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Imagination and counterfactual knowledge

想象力和反事实知识

基本信息

批准号：
208600333
负责人：
Professor Dr. Tobias Rosefeldt
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Philosophie
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Units
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2011-12-31 至 2018-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/208600333?language=en
关键词：
Imagination counterfactual knowledge

项目摘要

In the coming three years, we will continue to investigate the central question that has guided the first phase of the project: How can we have knowledge of what is not actually, but merely possibly the case. And, relatedly, how could we ever justify our assumptions about what would happen if some other particular situation were the case? In the first project phase, we showed that a systematic answer to this question requires assigning an important role to the imagination a quasi-perceptual representation of possible scenarios in the acquisition of modal knowledge. However, there is currently no plausible theory of the imagination which explains this role for modal knowledge. We will fill this gap in the second phase of the project. First, we will investigate which forms of the imagination exist and how they differ from each other and related mental states. We will also look at the relationship between the imagination and scientific practices such as computer-aided visual simulations. Next, we will look at the ways in which cognitively valuable forms of the imagination differ from those types of creative simulation which lack immediate cognitive benefits. Our working hypothesis is that imagination can only lead to knowledge if it doesn`t proceed lawlessly but is instead restricted by particular mechanisms. However, it is unclear precisely how this restriction functions for different forms of modal knowledge and what cognitive faculty produces it. Both questions deserve further investigation. Part of our investigation will concern one prominent conception of the imagination in the history of philosophy, namely Kant`s theory of the Einbildungskraft. We will show the systematic potential of Kant`s conception for the contemporary discussion of the cognitive value of the imagination.

在接下来的三年里，我们将继续调查指导该项目第一阶段的核心问题：我们如何才能知道什么不是实际的，而仅仅是可能的情况。而且，与此相关的是，我们如何证明我们的假设是合理的，即如果出现其他特定情况，会发生什么？在第一个项目阶段，我们表明，要系统地回答这个问题，需要赋予想象力一个重要的角色，即在获得情态知识的过程中对可能的情景进行准知觉表征。然而，目前还没有可信的想象理论来解释情态知识的这一作用。我们将在项目的第二阶段填补这一空白。首先，我们将调查想象的存在形式，以及它们之间的区别和相关的心理状态。我们还将探讨想象力与计算机辅助视觉模拟等科学实践之间的关系。接下来，我们将看看认知上有价值的想象形式与那些缺乏直接认知益处的创造性模拟类型的不同之处。我们的工作假设是，想象力只有在它不是非法进行的情况下才能产生知识，而是受到特定机制的限制。然而，目前还不清楚这种限制是如何作用于不同形式的情态知识的，也不清楚是什么认知能力产生了这种限制。这两个问题都值得进一步调查。我们的部分研究将涉及哲学史上一个突出的想象力概念，即康德的艾因比尔顿斯卡夫特理论。我们将展示康德的概念在当代关于想象的认知价值的讨论中的系统潜力。