Experiments on Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games (REU Supplement)

实验室实验，如本项目中的实验， 检验和丰富经济理论。 本项目采用实验室 实验来检验均衡选择的问题， 协调博弈 这些游戏的特点是 存在多个可排序的均衡。 在这些 在博弈中，当所有参与者都更好时， 相对于另一种平衡， 明确协调他们的战略，以实现他们的首选目标， 结果。 该项目探讨了协调失败是否 出现，并提供了一个因素， 增加了这种失败的可能性。 会审查 不同机制的能力，例如，沟通与预演 经验，以减轻这些失败。 该项目还 考虑协调博弈的经济应用， 研究产品市场中的双重道德风险问题。 经济学理论表明，协调失败可能是一种 宏观经济不稳定和微观经济不稳定的主要因素 市场不完善。 该项目将提供一些 第一个经验证据的存在和意义， 在受控实验室环境中的协调失败。 这个项目在方法上也很重要，因为它测试了 广泛使用的博弈论概念，如机制， 发挥沟通作用。 初步结果表明， 赛前沟通机制实验失败 试验.

Laboratory experiments, such as the experiments in this project, test and enrich economic theory. This project uses laboratory experiments to examine questions of equilibrium selection in coordination games. These games are characterized by the existence of multiple equilibria which are rankable. In these games, coordination failures occur when all players are better off in one equilibrium relative to another yet may be unable to explicitly coordinate their strategies to achieve the preferred outcome. The project explores whether coordination failures arise and provides a characterization of the factors which increase the likelihood of such failures. It examines the ability of different mechanisms, e.g., communication and pre-play experience, to attenuate these failures. The project also considers an economic application of a coordination game by examining a double moral hazard problem in product markets. Economic theory suggests that coordination failure could be a major factor in macroeconomic instability and microeconomic market imperfections. This project will provide some of the first empirical evidence of the existence and significance of coordination failures in a controlled laboratory environment. This project is also methodologically important because it tests widely used game-theoretic concepts such as mechanisms for pre- play communication. Preliminary results suggest that a plausible pre-play communication mechanism fails laboratory experimental tests.