Sufficient Evidence: Building Certifiably Dependable Systems--A Workshop

该奖项支持一个研讨会，使公众能够介绍和讨论“充分的证据？建立可认证的依赖系统”，在国家科学院的主持下进行。 关键系统往往需要认证：这是一种正式的保证，表明系统符合相关的技术标准，旨在确保系统不会对公众造成不适当的危害，并且可以安全可靠地提供预期的服务。今天，基于软件的系统的可靠性的认证通常更多地依赖于对用于开发系统的过程的评估，而不是系统本身的属性。虽然这些评估可能是有用的，但很少有人会质疑，对人工制品的直接观察应该比其生产方法的证书提供更强有力的保证。然而，软件系统的复杂性，以及它们行为的不连续性，使得它们非常难以分析，除非非常小心地对待它们的结构和维护。该研讨会提供了一个论坛，将介绍研究报告的结论，并邀请讨论小组对报告作出反应，并考虑对政府、私营部门和大学的相关研发和用户群体的影响和下一步措施。

This award supports a workshop to enable public presentation and discussion of the final report of the study on "Sufficient Evidence? Building Certifiably Dependable Systems," conducted under the auspices of the National Academies. Critical systems are often subject to certification: a formal assurance that the system has met relevant technical standards designed to assure it will not unduly endanger the public, and can be depended upon to deliver its intended service safely and securely. Today, certification of the dependability of a software-based system usually relies more on assessments of the process used to develop the system than on the properties of the system itself. Although these assessments can be useful, few would dispute that direct observation of the artifact ought to provide a stronger kind of assurance than the credentials of its production method. Yet the complexity of software systems, as well as the discontinuous way that they behave, renders them extremely difficult to analyze unless great care has been taken with their structure and maintenance. This workshop provides a forum in which the conclusions from the study report will be presented and invited panels of discussants will be asked to react to the report and consider implications and next steps for relevant R&D and user communities in government, the private sector, and universities.