Informational Lobbying, Legislative Institutions and Campaign Contributions

信息游说、立法机构和竞选捐款

• 批准号: 9409153
• 负责人: David Austen-Smith
• 金额: $ 3.48万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-07-01 至 1995-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9409153&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Informational; Lobbying; Legislative; Institutions; Campaign

9409153 Austen-Smith This research is to continue the investigation on the informational role of interest groups and its connection to the giving of campaign contributions on the policy process. During the initial stages of the research, the investigator developed a framework that explicitly integrates both campaign contributions and lobbying, considered in informational terms. The key idea is that lobbying is predominantly an informational activity. Legislators have to make decisions (set agendas, vote, and so forth) on issues about which they often know relatively little. Interest groups, however, are frequently well-informed about the consequences of particular legislation for their particular interests; consequently, legislators would like to become informed by listening to lobbyists. A principal implication of the framework was that campaign contributions per se do not constitute sufficient incentives for a legislator to grant access to a group that wishes to influence the legislator's decision by providing salient information. The reason is that the legislator has an incentive to listen to those groups who share his or her policy preferences, irrespective of any monies they may have given. This finding suggests the correlation between money and access is indirect. Rather than "buy" access, groups give money to candidates whose policy preferences reflect their own so that the resulting legislature will consist of legislators who will seek them out on informational grounds, irrespective of any campaign contributions. From this perspective, the issues then concern how groups decide to whom to contribute and how campaign expenditures influence voting behavior within the electorate. The research to be undertaken addresses both of these concerns, focusing on the (indirect) access motivation for contributing and on the advertising role of campaign expenditures.

小行星9409153 本研究旨在继续探讨利益集团的信息作用及其与政治献金的关系。 在研究的初始阶段，研究人员开发了一个框架，明确整合了竞选捐款和游说，考虑在信息方面。 关键的想法是，游说主要是一种信息活动。 立法者必须对他们通常知之甚少的问题做出决定（制定议程、投票等）。 然而，利益集团往往对特定立法对其特定利益的影响了如指掌;因此，立法者希望通过倾听游说者的意见来了解情况。 该框架的一个主要含义是，竞选捐款本身并不构成足够的激励措施，使立法者能够向希望通过提供重要信息来影响立法者决定的团体提供信息。 原因是立法者有动机听取那些与他或她有相同政策偏好的团体的意见，而不管他们可能提供了多少资金。 这一发现表明，金钱和访问之间的相关性是间接的。 团体不是“购买”进入，而是向那些政策偏好反映自己的候选人提供资金，这样产生的立法机构将由立法者组成，他们将以信息为基础寻找他们，而不管是否有任何竞选捐款。 从这个角度来看，问题则涉及团体如何决定向谁捐款，以及竞选支出如何影响选民的投票行为。 将要进行的研究解决了这两个问题，重点是捐款的（间接）获取动机和竞选支出的广告作用。