STARSS: Small: Simulation-Based Verification of EM Side-Channel Attack Resilience of Embedded Cryptographic Systems

STARSS：小型：基于仿真的嵌入式加密系统的 EM 侧信道攻击弹性验证

• 批准号: 1527888
• 负责人: Michael Orshansky
• 金额: $ 28.67万
• 依托单位: University of Texas at Austin
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-09-01 至 2019-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1527888&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: STARSS; Small; Simulation; Based; Verification

The widely used encryption algorithms, based both on private- and public-key cryptography, provide provable security guarantees against attacks under an abstract model of computation. In reality, physical systems leak information and the adversarial access is not completely captured by the abstractions in the standard model. Attacks that exploit a physically observable signal, such as power, timing, or electromagnetic (EM) radiation, are known as side-channel attacks. They present a formidable challenge to ensuring the security of existing cryptographic applications. Embedded systems are especially vulnerable to side-channel attacks as they can easily become physically accessible to an attacker and thus permit extensive probing. This project focuses on a side-channel attack based on the electromagnetic radiation analysis. The project aims to provide the designers of embedded cryptosystems with the ability to analyze the resilience of their designs at design-time. The project develops predictive models and algorithms that enable the computation of EM emanation profiles of information-bearing blocks and thus enables design-time investigation of embedded cryptosystem vulnerability to EM side-channel with sufficient accuracy at acceptable computational costs. The project relies on the recent advances in integral-equation based techniques for EM simulation to enable the needed level of simulation accuracy.

广泛使用的基于私钥和公钥密码的加密算法在抽象的计算模型下提供了针对攻击的可证明的安全保证。在现实中，物理系统会泄露信息，标准模型中的抽象并不能完全捕获敌意访问。利用物理上可观察到的信号(如电源、定时或电磁(EM)辐射)的攻击称为侧通道攻击。它们对确保现有加密应用程序的安全性提出了巨大的挑战。嵌入式系统特别容易受到旁路攻击，因为攻击者很容易在物理上访问它们，从而允许广泛的探查。本课题重点研究了一种基于电磁辐射分析的旁路攻击。该项目旨在为嵌入式密码系统的设计者提供在设计时分析其设计的弹性的能力。该项目开发了能够计算信息承载块的电磁发射分布的预测模型和算法，从而能够以可接受的计算成本以足够的精度对EM侧信道的嵌入式密码系统脆弱性进行设计时的调查。该项目依赖于基于积分方程式的电磁模拟技术的最新进展，以实现所需水平的模拟精度。