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Governing the Resource-Conflict Nexus: Commodity Management and Internal Violence

治理资源与冲突的关系：商品管理和内部暴力

基本信息

批准号：
190673504
负责人：
Professor Dr. Gerald Schneider
金额：
--
依托单位：
Arbeitsgruppe für Internationale Politik
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2011
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2010-12-31 至 2017-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/190673504?language=en
关键词：
Governing Resource Conflict Nexus Commodity

项目摘要

The resource curse literature has argued that an abundance of natural resources depresses a country´s economic growth and spurs the risk of the intrastate war. Yet, not all resource-rich countries experience violent conflict. Understanding such variation between peace and social instability requires a systematic analysis of how states regulate access to these abundant resources and try to solve uprisings and conflicts over them. This is the basic premise of the research project “Governing the Resource-Violence Nexus” (GRVN); it advances the proposition that this puzzling diversity of outcomes can be traced with considerable accuracy to the micro-level governance of commodities and resources. For this purpose, the GRVN project will focus on two interrelated topics, namely resource access governance and the design of natural resource management. While we will test whether the type of ownership structure (private versus public) is associated with the conflict potential of a country or region, we further differentiate between specific characteristics of resource management designs (e.g., specific contractual terms of resource exploration, competition structure within the resource extracting sector, inclusion of the local population in managerial decisions, among others) in a more detailed manner. As the comprehensive analysis of resource conflicts and their avoidance requires a systematic database, our project will build global datasets on resource governance. Also, it will explore country-level differences in the governance of metals such as copper, cobalt or tantalum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Relying on a mixture of advanced tools in formal theory, econometrics and qualitative research techniques, our project intends to show which form of resource conflict management allows states to evade unjust arrangements and political violence.

资源诅咒文献认为，丰富的自然资源会抑制一个国家的经济增长，并刺激国内战争的风险。然而，并非所有资源丰富的国家都经历暴力冲突。要理解和平与社会不稳定之间的这种差异，就需要系统地分析国家如何管理对这些丰富资源的获取，并试图解决由此引发的起义和冲突。这是“治理资源-暴力关系”研究项目的基本前提;它提出了这样一个命题，即这种令人困惑的结果多样性可以相当准确地追溯到商品和资源的微观治理。为此，全球资源增值网络项目将侧重于两个相互关联的主题，即资源获取治理和自然资源管理设计。虽然我们将测试所有权结构的类型（私人与公共）是否与一个国家或地区的冲突潜力相关，但我们进一步区分了资源管理设计的具体特征（例如，资源勘探的具体合同条款、资源开采部门内的竞争结构、将当地居民纳入管理决策等）。由于全面分析资源冲突及其避免需要一个系统的数据库，我们的项目将建立全球资源治理数据集。此外，还将探讨刚果民主共和国在铜、钴或钽等金属治理方面的国家一级差异。依靠正式理论，计量经济学和定性研究技术中的先进工具的混合物，我们的项目旨在展示哪种形式的资源冲突管理允许国家避免不公正的安排和政治暴力。