Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Breaking down the controlling state's refusal to bargain with the nationalist rebels. Israel and the Palestinian territories.

该项目研究巴勒斯坦温和派、激进派和以色列政治家之间不断演变的关系。 根据在以色列和巴勒斯坦领土进行的一年实地工作，该项目的主要目标是回答以下问题：是什么原因导致以色列20年来反对与巴勒斯坦人就1967年边界问题讨价还价的共识破裂？ 该项目的更广泛目标是具体说明在民族主义者视为“被占领”领土上的任何斗争成功打破控制国统治者之间反对谈判解决方案的共识的一般条件。 实地研究探讨了这样一种假设，即分裂的民族主义叛乱分子更有可能脱离联邦，从而重新定义试图遏制这些叛乱分子的国家的边界。 具体而言，只有当民族主义温和派和激进派之间发生分裂，并且温和派独立于激进派时，控制国不与叛乱分子谈判的共识才有可能破裂。 对权力平衡可能在不久的将来发生有利于激进分子的变化的担忧，给了控制国家的政治家一个至关重要的谈判动机。该项目结合了定量分析，博弈论模型和定性比较。 在数量方面，编码标准的发展允许对所有革命派别的意识形态立场进行比较。 对控制区的温和派和激进派以及控制区的主流政治家之间的互动进行建模，有助于确定在何种条件下，就领土变更进行谈判是参与者的最佳策略。 最后，比较的方法允许测试的影响，来自理论框架。 随着时间的推移，对巴勒斯坦-以色列案例的分析叙述也为其他民族主义者寻求国家自治的案例提供了重要的经验教训。

The project studies the evolving relationship among Palestinian moderates, radicals and Israeli politicians. Based on one year of field work in Israel and the Palestinian territories, the primary objective of the project is to answer the question: what caused the breakdown of a twenty-year consensus in Israel against bargaining with the Palestinians on the 1967 border question? The broader objective of the project is to specify the general conditions under which any struggle, in what the nationalists see as "occupied" territory, successfully breaks down the consensus among rulers in the controlling state against a bargained solution. Field research explores the hypothesis that divided nationalist rebels are more likely to secede and thereby to redefine the boundaries of the state that seeks to contain those rebels. Specifically, only when a split occurs between nationalist moderates and radicals, and the moderates are autonomous from the radicals, is the controlling state's consensus of non-negotiation with the rebels likely to break down. The fear that the balance of power could change in the near future in favor of the radicals gives politicians at the controlling state a crucial incentive to negotiate. The project combines a quantitative analysis, a game theoretic model, and a qualitative comparison. On the quantitative side, the development of coding criteria allows a comparison of the mix of ideological positions of all revolutionary factions. Modeling the interaction between moderates and radicals in controlled territories, and the mainstream politicians from the controlling states, helps to identify the conditions in which bargaining for territorial change is the best strategy for the actors involved. Finally, the comparative method allows the testing of implications derived from the theoretical framework. An analytic narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli case over time also provides crucial lessons for other cases of nationalist rebellion-seeking autonomy from the state.