Economic Analysis and Information in a Dynamic Setting

现在人们普遍认识到，信息的获取在 在真实的世界经济中以及在理论经济学中 分析。 这个项目研究消费者和公司的实验 不同的决定，以获得更好的信息， 决策 例如，企业将选择高于或低于 他们认为是利润最大化，以测试和提高他们的 关于市场的信息。 这种类型的实验是广泛的 这一点已经被观察到，但现有的经济理论还没有充分解释。 这个项目将有助于提高我们对实验的理解， 消费者和生产者通过制定信息的一般模型 通过实验和对比分析， 静力学和这些模型的解的存在性。 具体来说，该项目研究了一个最大化的消费者谁选择 输出以获得当前效用和更好的信息， 未来的决定。 初步结果显示，消费与 实验将大于近视的最佳水平， 消费 但这些结果依赖于非常严格的假设 消费者的不确定性。 该项目放宽了这些假设， 为了找到更普遍和现实的结果， 有趣的特例 该项目涉及的进入模式，其中现任公司有 比潜在进入者更多的信息。 秘书处的初步工作 调查表明，现任公司可以阻止新的 通过生产超过最大化电流的输出来进入 利润 即使潜在的进入者知道， 现有的公司正试图通过其定价来说服他们， 产出政策，该行业的利润低于实际 是. 这些进入模型假设潜在进入者选择 进或不进。 该项目分析了更为复杂的，但也 更现实的情况下，潜在的进入者可以测试 市场由产量决定。

It is now widely recognized that the acquisition of information plays a key role in real world economies as well as in theoretical economic analyses. This project studies experimentation by consumers and firms with different decisions to acquire better information for future decisions. For example, firms will choose output levels above or below what they think is profit maximizing in order to test and improve their information about the market. This type of experimentation is widely observed but is not adequately explained by existing economic theory. This project will help improve our understanding of experimentation by consumers and by producers by formulating general models of information acquisition through experimentation and analyzing the comparative statics and the existence of solutions to these models. Specifically, the project studies a maximizing consumer who chooses output to get both present utility and better information for making future decisions. Preliminary results show that consumption with experimentation will be greater than myopically optimal levels of consumption. But these results depend on very restrictive assumptions about consumer uncertainty. This project relaxes these assumptions in order to find more general and realistic results and to examine interesting special cases. The project deals with models of entry in which the incumbent firm has more information than potential entrants. Preliminary work by the investigator demonstrates that the incumbent firm can discourage new entrants by producing more than the output that maximizes current profits. This result holds even when the potential entrants know that the incumbent firm is trying to persuade them through its pricing and output policies that the industry is less profitable than it actually is. These entry models assume that potential entrants choose either to enter or not. This project analyzes the much more complicated but also more realistic situation in which potential entrants can test the market by output decisions.