Electoral Accountability

选举责任

• 批准号: 8700468
• 负责人: David Austen-Smith
• 金额: $ 7.93万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1987
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1987-07-15 至 1990-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8700468&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Electoral; Accountability

Previous research on coalition formation in legislatures has focused on general hypotheses to derive predictions concerning which parties would agree to form a government. This generality implies a lack of uniqueness in the predictions, inhibiting their use as a basis for studying the preceding stage of interaction, namely that of actual election of the parties to the legislature. The goal of this research is to develop a model applicable to all types of coalition governments regardless of differing institutional arrangements (e.g. which party initially attempts to form a government) that structure the process of government formation. This project has as its motivation a deeper understanding of the institutional structures within which coalition governments form. These institutional structures typically generate strategic possibilities for the parties in terms of the proposals and concessions to make to other parties, on policy, cabinet portfolios, and so on. By employing the techniques of non-cooperative game theory, the investigators will generate predictions of coalition formation and legislative outcomes as a function of the institutional rule in place, thereby allowing for the comparison of the effects of different structures. These techniques will also allow the investigators to "roll-back" the analysis to the electoral stage, where the voters will be modeled with specific predictions of what will happen if they vote one way or another. In this way the investigators hope to unify the study of electoral competition and coalition formation in multi-party systems of government. Recent advances in non-cooperative game theory permit the development of these more sophisticated models. One of these advances has been toward relaxing the informational assumptions of previous work and allowing some participants to possess information that is both valuable, in that it effects payoffs to other participants, and private, in that no one else has it. The knowledge of exactly what it would take to convince another party to agree to a government is an example of such information. Incorporating these advanced techniques will result in a model that is both rich in strategic possibilities for the participants, and more realistic than its predecessors. This will enhance the theoretical unification of elections and coalition formation described above, and lead to a better comprehension of the motivations and behavior of participants in this type of political setting.

以前关于立法机构联盟形成的研究集中在 关于一般假设，以得出关于哪些缔约方的预测 会同意组建政府 这种普遍性意味着缺乏 在预测的独特性，抑制他们的使用作为基础， 研究相互作用的前一阶段，即实际的 选举政党进入立法机关。 本研究的目的 是建立一个适用于所有类型的联合政府的模型 不论不同的体制安排（例如， 最初试图组建一个政府）， 政府的形成。 该项目的动机是更深入地了解 联合政府形成的体制结构。 这些制度结构通常会产生战略性的 各方在提案和让步方面的可能性 在政策、内阁组合等方面向其他政党提出建议。 运用非合作博弈论的技术， 调查人员将预测联盟的形成， 立法成果是现行体制规则的一个功能， 从而允许比较不同的 结构. 这些技术还将使研究人员能够 将分析“回滚”到选举阶段，选民将 如果他们投票， 无论如何 调查人员希望通过这种方式统一 多党选举竞争与联盟形成研究 政府系统。 非合作博弈论的最新进展允许发展 这些更复杂的模型。 其中一个进步是 放松以前工作的信息假设， 允许一些参与者拥有信息， 有价值的，因为它会影响其他参与者的收益， 私人的，在没有其他人拥有它。知识的确切内容，它 要说服另一个政党同意组建政府， 这类信息的例子。 学习这些先进的技术 将产生一种既有丰富的战略可能性， 参与者，比它的前辈更现实。 这将 加强选举与联合的理论统一 以上所述的形成，并导致更好的理解 这种政治参与者的动机和行为 设置.