Debate and Explanation in Political Decision Making

政治决策中的争论与解释

• 批准号: 9103651
• 负责人: David Austen-Smith
• 金额: $ 4.04万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1991
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1991-08-01 至 1994-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9103651&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Debate; Explanation; Political; Decision; Making

Political talk, whether in elections campaigns, legislative debates, public meetings, or elsewhere, is vital to the political process. Yet very little is understood about the circumstances under which talk affects political outcomes. This research will develop game theoretic models which explore the role of debate and explanation in political decision making. Specifically, the project will examine talk in two circumstances: within legislatures and committees as members debate policy choices, and during elections as legislators attempt to explain and defend their actions to constituents. The principal analytic tool used will be the theory of games with incomplete information -- specifically games involving costless signals or communication. This is because political talk is frequently cheap. It is easy for individuals to make claims that are not true and are know to be untrue. This feature generates a fundamental credibility problem that lies at the heart of cheap talk models. When completed this project will help us better understand the impact of political communication on political outcomes.

政治谈话，无论是在竞选活动中， 辩论、公开会议或其他地方，对政治至关重要。 过程然而，人们对当时的情况知之甚少， 在这种情况下，谈话会影响政治结果。 这项研究将 发展博弈论模型，探讨辩论的作用， 政治决策中的解释。 具体而言是 该项目将研究两种情况下的谈话：在立法机构内 和委员会作为成员讨论政策选择， 作为立法者试图解释和捍卫他们的选举， 对选民的行动。 主要的分析工具将是博弈论， 不完全信息--特别是涉及无成本的博弈 信号或通信。这是因为政治言论是 经常很便宜。个人很容易声称， 都不是真的，也知道是假的。 此功能生成一个 根本的信誉问题，在于廉价的核心 谈论模特。 当完成这个项目将有助于我们更好地了解 政治沟通对政治结果的影响。