力来发展一种对西方形而上学具有深远影响的基本原理的新描述。传统佛教哲学将“相互依赖”作为根本，优先考虑关系而不是对象。Nagarjua关于形而上学空虚的论证发展了这样一幅图景，其中现实是一个综合的网络，其中基本部分不能被分开。在由此产生的模型中，要么作为一个整体的综合网络必须是基本的(一元论)，要么综合网络是自我依赖的，不需要一个基本的水平(一致性)。我的项目涉及建立一个连贯的相互依赖的描述，借鉴西方和印度的哲学传统来定位和结合最成功的论点：a.形而上学依赖关系的存在。当我们说(例如)时整体依赖于其部分，我们似乎援引了一种因为存在而存在的关系--一种形而上学的依赖关系。在发展Schaffer(2010)的工作时，我会争辩说，这种关系对于任何成功的现实结构模型都是必不可少的。双向依赖关系的可能性。传统观点认为，依赖是不对称的：如果x依赖于y，那么y不依赖于x。Thompson(2018)最近的工作削弱了这一观点，为对称的依赖关系创造了空间。我将发展汤普森的工作，表明我们不仅有双向关系的空间，而且我们应该假定双向关系。缺乏一个基本的层次。我将考虑Bliss(2015)和Tallant(2017)的作品，他们认为无限倒退的痛苦，一定有某种实体是根本的。我将从佛教传统中探索资源来帮助绕过这类争论，以捍卫一种连贯主义的图景，以对抗其一元论竞争。我提出的论点直接建立在我关于相互依存的一元论和连贯主义(区别)的硕士论文基础上。我在亚洲哲学、佛教形而上学和形而上学的本科模块中获得第一名。我将在2020年春季成为亚洲哲学模块的教学成员，诺丁汉的哲学系是这个项目的理想基地。塔兰特教授在独立性和原教旨性方面的专业知识，以及巴克博士对印度形而上学的兴趣，都将使我受益匪浅。

My thesis will critique metaphysical foundationalism, developing a coherentist alternative. Foundationalism is the view that the foundations of reality are the smallest possible objects: what is fundamental is what cannot be divided further. Foundationalism has dominated Western metaphysical enquiry. I will explore its cultural contingency, using insight from Indian philosophy to develop a novel account of fundamentality with far-reaching consequences for Western metaphysics.Traditional Buddhist philosophy takes 'interdependence' to be fundamental, prioritizing relations over objects. Nagarjuna's argument for metaphysical emptiness develops such a picture, where reality is an integrated network within which fundamental parts cannot be separated. On the resulting model, either the integrated network as a whole must be fundamental (monism), or the integrated network is self-dependent, without the need for a fundamental level (coherentism). My project involves developing an account of coherentist interdependence, drawing upon Western and Indian Philosophical traditions to locate and combine the most successful arguments for:a. The existence of a metaphysical dependence relation. When we say (e.g.) that 'the whole depends upon its parts', we appear to invoke a kind of 'exists because of' relation-a metaphysical dependence relation. Developing work by Schaffer (2010), I'll argue that such a relation is essential to any successful model of the structure of reality.b. The possibility of a two-way directional dependence relation. The conventional view is that dependence is asymmetric: if x depends upon y, y does not depend upon x. Recent work by Thompson(2018) undermines this claim, making space for a symmetrical relation of dependence. I will develop Thompson's work, showing not only that we have space for a two-way relation, but that we should posit one.c. The absence of a fundamental level. I'll consider work by Bliss (2015) and Tallant (2017) that argues on pain of infinite regress, some entity must be fundamental. I'll explore resources from the Buddhist tradition to help circumvent arguments of this sort in order to defend a coherentist picture against its monistic rival.My proposed thesis builds directly upon my MA dissertation on interdependent monism and coherentism(Distinction). I achieved firsts in undergraduate modules in Asian philosophy, Buddhist metaphysics and Metametaphysics. I will be a teaching affiliate on a module in Asian philosophy in Spring 2020.Nottingham's Philosophy department is an ideal base for this project. I will greatly benefit from Professor Tallant's expertise in dependence and fundamentality, as well as Dr Barker's interest in Indianmetaphysics.