Deliberation and Voting in Committees

委员会的审议和投票

• 批准号: 0505818
• 负责人: David Austen-Smith
• 金额: $ 11.54万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-07-15 至 2007-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0505818&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Deliberation; Voting; Committees

Over the last ten years a large literature has developed looking at the implications of asymmetric information and strategic voting in simple models of elections. Up to now the central questions have focused on the manner in which different electoral rules aggregate information or contribute to an incentive to abstain from voting. However, the question of how voters come to be asymmetrically informed has been largely unexplored. Of particular interest, particularly in the context of small committees is the question of the effects of communication among voters prior to voting, i.e. deliberation. Strategic communication prior to voting creates an additional level of complexity in that voters must be concerned not only about the circumstances under which their vote is pivotal, but also about the circumstances under which their public statements are pivotal. Incorporating both sorts of consideration in turn leads to a need for committee members to be sensitive to interactions between voting and speaking. The PIs will explore such interactions between deliberation and voting using strategic (game-theoretic) models of communication with incomplete information. The research will identify institutional arrangements regarding voting (for instance, using majority or unanimity voting) and debate (for instance, how committee decisions and deliberation are affected by the order in which individuals speak or the constraints on what can be said) that best promote informed and efficient communication and collective decision-making. Communication and debate are considered important aspects of collective choice, both at the committee and the electoral level, yet implications for the character of debate and collective decisions of alternative institutional arrangements for communication and voting are very little understood. Results from the project should improve our understanding of the issues and thus inform substantive discussions on the role of deliberation in collective choice.

在过去的十年里，大量的文献已经发展起来，在简单的选举模型中，不对称信息和战略投票的影响。到目前为止，核心问题集中在不同的选举规则如何汇总信息或促进弃权的激励。然而，选民如何获得不对称信息的问题在很大程度上尚未得到探讨。特别令人感兴趣的是，特别是在小型委员会的情况下，投票前选民之间的沟通，即审议的影响问题。投票前的战略沟通增加了复杂性，因为选民不仅要关心他们投票的关键情况，还要关心他们的公开声明的关键情况。这两种考虑反过来又导致委员会成员需要对投票和发言之间的相互作用保持敏感。PI将使用不完全信息沟通的战略（博弈论）模型来探索审议和投票之间的互动。 这项研究将确定有关投票（例如，使用多数或共同投票）和辩论（例如，委员会的决定和审议如何受到个人发言顺序或对发言内容的限制的影响）的制度安排，这些安排最能促进知情和有效的沟通和集体决策。 沟通和辩论被认为是集体选择的重要方面，无论是在委员会还是在选举一级，但沟通和投票的替代体制安排对辩论和集体决定的性质的影响却知之甚少。 该项目的成果应能增进我们对这些问题的理解，从而为关于审议在集体选择中的作用的实质性讨论提供信息。