The Effects of Institutional Transformation on Corruption in Indonesia

摘要提案编号：0416840 NSF项目：经济机构： 国家经济研究局/布朗大学首席研究员：亨德森，弗农建议标题：制度转型对腐败的影响在埃塞俄比亚腐败一直是阻碍经济增长和发展的主要问题之一，在很大一部分发展中国家。 迄今为止，关于腐败原因的所有研究都依赖于总体数据，主要是国家一级的数据。 这项研究将收集和分析原始数据和腐败的性质和成本在印尼的企业和公共部门的转型在影响腐败的作用。印尼的腐败现象普遍，代价高昂。“有效油脂假说”认为，贿赂有利于企业经营，而本研究则认为，在腐败的情况下，公职人员会增加监管或“骚扰”的数量，以创造更多的受贿机会。 印度尼西亚是研究机构改革对腐败影响的一个难得的机会，原因有二，最重要的是最近公共部门的大规模改革，大多数腐败涉及与管理规章和税收的地方官员的互动。2001年以前，这些官员在单一制下运作，由中央任命。2001年初，印度尼西亚实际上实行了联邦制，将地方公共服务的责任转移到地方县或县政府。权力下放和地方民主化被认为是通过地方政治竞争和管辖区间争夺公司来遏制腐败的途径。第二，有一项基线调查，记录权力下放时腐败的程度和形式。这项研究将调查一些原有的公司以及新的公司，以评估体制变革对腐败的影响，并收集关于腐败和公司的更详细的信息，对导致腐败的公司和官员之间的互动的性质知之甚少。 哪些类型的公共法规和税收会招致贿赂，每种类型的重要性如何？在贿赂过程中，在政府要求的税收和许可证支付、减少这些支付的贿赂以及讨好地方官员所花的时间之间，有什么权衡？各公司的反应有多大差异？有些腐败涉及骗取国家税收。但地方官员收到的预期贿赂被资本化为较低的官员工资，并代表事实上的“税收”。通过从战略意义上研究这一关系，PI为发展中国家的受贿问题提供了很好的分析框架。 收集到的数据对其他研究人员将有巨大的用处

ABSTRACTProposal Number: 0416840NSF Program: ECONOMICSInstitution: NBER/Brown UniversityPrincipal Investigator: Henderson, Vernon JProposal Title: The Effects of Institutional Transformation on Corruption in IndonesiaCorruption has been one of the major problems hampering economic growth and development in a large part of the developing world. To date, all research on the causes of corruption have relied on aggregate data, mostly at the national level. This research will collect and analyze original data and the nature and costs of corruption to businesses in Indonesia and the role of public sector transformation in influencing corruption. Corruption in Indonesia is widespread and costly. While the "efficient grease hypothesis," argues that bribes facilitate business operations, this research argues that, with corruption, public officials increase the numbers of regulations, or "harassment," in order to generate more opportunities to collect bribes. Indonesia represents an unusual opportunity to study the impact of institutional reform on corruption for two reasons, the most important being the recent wholesale transformation of the public sector.Most corruption involves interaction with local officials, who administer regulations and taxation. Before 2001, these officials operated in a unitary system, and were appointed by the center. In early 2001, Indonesia effectively federalized, shifting responsibilities for local public services to the local county, or kabupatengovernment. Decentralization and local democratization were seen as ways to curb corruption through the local political competition and of inter-jurisdictional competition for firms. Secondly, there is a base line survey that documents the extent and forms of corruption at the time of decentralization. This research will survey a number of the original firms as well as new ones, to assess the impacts of the institutional change on corruption and to gather more detailed information on corruption and firms.There is very little known about the nature of the interaction between firms and officials that leads to corruption. What types of public regulations and taxation invite bribes and how important is each type? In the bribing process, what are thetrade-offs among official required payments for taxes and licenses, bribes to reduce these payments, and time spent wooing local officials? How heterogeneous are responses across firms? Some corruption involves defraud of the state of revenues. But expected bribes received by local officials are capitalized into lowerofficial salaries, and represent de facto "taxation". By studying the relationship in a strategic sense, the PI brings very good analytical framework to the issue of bribe taking in developing countries. The data collected will be of enormous use to other researchers