Analyzing the Effects of International Election Monitoring

分析国际选举监测的效果

• 批准号: 0550111
• 负责人: Judith Kelley
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-02-01 至 2010-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0550111&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Analyzing; Effects; International; Election; Monitoring

Most people who follow world politics are used to hearing about international election monitors, who work through intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or non-governmental organizations like the U.S.-based Carter Center, in order to ensure that elections are free and fair. Through their efforts, these monitors provide valuable information for journalists and policy makers alike. They help donor governments determine whether countries are meeting requirements for democratic governance, they inform investors (who care about stability), and they provide valuable information to human rights activists working to ensure that citizens have a meaningful voice in government.International election monitoring was not always so prevalent, however. At first it was mostly associated with the UN activity in non-sovereign territories. With the end of the Cold War, however, the practice has skyrocketed and countries and organizations spend vast resources to send observer teams to elections worldwide. Enthusiasm for the practice is broad; many people laud it is as a tool to improve the conduct of elections and build democracy. Critics, however, argue that election monitoring does not really reduce fraud and, worse that it sometimes ends up legitimizing fraudulent elections. Indeed, many important questions remain unanswered: Do monitoring efforts cause governments to reduce fraud? If monitors influence government behavior, why and how does that happen? How often do monitor assessments later turn out to be inaccurate? Is there a common explanation for such errors? Answering these questions require a thorough inquiry into the rise of election monitoring, and into the actions of various monitoring organizations themselves: What explains the level of engagement of international monitors in a given election as well as the conclusions monitoring groups draw about individual elections? Why do some governments still refuse to let in monitors, while other, similarly corrupt governments invite monitors? How do the answers to these questions vary with different monitoring organizations?There is an abundance of case studies of individual elections, particularly personal accounts of election observers, but systematic analyses of international election monitoring are lacking. This study represents an important step toward correcting this shortfall; data are collected and analyzed on the presence and conclusions of monitors since their inception in the mid-1980s. This involves coding of hundreds of reports and primary documents from monitoring organizations. This project improves our understanding of the effects of election monitoring, but all data will be digitally archived and made available to other researchers. These data provides entirely new variables for other research, which involves measures of the components of democracy. This initial project opens up many follow-up questions and opportunities for continued research on questions about the role of elections in democratic transitions and democratic consolidation.There is clearly more to democracy than elections. However, genuine elections are an important human right and an essential component of freedom of expression. By improving understanding of election monitoring, this project will support the spread of individual human rights and help external actors design effective policies and programs to achieve these ends.

大多数关注世界政治的人都习惯于听到国际选举监督员，他们通过联合国（UN）等政府间组织或美国等非政府组织开展工作。卡特中心，以确保选举是自由和公正的。 通过他们的努力，这些监测员为记者和决策者提供了宝贵的信息。它们帮助捐助国政府确定国家是否达到了民主治理的要求，它们为投资者（关心稳定的投资者）提供信息，它们为人权活动家提供有价值的信息，这些活动家致力于确保公民在政府中拥有有意义的声音。起初，它主要与联合国在非主权领土上的活动有关。然而，随着冷战的结束，这种做法急剧增加，各国和各组织花费大量资源向世界各地的选举派遣观察员小组。 对这种做法的热情是广泛的;许多人称赞它是改善选举行为和建立民主的工具。然而，批评者认为，选举监督并没有真正减少舞弊，更糟糕的是，它有时最终使舞弊选举合法化。事实上，许多重要的问题仍然没有答案：监控工作是否会使政府减少欺诈？如果监督员影响政府行为，为什么会发生这种情况？有多少次监测评估后来被证明是不准确的？对这些错误有什么共同的解释吗？回答这些问题需要对选举监督的兴起以及各种监督组织本身的行动进行彻底调查：如何解释国际监督员参与特定选举的程度以及监督小组对个别选举得出的结论？为什么有些政府仍然拒绝让监督员进入，而另一些同样腐败的政府却邀请监督员？不同的监测组织对这些问题的答案有何不同？有大量关于个别选举的个案研究，特别是选举观察员的个人陈述，但缺乏对国际选举监测的系统分析。这项研究是纠正这一不足的重要一步;收集和分析了自1980年代中期监测员成立以来监测员的存在和结论的数据。这涉及对来自监测组织的数百份报告和主要文件进行编码。该项目提高了我们对选举监测影响的理解，但所有数据都将以数字方式存档，并提供给其他研究人员。这些数据为其他研究提供了全新的变量，这些研究涉及民主组成部分的测量。这一初步项目提出了许多后续问题，并为继续研究选举在民主过渡和巩固民主中的作用问题提供了机会。然而，真正的选举是一项重要的人权，也是表达自由的一个基本组成部分。 通过提高对选举监测的认识，该项目将支持个人人权的传播，并帮助外部行为者设计有效的政策和方案来实现这些目标。