Strategic Voting for the Israeli Knesset, 2003

以色列议会战略投票，2003 年

• 批准号: 0312654
• 负责人: John Aldrich
• 金额: $ 1.68万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2003-01-01 至 2003-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0312654&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Strategic; Voting; Israeli; Knesset; 2003

Israel will hold elections on January 28, 2003 for the Knesset, their national legislature. This Small Grant for Exploratory Research is to assist the Principal Investigator and an advanced graduate student in including a battery of questions in the Israel National Election survey to study whether there is strategic voting in that election. This study is particularly timely and important and builds empirically on work begun on strategic voting in the 1999 Israeli election by a team that includes the Principal Investigator and a collaborator.The research is significant because: 1) prior work offers the suspicion that there is a considerable degree of strategic voting (voting not in accord with the voter's true preference order but meant to bring about an outcome more desired by the voter than the social choice that would result from voting in accord with the voter's true preference order) in this, the most nearly perfect proportional representation electoral system in the world. Theory, such as that from Maurice Duverger and Gary Cox implies at least that such voting should be extremely rare, if not none existent entirely. And yet, earlier work suggests that it is as common as in simply plurality voting, where theory says that it should be extensive. It appears that no one, including the Principal Investigator has been able to employ the full set of measures needed to test for this possibility, let alone even begin to investigate the reasoning for its occurrence, should the suggestive evidence be confirmed; 2) this is the first Israeli Knesset election since the change in electoral law and such change provides a unique opportunity to test for the effect of changing institutional rules on voting behavior; 3) one reason for the lack of theoretical development of the study of PR systems, relative to plurality systems, is the difficulty in determining the electoral goals of parties in a multi-party PR system, and thus the impact of these goals on voter behavior. Measure of each of the three most prominent goals are being investigated, two of which are novel measures used in surveys of the mass public. The Principal Investigator is in a position to be able to measure how, if at all, voters react to the strategic circumstances facing political parties in multi-party, Proportional Representation systems.This investigation will yield a data set that will be of enormous value to other scholars interested in the topic. The study has the potential to enhance our understanding of the topic and to have a broader social value of helping us to understand the effects of voting systems on electoral outcomes.

以色列将于2003年1月28日举行议会选举。 这个探索性研究的小补助金是为了协助主要研究员和高级研究生在以色列全国选举调查中包括一系列问题，以研究是否有在选举中的战略投票。 这项研究是特别及时和重要的，并建立在经验上的工作开始在1999年以色列选举的战略投票的一个小组，其中包括首席研究员和合作者。1）先前的工作提供了怀疑，有相当程度的战略投票（投票不雅阁选民的真实偏好顺序，但意味着产生选民更希望的结果，而不是雅阁选民的真实偏好顺序投票产生的社会选择）在这方面，世界上最接近完美的比例代表选举制度。 莫里斯·杜沃格（Maurice Duverger）和加里·考克斯（Gary Cox）等人的理论至少暗示，这种投票应该是极其罕见的，如果不是完全不存在的话。 然而，早期的研究表明，它和简单的多数投票一样普遍，理论上说它应该是广泛的。 似乎没有人，包括主要研究者，能够采用测试这种可能性所需的全套措施，更不用说开始调查其发生的原因，如果暗示性证据得到证实的话;（二）这是自选举法修改以来的第一次以色列议会选举，这种变化提供了一个独特的机会来测试改变体制的效果投票行为规则; 3）相对于多数制而言，公共关系制度研究缺乏理论发展的一个原因是，在多党制公共关系制度中，难以确定政党的选举目标，从而难以确定这些目标对选民行为的影响。 目前正在调查三个最突出目标中每一个目标的衡量标准，其中两个是在大众调查中使用的新衡量标准。 首席研究员能够衡量选民对多党比例代表制中政党所面临的战略环境的反应。这项调查将产生一个数据集，对其他对该主题感兴趣的学者具有巨大价值。 这项研究有可能提高我们对这一主题的理解，并具有更广泛的社会价值，帮助我们了解投票制度对选举结果的影响。