Efficient and Reliable Competitive Market for Electric Power: Integrating Electrical Engineering and Experimental Economics

ECS-9732845托马斯 该项目旨在解决电力工业结构调整所产生的具体经济和工程问题。 特别令人感兴趣的是那些与引进竞争性发电市场有关的问题。 我们注意到，存在与电力供应相关联的独特物理方面（例如，供应和需求的瞬时匹配、并行传输路线的意外拥塞以及响应于干扰的系统稳定性的维持）。 其他因素包括本地市场力量的前景。 由于可靠电力供应的这些和其他方面，通过多年经验为其他商品发展起来的有效市场和拍卖结构的传统理论如果不加改变地应用于电力市场，可能是没有效率的。 相反，目前为中央计划制度制定的公用事业运营规则在竞争环境中提供经济有效或可靠的运营做法方面可能并不理想。 本研究的目标是确定理想的经济市场机制与传统公用事业运营实践之间的新平衡，为消费者提供廉价能源并保持系统稳定性。 我们建议开发和使用联合收割机结合人类主体行为和电力系统行为的电力网络沿着计算机模拟和实验室市场。 该研究小组由理论和实验经济学家和电力/控制系统工程师组成，他们唯一有资格解决市场结构，拍卖机制和规则的问题，以及继续使用计算机程序的可行性，如大规模最优潮流模型（OPF），机组承诺（UC）和安全约束调度，这些程序在历史上一直用于指导运营。

ECS-9732845 Thomas This project is designed to settle specific economic and engineering questions arising from the restructuring of the electric power industry. Of specific interest are those questions related to the introduction of competitive markets for the generation of electricity. We note that there are unique physical aspects associated wit h the supply of electricity (e.g., instantaneous matching of supply and demand, unintended congestion of parallel transmission routes and maintenance of system stability in response to disturbances). Others include the prospect of localized market power. Because of these and other aspects of reliable electric power supply, traditional theories of efficient markets and auction structures developed for other commodities through years of experience may not be efficient if applied without alteration to markets for electricity. Conversely, current utility rules of operation developed for a centrally-planned regime may not be ideal in terms of providing economically efficient or reliable operating practices in a competitive environment. The objective of this research is to determine a new balance between ideal economic market mechanisms and traditional utility operating practices that will provide inexpensive energy for consumers and maintain system stability. Computer simulations of electricity networks along with laboratory markets that combine human-subject behavior and power systems behavior are the tools we propose to develop and use. The group of researchers assembled consists of theoretical and experimental economists and power/control systems engineers who are uniquely qualified to address issues of market structure, auction mechanisms and rules, and the viability of continuing to use computer programs such as large scale optimal power flow models (OPF), unit commitment (UC) and security constrained dispatch that have been used historically to guide operations.