Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Traditional Authority in the State: Chiefs and Taxation in Ghana

政治学博士论文研究：国家的传统权威：加纳的酋长和税收

• 批准号: 1160467
• 负责人: Clark Gibson
• 金额: $ 1.2万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-07-01 至 2013-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1160467&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

What are the politics of traditional authority in the modern state? Scholars of Africa often depict traditional authority as antagonistic to the power of elected officials. But increasing anecdotal evidence reveals a more complex relationship that generates crucial political and economic consequences. I seek to explain the interaction between formal and informal political institutions in Ghana with a strategic analysis, describing both variation in cooperation and the political and developmental outcomes that result. I hypothesize that a strategic delegation relationship exists between elected local politicians (principals) and local chiefs (agents) to facilitate greater re-election success for candidates with chiefs influencing citizen vote choice. In exchange for this service, chiefs gain greater fiscal autonomy without interference by the government. This trade of services between chiefs and politicians both enriches chiefs financially and increases their legitimacy as powerful figures in the community. This increased power in the development sphere allows chiefs to parlay that influence into vote mobilization for certain candidates. As chiefs become more involved in coordinating fiscal decisions, the daily importance of elected government decreases. The delegation relationship between officials and chiefs weakens the electoral connections between politicians and citizens, ultimately lowering democratic competition. To understand this delegation environment, I utilize several methods, combining nation-wide descriptive analysis, formal theory, and a large household survey in southern Ghana. I will use chiefly authority to explain electoral outcomes at the polling station level by using data from my measure of traditional power and electoral data to better understand the strategic considerations of this delegation. I will create a formal model of delegation with moral hazard, where the wage contract represents the level of fiscal autonomy chiefs are granted. Lastly, I will use a random natural experiment that has an intervention for the level of traditional authority in order to assess causal effects. I use information about the location of built and planned railroads in colonial Ghana to argue that modern transportation infrastructure weakened the traditional social fabric. I then plan to sample villages along the treatment and placebo rail lines to conduct a large household survey about voter mobilization, tax contribution, and public service access.This project will have a number of broader impacts. It can help policymakers as they design political and economic development projects. Donor officials know the power that traditional authorities have over the success and failure of their projects, yet little research has been attempted to document and explain this power. Understanding the relationship between local politics and traditional authority is a great step toward designing policy that can more effectively meet its objectives. This research has the ability to influence how policy-makers view the role of informal political actors within the democratic process. Currently, Ghanaian chiefs are constitutionally barred from the political process. If I find evidence that chiefs undermine the democratic process, this could lead to enhanced voter education and anti-vote buying campaigns within Ghana. Conversely, if I find evidence of greater efficiency and quality of public services provided by local informal institutions, this might lead to greater delegation of fiscal authority and power for chiefs to promote local development, a policy that could have widespread implications beyond Ghana and Africa. By including informal and traditional authority into the scope of policy analysis within these societies, new strategies to enhance the democratic process and promote economic growth may be identified. The findings of this study will apply to Ghana specifically, but its lessons may apply to other developing country contexts as well.

在现代国家，传统权威的政治是什么？非洲的学者经常将传统权威描述为对民选官员的权力的影响。但是，越来越多的轶事证据揭示了一种更复杂的关系，从而产生了至关重要的政治和经济后果。 我试图通过战略分析来解释加纳正式和非正式政治机构之间的相互作用，描述了合作的差异以及导致的政治和发展成果。我假设当选的当地政客（校长）与地方酋长（代理人）之间存在战略代表团关系，以促进与酋长影响公民投票选择的候选人的更大选择。为了换取这项服务，酋长在不受政府干预的情况下获得了更大的财政自治权。酋长和政客之间的这种服务贸易都在财务上丰富了酋长，并增加了作为社区中强大人物的合法性。发展领域的力量增加使酋长能够将影响某些候选人投票的投票动员。随着酋长越来越多地参与协调财政决策，民选政府的每日重要性下降。官员与酋长之间的代表团关系削弱了政客与公民之间的选举联系，最终降低了民主竞争。为了了解这种代表团的环境，我利用了几种方法，结合了全国性的描述性分析，正式理论和在加纳南部进行的大型家庭调查。 我将主要利用我的传统权力和选举数据的数据来更好地了解该代表团的战略考虑因素，从而主要利用权力来解释投票站级别的选举结果。我将与道德危害建立一个正式的代表团模型，工资合同代表了财政自治的负责人的水平。最后，我将使用一个随机的自然实验，该实验对传统权威水平进行干预，以评估因果关系。我使用有关加纳殖民地建筑和计划的铁路位置的信息来争辩，现代运输基础设施削弱了传统的社会结构。然后，我计划在治疗和安慰剂线路上进行对村庄进行采样，以进行有关选民动员，税收贡献和公共服务访问的大规模家庭调查。该项目将产生更广泛的影响。它可以帮助决策者设计政治和经济发展项目。捐助者官员知道传统当局对项目的成功和失败的权力，但是很少有研究试图记录和解释这一权力。了解当地政治与传统权威之间的关系是设计政策，可以更有效地实现其目标。这项研究具有影响政策制定者如何看待非正式政治行为者在民主进程中的作用的能力。目前，加纳酋长在宪法上被禁止政治进程。如果我发现酋长会破坏民主进程的证据，这可能会导致加纳境内的选民教育和反票购买运动。相反，如果我发现当地非正式机构提供的公共服务效率和质量的更高效率和质量的证据，这可能会导致更多的财政权威和酋长促进当地发展的权力代表团，这一政策可能在加纳和非洲以外的广泛影响。通过将非正式和传统权威包括在这些社会内的政策分析范围内，可以确定增强民主进程和促进经济增长的新策略。这项研究的结果将特别适用于加纳，但其课程也可能适用于其他发展中国家的情况。