Methods and models to combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain

打击假冒伪劣产品向供应链渗透的方法和模式近年来，假冒伪劣产品（即，有缺陷的）商品和食品导致死亡、产品故障和重大产品召回。我的研究计划的目标是使用运筹学方法来帮助决策者在打击供应链中的产品质量下降。为此，我将开发三个相关的研究流，涉及优化，区块链技术采用的合作游戏方法，以及人群报告的激励机制设计。 首先，我考虑中间人的问题，例如，医院或零售商。中介可以通过从信誉良好的主要来源购买任何数量的100%可靠的货物来补充其库存，例如，真正的制造商。如果无法获得主要来源，也没有其他信誉良好的主要来源，中介机构是应该放弃业务，还是转向其他供应商，并面临收到假冒产品的风险？中间人将具有关于由替代供应商供应的产品中的假冒商品的分数的先验信念。中间商的问题包括测试以获得进一步的信息，如果有必要，决定从替代供应商订购多少单位。 我的第二个目标是使用博弈论来激励食品供应链中区块链技术的全系统采用。区块链的适应性提高了企业的食品可追溯性，并为消费者提高了供应链的透明度。对于这个项目，我解决以下五个主要问题。(i)随着越来越多的公司采用区块链技术，整个供应链的利润能否增加？(ii)哪一家公司在采用区块链技术增加整个供应链利润方面发挥着最重要的作用？(iii)区块链技术的采用如何影响食品供应链中的需求以及批发定价和订单决策？(iv)全系统采用区块链技术所产生的总利润如何在三家公司之间公平分配？(v)如果我们使用合作博弈的方法来分配总利润，那么在没有公司采用区块链技术的情况下，哪家公司获得的利润增量最大？作为我的最终目标，我将考虑将“跟踪和追踪”等防伪技术与实施延期付款计划相结合。然后，我将联合收割机与群众举报相结合，以了解在什么情况下检查机制比群众举报更可取，以及在线声誉论坛是否可以取代传统的检查机制。我相信我提出的研究项目将有助于打击假货和掺假产品渗透到供应链中，并最终使加拿大消费者受益。

Methods and models to combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain In recent years the proliferation of fake and adulterated (i.e., defective) goods and food products has resulted in deaths, product failures and major product recalls. The objective of my research program is to use operations research methodology to help decision makers in combatting the degradation of the product quality in supply chains. To that end, I will develop three related streams of research involving optimization, cooperative game approach to blockchain technology adoption, and incentive mechanism design with crowd reporting. First, I consider the problem of an intermediary, e.g., a hospital or a retailer. The intermediary can replenish its inventory by purchasing 100% reliable goods in any amount from a reputable primary source, e.g., a genuine manufacturer. If the primary source becomes unavailable and there is no other reputable primary source, should the intermediary forgo its business, or turn to an alternate supplier and face the risk of receiving counterfeit products? The intermediary would have a prior belief about the fraction of counterfeit goods in the products supplied by the alternate supplier. The intermediary's problem involves testing to gain further information and, if warranted, deciding on how many units to order from the alternate supplier. My second objective involves using game theory to incentivize the system-wide adoption of blockchain technology in a food supply chain. Blockchain adaption raises food traceability for firms and improves supply chain transparency for consumers. For this project, I address the following five major questions. (i) Can the supply chain-wide profit increase as more firms adopt the blockchain technology? (ii) Which firm plays the most important role in the supply chain-wide profit increase with the adoption of blockchain technology? (iii) How does the adoption of blockchain technology impact the demand as well as the wholesale pricing and order decisions in the food supply chain? (iv) How is the total profit resulting from the system-wide adoption of blockchain technology fairly allocated among the three firms? (v) Which firm obtains the largest increment above his profit when no firm adopts the blockchain technology, if we use a cooperative game approach to allocate the total profit? As my final objective, I will consider combining anti-counterfeit technologies such as "Track and Trace," with implementing deferred payment programs. I will then combine the deferred payment programs with crowd reporting to learn under what conditions would an inspection mechanism be preferable to crowd reporting, and if the online reputation forums can replace traditional inspection mechanisms. I believe the research projects I am proposing will help combat infiltration of fakes and adulterated products into the supply chain, and ultimately, will benefit the Canadian consumers.