Military Coercion in Interstate Crises

州际危机中的军事强制

• 批准号: 0518222
• 负责人: Branislav Slantchev
• 金额: $ 22.96万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-07-01 至 2008-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0518222&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Military; Coercion; Interstate; Crises

What strategies can states use to achieve their goals in interstate crises? How likely are these strategies to result in war? Crisis behavior is bargaining in the shadow of power: actors employ threats to use force, or engage in limited uses of force, to coerce their opponent and secure concessions. Threats must be credible to be effective: it must be in one's interest to follow through despite the temptation to avoid their costs. Hence, the ability to credibly commit to the use of force is at the heart of crisis bargaining. Whereas scholars have investigated how actors can communicate their commitments in an environment where uncertainty makes bluffing possible, they have not explored how actors can restructure the environment itself through their actions. Military moves, such as arms buildups and troop mobilization and deployments, can serve as signals, but can also alter the strategic situation by improving one's expected payoff from the use of force. These are tacit bargaining moves that can be used to create one's own commitment or undermine the opponent's. Even though we know about the consequences of the inability to commit credibly, we do not know much about the process of creating commitments themselves.Scientific ObjectivesThis project investigates the use of military moves for coercive purposes. It uses a series of gametheoretic mathematical models to study the use of the military instrument to establish commitments and communicate them. Among the questions to be explored are: the impact of military technology on crisis stability and the use of preemptive war; how uncertainty about opponents creates incentives for bluffing, and how these can be undermined; how certain moves may be provocative and destabilizing; how diplomatic negotiation can be used alongside tacit bargaining moves; how resource constraints affect the ability to resolve crises peacefully to one's advantage; how the commitment process extends once war begins; and how the instrument can be used to terminate the war. The project is not entirely theoretical: a significant component involves detailed historical case studies and careful statistical testing of hypotheses derived from the theoretical model using data specifically collected for this project.Broader Social ValueThis project aims to improve international relations theory, but it makes broader contributions. Although the theoretical development is very technical, the results will be communicated to a wider audience because of their implications for the coercive use of force, its limits, and potential dangers. The attempt to use the military instrument for coercive purposes may produce the war leaders were trying to avoid, and not by mistake.

在州际危机中，各国可以使用哪些策略来实现其目标？这些策略导致战争的可能性有多大？危机行为是权力阴影下的讨价还价：行为者通过威胁使用武力或有限地使用武力来胁迫对手并获得让步。威胁必须可信才能有效：尽管存在避免付出代价的诱惑，但坚持到底必须符合某人的利益。因此，可信地承诺使用武力的能力是危机讨价还价的核心。尽管学者们研究了行动者如何在不确定性使得虚张声势成为可能的环境中传达他们的承诺，但他们没有探索行动者如何通过他们的行动来重组环境本身。军事行动，例如军备集结、部队动员和部署，可以作为信号，但也可以通过提高使用武力的预期回报来改变战略局势。 这些都是心照不宣的讨价还价举动，可以用来创造自己的承诺或破坏对手的承诺。尽管我们知道无法可信地做出承诺的后果，但我们对做出承诺本身的过程知之甚少。科学目标该项目调查了出于强制目的而使用军事行动的情况。它使用一系列博弈论数学模型来研究使用军事工具来建立承诺并传达承诺。需要探讨的问题包括：军事技术对危机稳定性的影响以及先发制人战争的运用；对手的不确定性如何产生虚张声势的动机，以及如何削弱这些动机；某些举动可能具有挑衅性和破坏稳定的性质；如何在默契讨价还价的同时使用外交谈判；资源限制如何影响和平解决危机的能力，从而对一方有利；一旦战争开始，承诺过程如何延伸；以及如何使用该工具来结束战争。该项目并不完全是理论性的：一个重要组成部分涉及详细的历史案例研究，以及使用专门为该项目收集的数据对理论模型得出的假设进行仔细的统计检验。更广泛的社会价值该项目旨在改进国际关系理论，但它做出了更广泛的贡献。尽管理论发展非常技术性，但由于其对强制使用武力、其局限性和潜在危险的影响，其结果将传达给更广泛的受众。将军事工具用于强制目的的尝试可能会导致领导人试图避免的战争，而不是错误的。