Adaptive Behavior and Cooperation in Experimental Coordination Games

实验协调博弈中的适应性行为与合作

• 批准号: 9013110
• 负责人: Robert Forsythe
• 金额: $ 2.4万
• 依托单位: University of Iowa
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1990
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1990-08-01 至 1993-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9013110&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Adaptive; Behavior; Cooperation; Experimental; Coordination

This project continues to study coordination problems in experimental games. It evaluates alternative theories of adaptive behavior by studying the times series of past experiments on coordination games and through the design of new games. It examines the ability of evolutionary stability and the genetic algorithm as well as individual learning models to explain the dynamics of play. The project also studies the foundations of cooperation which pervade much of the prior work on experimental coordination games. This research has made and will continue to make an important contribution to economics. Coordination games of the type studied in this project have been used to test theories about underemployment equilibria in macroeconoimcs. In industrial organization coordination problems occur in such areas of research as standardization, the entry of new firms into an oligopolistic industry, multi-agent incentive problems and network externalities. The controlled laboratory experiments in this project provide one of the only ways of testing the wide variety of selection and refinement criteria used by game theorists.

该项目继续研究实验游戏中的协调问题。 它通过研究过去协调游戏实验的时间序列和新游戏的设计来评估适应性行为的替代理论。 它检查了进化稳定性和遗传算法以及个体学习模型来解释游戏动态的能力。 该项目还研究了合作的基础，这些基础贯穿于之前的实验性协调游戏的大部分工作中。 这项研究已经并将继续对经济学做出重要贡献。 本项目研究的协调博弈类型已被用来检验宏观经济学中就业不足均衡的理论。 在产业组织中，协调问题出现在标准化、新企业进入寡头垄断行业、多主体激励问题和网络外部性等研究领域。 该项目中的受控实验室实验提供了测试博弈论学家使用的各种选择和细化标准的唯一方法之一。