Conflict Bargaining with Endogenous Distribution of Power

内生权力分配的冲突谈判

• 批准号: 0850435
• 负责人: Branislav Slantchev
• 金额: $ 13.37万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-08-01 至 2011-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0850435&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Conflict; Bargaining; Endogenous; Distribution; Power

This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009(Public Law 111-5)."International crises occur when two states confront each other with mutually incompatible demands. In general, states will not make concessions unless they are convinced that the alternative of fighting will be even more unpleasant. Crisis negotiations are exchanges of threats designed to persuade the opponent that one has the political will to use force if one's demands are not met, and that one has the military capabilities to render war sufficiently unpleasant to the opponent relative to the concessions demanded. These threats will not work unless the opponent believes both of these requirements are met-that is, they must be credible. The general conclusion from our studies of crisis bargaining is that to achieve credibility, actors must take actions that they could not, or would not, have taken unless they were serious about fighting. We have studied numerous ways in which militarily strong actors can signal their resolve, and we have learned that if one can, then one signals strength and resolve in a crisis: it never pays to pretend to be weak. The logic is straightforward: if one feigns weakness successfully, the opponent will not concede, and one would have to fight a costly and risky war. Hence, there appears to be no reason to signal weakness if one is strong. There are, however, instances in which opponents have concealed their strength even though they preferred to achieve a diplomatic solution (e.g., the Chinese prior to their intervention in the Korean War in 1950), and these are quite puzzling from our theoretical perspective.This project investigates conditions under which a strong resolved actor might pretend to be weak during a crisis. It uses game-theoretic mathematical models to study the relationship between pre-war crisis bargaining and war-fighting. Among the questions to be explored are: how the information states transmit and obtain during the crisis influences their fighting strategies, how the pursuit of optimal fighting strategies might clash with the pursuit of peaceful means of crisis resolution, how actors might deliberately mislead the opponent into a false sense of superiority and risk deterrence failure in order to obtain a military advantage, the conditions that make such feints more or less likely, and the implications for the signaling theories of crisis bargaining. The project aims to advance the theories of the causes of war as well by advancing the notion that war should be seen as interdependent investments in costly effort to persuade the opponent to concede, with strategies chosen reflecting what one believes about the opponent's political will and military capacity. This further develops the study of war as an interactive process instead of an outcome that terminates political exchange.The project aims to improve international relations theory, but it makes broader contributions. The development of the war-fighting component of the model is meant to bring our theories of war closer to what policy-makers and military officers seem to have in mind when they design war plans. Although the theoretical development is technical, the results must be communicated to a wider audience because of their implication for policy-making.

该奖项是根据《2009年美国复苏和再投资法案》(公法111-5)资助的。一般来说，除非各州确信战争的替代方案会更令人不快，否则它们不会做出让步。危机谈判是威胁的交换，旨在说服对手，如果自己的要求得不到满足，你有使用武力的政治意愿，并且你有军事能力，相对于要求的让步，你有足够的军事能力让对手感到不快。除非对手认为这两个要求都得到满足，否则这些威胁不会奏效--也就是说，它们必须是可信的。从我们对危机讨价还价的研究中得出的总体结论是，为了获得可信度，行为者必须采取他们不能或不会采取的行动，除非他们认真对待战斗。我们研究了军事力量强大的参与者发出决心的多种方式，我们认识到，如果可以，那么在危机中发出力量和决心的信号：假装软弱是永远不会有好处的。逻辑很简单：如果一个人成功地假装虚弱，对手就不会让步，人们将不得不打一场代价高昂、风险巨大的战争。因此，如果一个人很强大，似乎就没有理由发出疲软的信号。然而，也有一些例子表明，尽管对手更愿意通过外交途径解决问题，但他们还是隐藏了自己的实力(例如，中国在1950年介入朝鲜战争之前)，从我们的理论角度来看，这些都是相当令人费解的。这个项目调查了在什么情况下，强大的决心坚定的参与者可能会在危机中假装软弱。运用博弈论数学模型研究了战前危机讨价还价与战争之间的关系。要探讨的问题包括：国家在危机期间传递和获取的信息如何影响其战斗战略；追求最佳战斗战略可能如何与追求和平解决危机的手段相冲突；行为者如何故意误导对手形成错误的优越感和风险威慑失败以获得军事优势；使这种假装更有可能或更不可能发生的条件；以及对危机谈判的信号理论的影响。该项目还旨在推进战争起因的理论，提出这样一个概念，即战争应该被视为相互依赖的投资，以代价高昂的努力说服对手让步，所选择的策略反映出一个人对对手的政治意愿和军事能力的看法。这进一步发展了战争研究是一个互动的过程，而不是一个终止政治交流的结果。该项目旨在改进国际关系理论，但它做出了更广泛的贡献。该模型的作战部分的开发是为了让我们的战争理论更接近政策制定者和军官在设计战争计划时似乎心里想的东西。尽管理论发展是技术性的，但由于其对政策制定的影响，结果必须传达给更广泛的受众。