Debate and Explanation in Political Decision Making

无论是在竞选活动、立法辩论、公开会议或其他地方，政治对话对政治进程都是至关重要的。然而，人们对谈话在何种情况下会影响政治结果知之甚少。本研究将开发博弈论模型，探索辩论和解释在政治决策中的作用。具体地说，该项目将在两种情况下审查谈话：在立法机构和委员会内，当议员就政策选择进行辩论时，以及在选举期间，立法者试图向选民解释和辩护他们的行为。使用的主要分析工具将是不完全信息博弈理论--特别是涉及无成本信号或通信的博弈。这是因为政治谈话往往是廉价的。对于个人来说，很容易做出不真实的声明，也很容易被认为是不真实的。这一功能产生了一个根本性的可信度问题，这是廉价谈话模型的核心。该项目完成后，将帮助我们更好地了解政治沟通对政治结果的影响。

Political talk, whether in elections campaigns, legislative debates, public meetings, or elsewhere, is vital to the political process. Yet very little is understood about the circumstances under which talk affects political outcomes. This research will develop game theoretic models which explore the role of debate and explanation in political decision making. Specifically, the project will examine talk in two circumstances: within legislatures and committees as members debate policy choices, and during elections as legislators attempt to explain and defend their actions to constituents. The principal analytic tool used will be the theory of games with incomplete information -- specifically games involving costless signals or communication. This is because political talk is frequently cheap. It is easy for individuals to make claims that are not true and are know to be untrue. This feature generates a fundamental credibility problem that lies at the heart of cheap talk models. When completed this project will help us better understand the impact of political communication on political outcomes.