Advertising Themes

广告主题

• 批准号: 0752923
• 负责人: Simon Anderson
• 金额: $ 11.6万
• 依托单位: University of Virginia Main Campus
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-06-01 至 2013-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0752923&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Advertising; Themes

This research broadens the base of economic models of advertising in three directions (described below), leading to a closer integration between the fields of Economics and Marketing. The first part of the project is sub-titled "Advertising Attributes." This part traces the implications of assuming that advertising may enhance consumer valuation of product attributes. Under this approach, when a firm advertises an attribute (or "characteristic") of its product, this also raises the perceived quality of other rival products that have the attribute. This means that there can be positive spill-overs in advertising - a "Raise-all-boats" effect - for products with similar attributes. There are also the more traditional spill-overs from business stealing that come from advertising for products with dissimilar attributes. The extent to which advertising emphasizes attributes (and the matrix of product attributes in products) determines the net pattern of spill-overs. If advertising can be focused on particular attributes, then at most one firm will advertise any given attribute. The second part of the project contributes to the "Economics of Attention." It addresses the problem that advertisers face of breaking through advertising clutter caused by other advertisers. The upshot can be a situation where firms must advertise heavily because others are doing so: they are "Shouting to be heard." However, the same market parameters can also be consistent with a much lower volume of advertising, and a broader range of message senders. In this context, an information intermediary (such as a television broadcaster) has an incentive to encourage a large volume of messages: a higher price yields less clutter (benefiting both ad recipients and even senders) but less profit to the intermediary. One result from the analysis of competitive pricing of information access is that a tax can be optimal to curtail excess message breadth and depth. This prescription needs to be adjusted if there is market competition among message senders within the same industry. Such competition can give equilibria with price dispersion and inter-industry spillovers (across the equilibrium price distributions) in competing for attention.The third part, "Advertising: the Persuasion Game," frames the classic quality disclosure game squarely as a model of advertising - and so expands the rather limited stable of economic models of advertising - by introducing price and horizontal characteristics into the marketing decision. Two versions of the framework are considered, corresponding to different consumer behavior in different industries. If the consumer's product expectations are formed in advance of her visiting the store (as with headache medicine, for example), the corresponding "experience good" version of the model indicates that a larger degree of horizontal information should be imparted by low-quality firms. For a "search good," the consumer finds out about crucial dimensions only after visiting (for example, with airlines, the consumer must go to the web-site or telephone to find out when the flights leave). This analysis is more elaborate, and includes the decision of advertising price. It is shown that price is less likely to be advertised by high-quality firms. Data from ads for airlines and analgesics ads on TV are analyzed to test conclusions drawn from the theoretical models.

这项研究在三个方向上拓宽了广告经济模型的基础（如下所述），从而实现了经济学和营销领域之间的更紧密结合。 该项目的第一部分的副标题是“广告属性”。这部分追溯了假设广告可以提高消费者对产品属性的评价的含义。在这种方法下，当一家公司宣传其产品的属性（或“特性”）时，这也会提高具有该属性的其他竞争对手产品的感知质量。这意味着对于具有相似属性的产品，广告可以产生积极的溢出效应，即“举手投足”效应。还有一些更传统的商业盗窃溢出效应，这些溢出效应来自于为具有不同属性的产品做广告。广告强调属性（以及产品中的产品属性矩阵）的程度决定了溢出的净模式。如果广告可以集中于特定属性，那么最多有一家公司会对任何给定属性进行广告。该项目的第二部分致力于“注意力经济学”。 它解决了广告商面临的突破其他广告商造成的广告混乱的问题。结果可能是公司必须大力做广告，因为其他公司也在这样做：他们“大声喊叫，希望被听到”。然而，相同的市场参数也可以与低得多的广告量和更广泛的消息发送者保持一致。在这种情况下，信息中介（例如电视广播公司）有动机鼓励大量消息：较高的价格会减少混乱（对广告接收者甚至发送者都有好处），但中介的利润会减少。对信息访问的竞争性定价进行分析的结果之一是，税收可能是限制过多信息广度和深度的最佳选择。如果同行业内的消息发送者之间存在市场竞争，则需要调整该规定。这种竞争可以在争夺注意力的过程中实现价格分散和行业间溢出（跨越均衡价格分布）的平衡。第三部分“广告：说服游戏”将经典的质量披露游戏直接构建为广告模型，从而通过将价格和横向特征引入营销决策来扩展广告经济模型的相当有限的稳定性。考虑了两个版本的框架，对应于不同行业的不同消费者行为。如果消费者的产品期望是在她访问商店之前形成的（例如，头痛药），则模型的相应“体验良好”版本表明，较大程度的横向信息应该由低质量的公司传递。对于“搜索商品”，消费者只有在访问后才能了解关键维度（例如，对于航空公司，消费者必须访问网站或电话了解航班何时起飞）。这个分析更加详细，包括广告价格的决定。结果表明，优质公司不太可能宣传价格。 对航空公司广告和电视镇痛药广告的数据进行分析，以检验理论模型得出的结论。