Imagination and counterfactual knowledge

在未来三年中，我们将继续研究指导该项目第一阶段的中心问题：我们如何才能了解实际上并非如此，而只是可能如此。与此相关的是，我们如何证明我们的假设是正确的，如果其他特定情况是这样的话，会发生什么？在第一个项目阶段，我们表明，系统地回答这个问题，需要分配一个重要的角色，想象力的准感知表示可能的情况下，在收购模态知识。然而，目前还没有一个合理的理论来解释这种作用的想象力的模态知识。我们将在项目的第二阶段填补这一空白。首先，我们将研究存在哪些形式的想象，以及它们彼此之间以及相关的心理状态之间的差异。我们还将研究想象力和科学实践之间的关系，例如计算机辅助视觉模拟。接下来，我们将研究有认知价值的想象形式与缺乏直接认知益处的创造性模拟形式的不同之处。我们的工作假设是，想象力只能导致知识，如果它不无法无天，而是受到特定机制的限制。然而，这一限制究竟是如何对不同形式的模态知识起作用的，以及是什么样的认知能力产生了它，这两个问题都值得进一步研究。我们的研究的一部分将涉及哲学史上一个突出的想象力概念，即康德的Einbildungskraft理论。我们将展示康德的概念的系统潜力，为当代讨论的认知价值的想象力。

In the coming three years, we will continue to investigate the central question that has guided the first phase of the project: How can we have knowledge of what is not actually, but merely possibly the case. And, relatedly, how could we ever justify our assumptions about what would happen if some other particular situation were the case? In the first project phase, we showed that a systematic answer to this question requires assigning an important role to the imagination a quasi-perceptual representation of possible scenarios in the acquisition of modal knowledge. However, there is currently no plausible theory of the imagination which explains this role for modal knowledge. We will fill this gap in the second phase of the project. First, we will investigate which forms of the imagination exist and how they differ from each other and related mental states. We will also look at the relationship between the imagination and scientific practices such as computer-aided visual simulations. Next, we will look at the ways in which cognitively valuable forms of the imagination differ from those types of creative simulation which lack immediate cognitive benefits. Our working hypothesis is that imagination can only lead to knowledge if it doesn`t proceed lawlessly but is instead restricted by particular mechanisms. However, it is unclear precisely how this restriction functions for different forms of modal knowledge and what cognitive faculty produces it. Both questions deserve further investigation. Part of our investigation will concern one prominent conception of the imagination in the history of philosophy, namely Kant`s theory of the Einbildungskraft. We will show the systematic potential of Kant`s conception for the contemporary discussion of the cognitive value of the imagination.