Equilibrium with Bounded Rationality in Economic Games

经济博弈中的有限理性均衡

• 批准号: 9617784
• 负责人: Simon Anderson
• 金额: $ 22.1万
• 依托单位: University of Virginia Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1997-04-15 至 2002-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9617784&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Equilibrium; Bounded; Rationality; Economic; Games

PROJECT ABSTRACT Modern economic theory is built on the assumption that all economic agents are completely rational, meaning that they always know what is best for them and never make mistakes. Observed behavior however, is noisy and cannot be predicted precisely. Small amounts of randomness at the individual level may have a large effect on economic outcomes when people interact. This project develops a realistic model of error-prone decision making that is used to explain a number of discrepancies between observed human behavior and the predictions of standard economic analysis. This approach is used to evaluate alternative types of auctions and other mechanisms for coordinating the activities of buyers and sellers. Other applications include charitable contributions to public causes, strategic bargaining, and intra-industry competition. In each case, data from laboratory experiments with human subjects are used to refine our approach.

现代经济学理论建立在这样一个假设之上：所有的经济主体都是完全理性的，也就是说，他们总是知道什么对他们最好，而且从不犯错。 然而，观察到的行为是嘈杂的，无法精确预测。 当人们互动时，个体层面的少量随机性可能会对经济结果产生巨大影响。该项目开发了一个易于出错的决策的现实模型，用于解释观察到的人类行为与标准经济分析预测之间的差异。 这种办法用于评价其他类型的拍卖和协调买卖双方活动的其他机制。其他应用包括对公共事业的慈善捐款，战略谈判和行业内竞争。 在每种情况下，来自人类受试者的实验室实验的数据都被用来改进我们的方法。