Combating Counterfeit Analog and Mixed Signal ICs with Lightweight Embedded Mechanisms and Innovative Electrical Tests

提案标题：利用轻量级嵌入式机制和创新的电气测试打击假冒模拟和混合信号IC项目目标简介：以有针对性的电气测试和设计结构为中心的检测和避免模拟和混合信号假冒IC的综合框架。非技术摘要：全球化导致供应链中报告的所有类型的假冒电子元件大幅上升。除了知识产权侵权造成的数十亿美元损失外，假冒零部件的质量往往不合格，从而给纳入假冒零部件的关键系统和基础设施带来风险。在集成电路(IC)中，模拟和混合信号(AMS)IC因其产品生命周期长、利润率高、在主要市场(工业、汽车、智能、消费、无线、计算机等)中普遍存在、较低的复杂性以及(V)易于反向工程和克隆较旧的工艺技术节点而成为仿冒的最佳目标。鉴于使用AMS电子产品的系统和部门数量众多，假冒产品对主要零部件制造商、原始设备制造商、政府和社会都有重大影响。虽然有一些基于物理检查和电气测试的造假检测方法可以应用于AMS IC，但它们耗时、破坏性强，而且通常需要黄金(已知的真实)信息。此外，已经开发了新的设计技术来检测伪造的数字IC，但由于模拟和数字设计之间的根本差异，这些技术不太适合AMS IC。技术摘要：该项目首次探索了检测和防止所有类型的模拟和混合信号(AMS)假冒IC的整体框架。这一目标面临的基本挑战包括缺乏老化模型(检测回收/使用的IC所需)、缺乏数字IC功能(例如，测试结构、传统加密模块等)以及AMS IC的严格资源限制。在这项工作中，通过开发用于检测回收和重新标记的IC的创新电气测试以及开发用于检测/防止克隆、过度生产和回收的IC的轻量级嵌入式机制来解决这些挑战。为了消除对黄金信息的需求，并继续适用于广泛的IC，电气测试针对通用电源管理电路的行为差异，这些电路可在许多大型模拟、混合信号和数字IC中访问，例如，基于全模拟物理不可克隆功能(PUF)和新型回收老化传感器开发了用于无源IC防伪检测的低漏失稳压器(LDO)嵌入式机制。虽然现有的机制需要数字控制逻辑和一个额外的引脚来访问PUF和传感器输出，但新的低成本接口被开发出来，使所有拟议的方法更容易采用。为了主动预防，混沌密码学(可以在模拟IC中实现)被用于新型IC锁定/解锁机制，以防止生产过剩的IC进入市场。所有方法都将在模拟和硅片中进行测试。正品IC将被获取，并与PI的实验室中的行业合作者提供的假冒产品进行测试。嵌入的机制将被集成到测试IC中，并使用标准的CMOS工艺进行制造以进行验证。

Proposal Title: Combating Counterfeit Analog and Mixed Signal ICs with Lightweight Embedded Mechanisms and Innovative Electrical Tests Brief description of project Goals: A comprehensive framework for detecting and avoiding analog and mixed signal counterfeit ICs centered on targeted electrical tests and design structures.Nontechnical Abstract:Globalization has resulted in a substantial rise in all types of counterfeit electronic components reported throughout the supply chain. Aside from the billions lost from IP infringement, counterfeit parts are often of substandard quality, thereby creating risks for the critical systems and infrastructures that incorporate them. Among integrated circuits (ICs), analog and mixed signal (AMS) ICs are the best targets for counterfeiting due to their long product life cycles, high profit margins, prevalence across major markets (industrial, automotive, intelligence, consumer, wireless, compute, etc.), lower complexity, and (v) ease of reverse engineering and cloning older process technology nodes. Given the large number of systems and sectors using AMS electronics, counterfeits have significant impacts on major component manufacturers, original equipment manufacturers, governments, and society. While there exist counterfeit detection approaches based on physical inspection and electrical tests that could be applied to AMS ICs, they are time consuming, destructive, and often require golden (known authentic) information. In addition, new design techniques have been developed to detect counterfeit digital ICs, but these are not well-suited for AMS ICs due to the fundamental differences between analog and digital design. Technical Abstract:This project explores, for the first time, a holistic framework to detect and prevent all types of analog and mixed-signal (AMS) counterfeit ICs. Fundamental challenges to this goal include lack of aging models (needed to detect recycled/used ICs), lack of digital IC features (e.g., test structures, traditional cryptographic modules, etc.), and strict resource constraints of AMS ICs. In this work, these challenges are addressed through the development of innovative electrical tests for detecting recycled and remarked ICs as well as development of lightweight embedded mechanisms for detection/prevention of cloned, overproduced, and recycled ICs. To eliminate the need for golden information and remain applicable to a wide range of ICs, the electrical tests target differences in behavior of general power management circuitry, which are accessible in many large analog, mixed signal, and digital ICs, such as Low Drop-Out Regulators (LDOs) Embedded mechanisms for passive IC counterfeit detection are developed based on fully analog physically unclonable functions (PUFs) and new recycling\aging sensors. While existing mechanisms require digital control logic and an additional pin for access to PUF and sensor output, new low cost-interfaces are developed to make all the proposed approaches easier to adopt. For active prevention, chaotic cryptography (which can be implemented in analog ICs) is exploited for novel IC locking\unlocking mechanisms that prevent overproduced ICs from entering the market. All approaches will be tested in simulation and silicon. Authentic ICs will be acquired and tested against counterfeits available in the PI's lab from industry collaborators. The embedded mechanisms will be incorporated into test ICs and fabricated using standard CMOS processes for validation.