Counterfactuals, Chance and Ability

能力的概念一直是相当大的哲学关注的焦点。这尤其是因为拥有能力意味着什么的问题与人类是否有自由意志的辩论密切相关：我们是否有能力按照我们选择的方式行事，或者我们是否决心按照我们实际做的事情行事？在这个问题中，短语“能够做到X”的含义和行为一直是哲学关注的主要焦点之一。哲学家和语言学家目前的共识是，“A能够做X”是一种指示性的断言，这取决于特定的动因，也取决于提出这一断言时相关的背景事实。对自由意志的关注有点不合时宜，因为能力概念在形而上学和语言哲学中的许多应用都被忽视了。我的研究旨在调查其中的一些其他联系。我打算探索的第一个联系是与反事实声明的语义学有关，其中涉及“可能”，例如“如果硬币被抛出，它可能会落在地上。”一种关于这类反事实的理论认为，这意味着“这并不是说，如果扔硬币，它就不会落在地上”。起初，这似乎是可以接受的，但这似乎意味着，如果‘可能’反事实是真的，那么双重‘将’反事实就是假的。由于“可能”的说法相当站不住脚，几乎所有“可能”的反事实都是虚假的，这是一个没有吸引力的结果。另一种理论是，这些反事实是认识性的，意思是，就我们所知，如果硬币被抛出，它会落在头上。这一点很好地与其他认知用法‘力量’相吻合。但抛硬币的反事实似乎是真的，因为硬币是这样的，而不是因为我们所知道的！我的另一种建议是，这样的条件句实际上是伪装的能力归属，意思是‘如果掷硬币，它可以(本来能够)击中人头’。我将调查“可能”反事实是如何起作用的，以及支持某些(但不是全部)这样的条件句能力解释的论点：有些最好被理解为认识论。我打算调查的第二个联系是偶然的。许多哲学家已经观察到，机会是一种分级的可能性，但我认为，如果我们将机会与一般的可能性联系起来，而不是与能力联系起来，就可以讲述一个更好的故事。一枚硬币只有在能够落下头的情况下，才有可能落到头上，这似乎是有道理的。我打算调查机会和能力之间的这种看似合理的联系是否经得起仔细的审查。机会取决于人们将机会归因于哪个系统，以及背景假设，这让人非常想起能力归因是如何起作用的，但需要做更多的工作来充实这种联系。许多人争辩说，非微不足道的机会与决定论是不相容的，而这些不相容的论点是关于自由意志的类似论点的变体。在我的研究过程中，我将为一种相容论辩护：即使在决定论下，可以说一枚硬币抛出时可以落下头，因此扔出时有机会落到头上。我打算探索的最后一个联系是能力和责任之间的关系。哈里·法兰克福最近提出的一项论点认为，责任并不要求责任人有可能做其他事情。但这是否会导致进一步的结论，即责任并不要求责任人能够以其他方式行事？这个问题将是我在这一领域研究的重点；我建议不会得出进一步的结论，确保责任与采取其他行动的能力之间的联系。这要求我们能够做不可能做的事情；我打算调查这是否像它最初看起来那样令人不快。

The notion of ability has been the focus of considerable philosophical attention. This is particularly because the question of what it means to have an ability is closely connected to the debate over whether human beings have free will: do we have the ability to act as we choose, or are we determined to act as we in fact do? The meaning and behaviour of the phrase 'is able to do X' in this question has been one of the primary loci of philosophical attention. The current consensus, amongst philosophers and linguists, is that 'A is able to do X' is an indexical claim, dependent on a particular agent, and also dependent on which kinds of background facts are relevant at the time the claim is made. The focus on free will is slightly unfortunate, for many applications of the concept of ability elsewhere in metaphysics and philosophy of language have been overlooked. My research is intended to investigate some of these other connections.The first connection I intend to explore is with the semantics of counterfactual claims involving 'might', like 'If the coin had been tossed, it might have landed heads'. One theory of such counterfactuals suggests that this means 'it is not the case that if the coin had been tossed, it wouldn't have landed heads'. Initially this seems okay, but it appears to follow that if a 'might' counterfactual is true, the dual 'would' counterfactual is false. Since 'might' claims are quite weak, almost all 'would' counterfactuals are false, an unappealing result. The other theory is that these counterfactuals are epistemic, meaning something like 'For all we know, if the coin had been tossed it would have landed heads'. This fits well with other epistemic uses of 'might'. But the coin-tossing counterfactual seems to be true because of how the coin is, not because of what we know! My alternative proposal is that such conditionals are in fact disguised ability ascriptions, meaning 'If the coin had been tossed, it could (would have been able to) land heads'. I will investigate how 'could' counterfactuals work, as well as arguments in favour of the ability interpretation of some, but not all, such conditionals: some are best understood as epistemic.The second connection I intend to investigate is with chance. Many philosophers have observed that chance is a kind of graded possibility, but I think that a better story can be told if we connect chance, not to possibility in general, but to ability. It seems plausible that a coin has some chance of landing heads if, and only if, it is able to land heads. I intend to investigate whether this plausible connection between chance and ability withstands scrutiny. The ways that chances depend on which system one ascribes the chances to, and on background assumptions, are very reminiscent of how ability ascriptions work, but more needs to be done to flesh out the connection. Many have argued that non-trivial chances are incompatible with determinism, and these incompatibilist arguments are variants on similar arguments with respect to free will. In the course of my research I will defend a kind of compatibilism: even under determinism, it can be true to say of a coin that it is able to land heads if tossed, and thus it has a chance of landing heads if tossed.The last connection I intend to explore is the relationship between ability and responsibility. A recent argument due to Harry Frankfurt argues that responsibility does not require that it be POSSIBLE that those responsible do otherwise than they did. But does this lead to the further conclusion that responsibility does not require that those responsible be ABLE to do otherwise? This question will be the focus of my research in this area; I propose that the further conclusion does not follow, securing the connection between responsibility and the ability to do otherwise. This requires that we be able to do that which is impossible; I intend to investigate whether this is as unpalatable as it first appears.