Informational Lobbying, Legislative Institutions and Campaign Contributions

9409153 austin - smith这项研究是为了继续调查利益集团的信息作用及其与政策过程中竞选捐款的关系。在研究的最初阶段，研究者开发了一个框架，明确地将竞选捐款和游说结合起来，从信息的角度考虑。其关键思想是，游说主要是一种信息活动。立法者必须对他们通常知之甚少的问题做出决定（设定议程、投票等等）。然而，利益集团往往对特定立法对其特定利益的影响了如指掌；因此，立法者希望通过听取游说者的意见来了解情况。该框架的一个主要含义是，竞选捐款本身并不构成足够的奖励，使立法者允许接触希望通过提供重要信息来影响立法者决定的群体。原因在于，立法者有动机倾听那些与他或她的政策偏好相同的群体的意见，而不管他们可能给了多少钱。这一发现表明，金钱和获得机会之间的关系是间接的。团体不是通过“购买”途径，而是向政策偏好反映他们自己的候选人提供资金，这样，由此产生的立法机构将由立法者组成，这些立法者将根据信息的理由寻找他们，而不管是否有竞选捐款。从这个角度来看，问题涉及团体如何决定向谁捐款以及竞选支出如何影响选民的投票行为。将进行的研究涉及这两个问题，重点是捐款的（间接）机会动机和竞选支出的广告作用。

9409153 Austen-Smith This research is to continue the investigation on the informational role of interest groups and its connection to the giving of campaign contributions on the policy process. During the initial stages of the research, the investigator developed a framework that explicitly integrates both campaign contributions and lobbying, considered in informational terms. The key idea is that lobbying is predominantly an informational activity. Legislators have to make decisions (set agendas, vote, and so forth) on issues about which they often know relatively little. Interest groups, however, are frequently well-informed about the consequences of particular legislation for their particular interests; consequently, legislators would like to become informed by listening to lobbyists. A principal implication of the framework was that campaign contributions per se do not constitute sufficient incentives for a legislator to grant access to a group that wishes to influence the legislator's decision by providing salient information. The reason is that the legislator has an incentive to listen to those groups who share his or her policy preferences, irrespective of any monies they may have given. This finding suggests the correlation between money and access is indirect. Rather than "buy" access, groups give money to candidates whose policy preferences reflect their own so that the resulting legislature will consist of legislators who will seek them out on informational grounds, irrespective of any campaign contributions. From this perspective, the issues then concern how groups decide to whom to contribute and how campaign expenditures influence voting behavior within the electorate. The research to be undertaken addresses both of these concerns, focusing on the (indirect) access motivation for contributing and on the advertising role of campaign expenditures.