Influence and Information Acquisition through Experiments

通过实验影响力和信息获取

• 批准号: 9804877
• 负责人: David Austen-Smith
• 金额: $ 5.3万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1998
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1998-07-01 至 1999-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9804877&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Influence; Information; Acquisition; through; Experiments

This research explores how information held by experts is conveyed to non-experts. The problem with such information transmission, however, is that the experts have powerful incentives to provide biased information to non-experts. Building on signaling models in game theory, this research looks at two related topics. In the first, the tradeoff between costly and costless signaling, when both types of signals are available, is investigated. In the second topic, given that the non-expert may be skeptical of an expert's advice, the types of information that can strategically be sent by the expert in order to win over the non-expert are investigated. The proposed research is theoretically motivated and relies exclusively on developing formal models of strategic behavior. There are a wide variety of potential applications for this research, including the interactions between lobbyists and legislators or pharmaceutical industries giving evidence to the FDA.

本研究探讨了专家持有的信息如何传达给非专家。然而，这种信息传递的问题在于，专家有强大的动机向非专家提供有偏见的信息。基于博弈论中的信号模型，本研究着眼于两个相关主题。首先，当两种类型的信号都可用时，研究了昂贵和无成本信号之间的权衡。在第二个主题中，考虑到非专家可能对专家的建议持怀疑态度，研究了专家为了赢得非专家的支持而可以战略性地发送的信息类型。拟议的研究是由理论驱动的，并且完全依赖于发展战略行为的正式模型。这项研究有各种各样的潜在应用，包括游说者和立法者之间的互动，或制药行业向FDA提供证据。