EAGER: PUF-Locked Circuit Obfuscation for Counterfeit and Piracy Prevention

EAGER：PUF 锁定电路混淆，用于预防假冒和盗版

• 批准号: 1651695
• 负责人: Hai Zhou
• 金额: $ 10万
• 依托单位: Northwestern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2016-10-01 至 2020-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1651695&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: EAGER; PUF; Locked; Circuit; Obfuscation

The economic impacts and security hazards of hardware piracy is not apt to be neglected compared to software, but is even more severe. The loss due to global hardware piracy has now reached the level of billions per month, with a major share in almost all electronic devices. It was reported by the Alliance for Gray Market and Counterfeit Abatement that about 10% of the start-of-the-art technology products available on market are counterfeits.In this project, a theory and a framework of circuit obfuscation for hardware counterfeit and piracy prevention are developed. Obfuscation is a technique to make a design obscure therefore hard to understand. The recent theoretical studies on program obfuscation are leveraged, and the project is built on the definition of the best-possible obfuscation. With efficient obfuscators to structurally transform a circuit to an obfuscated one, any security enhancement circuitry such as a PUF-lock or a watermark can be embedded in a circuit without being discovered. Not understanding a design, an potential attacker could not modify the design to remove the security circuitry or to insert any Trojan. Besides the framework and relevant tools for circuit obfuscation, the project also works on a large number of real-world applications to validate the approach.

硬件盗版带来的经济影响和安全隐患与软件盗版相比更不容忽视，甚至更为严重。全球硬件盗版造成的损失现已达到每月数十亿美元的水平，几乎在所有电子设备中占主要份额。根据灰色市场与反盗版联盟的报告，市场上大约有10%的最先进的技术产品是假冒的，在这个项目中，开发了一种用于硬件假冒和盗版预防的电路混淆理论和框架。混淆是一种使设计变得模糊从而难以理解的技术。本项目充分利用了最近关于程序混淆的理论研究，并建立在最佳混淆的定义上。 利用有效的混淆器将电路结构地转换为混淆电路，任何安全增强电路（诸如PUF锁或水印）可以被嵌入电路中而不被发现。由于不了解设计，潜在的攻击者无法修改设计以删除安全电路或插入任何特洛伊木马。除了电路混淆的框架和相关工具外，该项目还在大量的实际应用中验证了该方法。

项目成果

SigAttack: New High-level SAT-based Attack on Logic Encryptions

SigAttack：针对逻辑加密的新的基于 SAT 的高级攻击

• DOI: 10.23919/date.2019.8714924
• 发表时间: 2019
• 期刊: Testing in Europe (DATE
• 作者: Shen, Yuanqi;Li, You;Kong, Shuyu;Rezaei, Amin;Zhou, Hai
• 通讯作者: Zhou, Hai

Rescuing Logic Encryption in Post-SAT Era by Locking & Obfuscation

通过锁定拯救后SAT时代的逻辑加密

• DOI: 10.23919/date48585.2020.9116500
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: Testing in Europe (DATE
• 作者: Rezaei, Amin;Shen, Yuanqi;Zhou, Hai
• 通讯作者: Zhou, Hai

Double DIP: Re-Evaluating Security of Logic Encryption Algorithms

• DOI: 10.1145/3060403.3060469
• 发表时间: 2017-05
• 期刊: Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017
• 作者: Yuanqi Shen;H. Zhou

Resolving the Trilemma in Logic Encryption

解决逻辑加密中的三难困境

• DOI: 10.1109/iccad45719.2019.8942076
• 发表时间: 2019
• 期刊: International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
• 作者: Zhou, Hai;Rezaei, Amin;Shen, Yuanqi
• 通讯作者: Shen, Yuanqi

SAT-based bit-flipping attack on logic encryptions

基于 SAT 的逻辑加密位翻转攻击

• DOI: 10.23919/date.2018.8342086
• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: and Testing in Europe (DATE
• 作者: Shen, Yuanqi;Rezaei, Amin;Zhou, Hai
• 通讯作者: Zhou, Hai