STARSS: Small: Simulation-Based Verification of EM Side-Channel Attack Resilience of Embedded Cryptographic Systems

广泛使用的加密算法，基于私钥和公钥密码，提供了可证明的安全保证，以抵御抽象计算模型下的攻击。实际上，物理系统会泄漏信息，并且标准模型中的抽象并没有完全捕获对抗性访问。利用物理上可观察到的信号（如功率、定时或电磁（EM）辐射）的攻击被称为侧信道攻击。他们提出了一个艰巨的挑战，以确保现有的加密应用程序的安全性。嵌入式系统特别容易受到侧信道攻击，因为它们可以很容易地被攻击者物理访问，从而允许广泛的探测。本项目主要研究基于电磁辐射分析的旁道攻击。该项目旨在为嵌入式密码系统的设计者提供在设计时分析其设计的弹性的能力。该项目开发的预测模型和算法，使信息承载块的EM散发配置文件的计算，从而使嵌入式加密系统的脆弱性EM侧通道的设计时调查具有足够的准确性在可接受的计算成本。该项目依赖于最近的进展，积分方程为基础的电磁仿真技术，使所需的仿真精度水平。

The widely used encryption algorithms, based both on private- and public-key cryptography, provide provable security guarantees against attacks under an abstract model of computation. In reality, physical systems leak information and the adversarial access is not completely captured by the abstractions in the standard model. Attacks that exploit a physically observable signal, such as power, timing, or electromagnetic (EM) radiation, are known as side-channel attacks. They present a formidable challenge to ensuring the security of existing cryptographic applications. Embedded systems are especially vulnerable to side-channel attacks as they can easily become physically accessible to an attacker and thus permit extensive probing. This project focuses on a side-channel attack based on the electromagnetic radiation analysis. The project aims to provide the designers of embedded cryptosystems with the ability to analyze the resilience of their designs at design-time. The project develops predictive models and algorithms that enable the computation of EM emanation profiles of information-bearing blocks and thus enables design-time investigation of embedded cryptosystem vulnerability to EM side-channel with sufficient accuracy at acceptable computational costs. The project relies on the recent advances in integral-equation based techniques for EM simulation to enable the needed level of simulation accuracy.