Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Breaking down the controlling state's refusal to bargain with the nationalist rebels. Israel and the Palestinian territories.

该项目研究巴勒斯坦温和派、激进分子和以色列政治家之间不断演变的关系。根据在以色列和巴勒斯坦领土一年的实地工作，该项目的主要目标是回答以下问题：是什么原因导致以色列20年来反对与巴勒斯坦人就1967年边界问题进行谈判的共识破裂？这个项目更广泛的目标是明确一般条件，在这种条件下，在民族主义者认为是“被占领”的领土上，任何斗争都能成功地打破控制国统治者之间反对讨价还价解决方案的共识。实地调查探讨了这样一种假设，即分裂的民族主义叛军更有可能脱离，从而重新定义试图遏制这些叛军的国家的边界。具体来说，只有当民族主义温和派和激进派之间出现分裂，并且温和派独立于激进派时，控制国家不与叛军谈判的共识才有可能破裂。对权力平衡可能在不久的将来向激进分子倾斜的担忧，给了控制国家的政客们进行谈判的重要动力。该项目结合了定量分析、博弈论模型和定性比较。在数量方面，编码标准的发展允许对所有革命派别的意识形态立场进行比较。对控制地区的温和派和激进派以及控制国家的主流政治家之间的互动进行建模，有助于确定在哪些条件下，领土变化的讨价还价是相关行为者的最佳策略。最后，比较方法允许检验从理论框架中得出的含义。随着时间的推移，对巴以问题的分析也为其他寻求国家自治的民族主义叛乱提供了重要的经验教训。

The project studies the evolving relationship among Palestinian moderates, radicals and Israeli politicians. Based on one year of field work in Israel and the Palestinian territories, the primary objective of the project is to answer the question: what caused the breakdown of a twenty-year consensus in Israel against bargaining with the Palestinians on the 1967 border question? The broader objective of the project is to specify the general conditions under which any struggle, in what the nationalists see as "occupied" territory, successfully breaks down the consensus among rulers in the controlling state against a bargained solution. Field research explores the hypothesis that divided nationalist rebels are more likely to secede and thereby to redefine the boundaries of the state that seeks to contain those rebels. Specifically, only when a split occurs between nationalist moderates and radicals, and the moderates are autonomous from the radicals, is the controlling state's consensus of non-negotiation with the rebels likely to break down. The fear that the balance of power could change in the near future in favor of the radicals gives politicians at the controlling state a crucial incentive to negotiate. The project combines a quantitative analysis, a game theoretic model, and a qualitative comparison. On the quantitative side, the development of coding criteria allows a comparison of the mix of ideological positions of all revolutionary factions. Modeling the interaction between moderates and radicals in controlled territories, and the mainstream politicians from the controlling states, helps to identify the conditions in which bargaining for territorial change is the best strategy for the actors involved. Finally, the comparative method allows the testing of implications derived from the theoretical framework. An analytic narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli case over time also provides crucial lessons for other cases of nationalist rebellion-seeking autonomy from the state.