STARSS: Small: Simulation-Based Verification of EM Side-Channel Attack Resilience of Embedded Cryptographic Systems

目前广泛使用的基于私钥和公钥加密的加密算法，在抽象的计算模型下提供了可证明的安全保证。在现实中，物理系统会泄漏信息，并且标准模型中的抽象不能完全捕获对抗性访问。利用物理上可观察到的信号（如功率、时序或电磁（EM）辐射）的攻击被称为侧信道攻击。它们对确保现有加密应用程序的安全性提出了巨大的挑战。嵌入式系统特别容易受到侧信道攻击，因为它们很容易被攻击者物理地访问，从而允许广泛的探测。本课题主要研究基于电磁辐射分析的侧信道攻击。该项目旨在为嵌入式密码系统的设计者提供在设计时分析其设计的弹性的能力。该项目开发了预测模型和算法，能够计算信息承载块的电磁发射概况，从而能够在设计时以可接受的计算成本，以足够的精度调查嵌入式密码系统对电磁侧信道的脆弱性。该项目依赖于基于积分方程的EM仿真技术的最新进展，以实现所需的仿真精度水平。

The widely used encryption algorithms, based both on private- and public-key cryptography, provide provable security guarantees against attacks under an abstract model of computation. In reality, physical systems leak information and the adversarial access is not completely captured by the abstractions in the standard model. Attacks that exploit a physically observable signal, such as power, timing, or electromagnetic (EM) radiation, are known as side-channel attacks. They present a formidable challenge to ensuring the security of existing cryptographic applications. Embedded systems are especially vulnerable to side-channel attacks as they can easily become physically accessible to an attacker and thus permit extensive probing. This project focuses on a side-channel attack based on the electromagnetic radiation analysis. The project aims to provide the designers of embedded cryptosystems with the ability to analyze the resilience of their designs at design-time. The project develops predictive models and algorithms that enable the computation of EM emanation profiles of information-bearing blocks and thus enables design-time investigation of embedded cryptosystem vulnerability to EM side-channel with sufficient accuracy at acceptable computational costs. The project relies on the recent advances in integral-equation based techniques for EM simulation to enable the needed level of simulation accuracy.