Reputations in Macroeconomics

宏观经济学声誉

• 批准号: 1523980
• 负责人: Boyan Jovanovic
• 金额: $ 27.2万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-08-15 至 2018-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1523980&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Reputations; Macroeconomics

This award fund research that develops new theories about the possible relationship between firms? investment in reputation and macroeconomic outcomes. We have long known that businesses are willing to invest in building strong reputations. A reputable business can charge higher prices, it will have more clients and a higher demand for its products. This study will analyze how investment in reputation responds to aggregate and sectoral shocks, and how it generates business cycles even when shocks are not present. The overall goal is to understand how unexpected new information (so called news shocks) affect investment, prices, output, and consumption when firms care about the reputation of their products and/or services. Because the project has implications for corporate tax policy, besides advancing the progress of science it may also enhance national prosperity.The model takes previous work on firm reputation for unobservable quality and expands it to a general equilibrium setting with aggregate shocks and asset trading. The goal is to offer new explanations of macroeconomic outcomes. News shocks raise output and asset prices. New products are more subject to reputation concerns given that their quality is more uncertain at early stages of development; assuming that the durables sector features a faster flow of new products, this sector is a leading indicator. Idiosyncratic volatility and aggregate volatility move in opposite directions. Multiple equilibria arise because production has a pecuniary external effect that works through the discount factor. Although the model has no direct externalities, some equilibria are cyclical even if there are no shocks.

这项奖励基金的研究，发展新的理论，可能的关系，公司？对声誉和宏观经济结果的投资。 我们早就知道，企业愿意投资建立强大的声誉。一个有信誉的企业可以收取更高的价格，它将有更多的客户和更高的需求，其产品。本研究将分析声誉投资如何应对总体和部门冲击，以及即使在不存在冲击的情况下，声誉投资如何产生商业周期。 总体目标是了解当企业关心其产品和/或服务的声誉时，意外的新信息（所谓的新闻冲击）如何影响投资，价格，产出和消费。 由于该项目对公司税收政策有影响，除了促进科学进步外，还可能促进国家繁荣。该模型采用了以前关于不可观察质量的公司声誉的工作，并将其扩展到具有总冲击和资产交易的一般均衡设置。目标是为宏观经济结果提供新的解释。 新闻冲击提高了产出和资产价格。 新产品更容易受到声誉问题的影响，因为它们的质量在开发的早期阶段更不确定;假设耐用品部门的特点是新产品流动更快，这一部门是一个领先指标。 特质波动率和总体波动率的方向相反。 多重均衡之所以出现，是因为生产具有通过贴现因子起作用的货币外部效应。 虽然该模型没有直接的外部性，但即使没有冲击，一些均衡也是周期性的。