Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Rebel Organization and Civilian Abuse

在过去半个世纪的内战中，约有1 800万人丧生。在许多战争中，尽管毛泽东描绘的叛军形象赢得了民心，但平民付出的代价最大，流离失所、营养不良和疾病的比例很高。战争的这些间接成本最终比战斗更具破坏性。但平民和士兵支付的相对费用有很大差异。例如，在斯里兰卡，平民与士兵的死亡比例为1：1;而在刚果民主共和国，这一比例超过100：1。这就引出了一个问题：为什么有些反叛团体在其领土上建立秩序，而另一些则虐待和掠夺平民。目前政治学对这一问题的回答主要集中在反叛分子如何获得资金以及反叛分子与国家民兵之间的战略平衡上。本文提出了一种新的基于反叛组织内部动力学的反叛集团行为理论。它假定反叛领导人有在其领土上建立秩序的经济动机，但往往无法阻止集团成员抢劫和虐待平民。虽然早期的理论认为资源和掠夺行为之间存在正相关关系，但该项目的理论预测，当反叛领导人获得财政资源时，他们将对其下属施加更有效的控制。预测掠夺行为会受到约束的第二个因素是领导人与其指挥官之间的密切种族/社会联系。最后，该项目确定了迄今为止在文献中被忽视的第三个因素。研究人员发现，外部赞助人的目标的问题，并在掠夺性行为的情况下，有动机的外国供应商，以支持弱势领导人谁可以更容易被操纵，导致虐待，派系groups.Applied在利比里亚的内战，1989年至2003年，该模型预测利比里亚的反叛团体之间的变化，取决于上述因素。为了测试该模型，该项目使用了地球科学中开发的遥感方法。对卫星图像进行处理，以衡量作物面积的变化，作为利比里亚战争期间平民遭受虐待的替代指标。这些作物估计数与通过14个月实地工作收集的关于反叛团体特征的系统数据以及地理和人口数据相结合。初步结果表明，随着时间的推移，作物面积发生了显着变化，与模型的预测一致。该模型进一步测试了原始的，跨国数据集的叛乱集团，1945- 2003年。内战的研究一直受到缺乏可靠的，微观层面的数据。本论文开发了一个严格的方法，克服这些限制，同时也提供了理论贡献的领域。通过强调粮食安全和集团内谈判，论文提供了具体的影响，设计人道主义干预和成功的和平协议。

In civil wars over the past half-century, some 18 million people lost their lives. In many of these wars, despite a Mao Tse-tung image of rebels winning hearts and minds, civilians pay the heaviest cost, with high levels of displacement, malnutrition, and disease. These indirect costs of war are ultimately more damaging than the fighting. But there is significant variation in the relative costs paid by civilians and those paid by soldiers. For example, in Sri Lanka, the ratio of civilian to soldier deaths was 1:1; meanwhile in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that ratio was more than 100:1. This leads to the question of why some rebel groups create order in their territories, while others abuse and prey upon the civilian population. State-of-the-art answers to this question in political science focus mostly on how rebels get funded and on the strategic balance between rebels and state militias.The dissertation proposes a new theory of rebel group behavior based on the internal dynamics of rebel organizations. It assumes that rebel leaders have an economic incentive to create order in their territories but are often unable to prevent group members from looting and abusing the civilian population. While earlier theories saw a positive relationship of resources and predatory behavior, this project's theory predicts that rebel leaders will exert more effective control over their subordinates when they have access to financial resources. A second factor predicting restraint on predatory behavior is that of close ethnic/social ties between leaders and their commanders. Finally, the project has identified a third factor so far ignored in the literature. The researcher finds that the goals of external patrons matter, and in cases of predatory behavior, there are incentives by foreign suppliers to support weak leaders who can be more easily manipulated, resulting in abusive, factionalized groups.Applied to the civil war in Liberia, 1989-2003, this model predicts variation among Liberia's rebel groups, depending on the factors listed above. To test the model, the project uses a remote sensing methodology developed in the earth sciences. Satellite images are processed to measure changes in crop area as a proxy for civilian abuse during Liberia's war. These crop estimates are combined with systematic data on rebel group characteristics collected through 14 months of field work, as well as geographic and demographic data. Preliminary results indicate significant variation in crop area over time, consistent with the model's predictions. The model is further tested on an original, cross-national dataset of rebel groups, 1945-2003.The study of civil war has been constrained by a lack of reliable, micro-level data. This dissertation develops a rigorous method for overcoming these limitations while also offering a theoretical contribution to the field. Through its emphasis on food security and intra-group bargaining, the dissertation provides concrete implications for designing humanitarian interventions and successful peace agreements.