Influence and Information Acquisition through Experiments

这项研究探讨了专家掌握的信息是如何传递给非专家的。然而，这种信息传递的问题是，专家有强大的动机向非专家提供有偏见的信息。基于博弈论中的信号模型，这项研究着眼于两个相关的主题。首先，研究了当两种类型的信号都可用时，昂贵和廉价信令之间的权衡。在第二个专题中，考虑到非专家可能对专家的建议持怀疑态度，调查了专家为了赢得非专家的支持而可以战略性地发送的信息类型。拟议的研究是有理论动机的，完全依赖于开发战略行为的正式模型。这项研究有广泛的潜在应用，包括游说者和立法者之间的互动，或者向FDA提供证据的制药行业之间的互动。

This research explores how information held by experts is conveyed to non-experts. The problem with such information transmission, however, is that the experts have powerful incentives to provide biased information to non-experts. Building on signaling models in game theory, this research looks at two related topics. In the first, the tradeoff between costly and costless signaling, when both types of signals are available, is investigated. In the second topic, given that the non-expert may be skeptical of an expert's advice, the types of information that can strategically be sent by the expert in order to win over the non-expert are investigated. The proposed research is theoretically motivated and relies exclusively on developing formal models of strategic behavior. There are a wide variety of potential applications for this research, including the interactions between lobbyists and legislators or pharmaceutical industries giving evidence to the FDA.