Semantics and Pragmatics of Conditionals: form Sentence to Discourse

P2研究了条件句中语义和语用的分工。我们从句子层面、语篇层面和认识论层面三个方面对这一问题进行了探讨。在句子层面，我们将继续第一个资助期的研究，考察条件句全范式的形态构成，并考察表层差异如何导致真值和/或幸福条件的差异。我们将解释为什么某些类型的条件句系统地但可取消地产生其前提条件不太可能的信息，为什么其他类型的条件句有系统地(有时仅可取消地)生成其前提句为假的信息，以及为什么其余类型的条件句没有系统地被任何一种信息所涉及。在语篇层面上，我们对条件句的严格和可变严格分析进行了辩论。有两个论点支持严格的分析：(I)Sobel序列和(Ii)负极性项(NPI)许可。Sobel序列的严格条件解释最近受到了新数据的挑战。我们将从含义、修辞关系和信息结构方面对条件序列进行解释，这有可能解释所有可用的数据。冯·芬特尔？S主张对条件句进行严格的分析，其依据是一个广泛成功的概括，它解释了其他领域中的净现性许可。然而，在将该账户扩展到条件句时添加的关键因素可能会破坏其在某些领域的成功：仅限于非正式的和对焦点敏感的遗憾和惊讶。我们研究了这些结构的焦点敏感度是如何被模型化的，同时又像冯·芬特尔的分析那样许可了NPI。在与认识论的接口上，我们研究了条件句、认知情态词和证据词之间的交互作用，以开发工具来帮助弥合语义和认识论之间的差距。认识论关注的是模拟个体如何根据新的信息改变他们的信念。条件句在这类理论中扮演着特殊的角色。然而，现有的认识论关于信仰动态的理论认为条件条件缺乏真理价值。这就提出了嵌入问题：如果条件句缺乏真值条件，我们如何解释带有条件成分的复句的可解释性？我们期待条件句与言据词和认知情态词一起研究的成果，因为所有三类词汇项的成员(I)贡献了关于其命题可能性的信息，(Ii)在句法上是可嵌入的，尽管以有趣的限制方式。

P2 investigates the division of labor between semantics and pragmatics in conditionals. We explore this question in three domains: at the sentence level, at the discourse level, and at the interface with epistemology.At the sentence level, continuing the research initiated in the first funding period, we will examine the morphological composition of the full paradigm of conditional constructions and investigate how surface differences lead to differences in truth and/or felicity conditions. We will explain why some kinds of conditional systematically but cancellably generate the infor-mation that their antecedents are unlikely, why other kinds systematically (and only sometimes cancellably) generate the information that their antecedents are false, and why the remaining kinds are not systematically attended by either kind of information.At the discourse level we engage the debate over strict and variably strict analyses of conditionals. There are two arguments in favor of a strict analysis: (i) Sobel sequences and (ii) Negative Polarity Item (NPI) licensing. The strict conditional explanation of Sobel sequences has recently been challenged by novel data. We will pursue an explanation for conditional sequences in terms of implicatures, rhetorical relations and information structure which has the potential to explain all of the available data. von Fintel¿s NPI argument for a strict analysis of conditionals relies on a widely successful generalization that explains NPI-licensing in other domains. However, the key ingredient that is added in extending the account to conditionals threatens to undermine its success in some domains: non-adnominal only and focus-sensitive regret and surprise. We investigate how the focus-sensitivity of these constructions can be modelled while at the same time licensing NPIs as in von Fintel`s analysis.At the interface with epistemology, we study the interaction between conditionals, epistemic modals, and evidentials to develop tools that will help bridge a gap between semantics and epistemology. Epistemologists are concerned with modelling how individuals change their beliefs in the light of new information. Conditionals play a special role in such theories. However, existing theories of the dynamics of belief by epistemologists have taken conditionals to lack truth values. This raises the embedding problem: if conditionals lack truth conditions, how do we explain the interpretability of complex sentences with conditional components? We expect fruit from studying conditionals together with evidentials and epistemic modals because the members of all three classes of lexical items (i) contribute information about the likelihood of their proposition and (ii) are syntactically embeddable, though in an interestingly restricted way.