Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informational Robust Approach
具有共同价值观的最优拍卖设计:一种信息稳健的方法
基本信息
- 批准号:1757222
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 27.66万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:美国
- 项目类别:Standard Grant
- 财政年份:2018
- 资助国家:美国
- 起止时间:2018-03-01 至 2021-02-28
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
This award funds research to develop new methods for identifying the best ways to buy and sell goods via auctions. Auction methods are widely used by governments and private firms. For example, web-based electronic reverse auctions are increasing used as a procurement method by Federal agencies. At the same time, agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Treasury use auctions to sell everything from Treasury bills to oil and gas leases. This project will use game theory to find auction rules that will perform well in a wide range of situations. It seeks to develop rules that will work well when bidders place the same value on the auctioned good but have different information about the exact value. The project advances the basic science of auction theory, and will lead to better procedures for public procurement and better methods for generating public funds from the sale of natural resources such as timber, oil, and gas. The methodological component of the project could lead to the development of more efficient online trading platforms. The project therefore benefits the U.S. economy.The aim of the project is to characterize revenue maximizing auctions when bidders have a common valuation for the good being sold. This research will develop new theories of optimal robust auctions that provide favorable revenue guarantees across different models of bidder beliefs and across different kinds of equilibrium behavior. Existing theories identify optimal auction designs that are highly sensitive to modeling assumptions. This project will develop auction designs that are less sensitive to model misspecification. Besides advancing the theory of optimal auctions, the project will also develop and demonstrate methods for designing mechanisms in models with rich information or potentially complex equilibrium strategies.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
该奖项资助研究开发新方法,以确定通过拍卖购买和出售商品的最佳方式。拍卖方法被政府和私人公司广泛使用。例如,联邦机构越来越多地使用网上电子逆向拍卖作为一种采购方法。与此同时,联邦通信委员会、内政部和财政部等机构利用拍卖来出售从国库券到石油和天然气租赁的所有东西。这个项目将使用博弈论找到拍卖规则,将在广泛的情况下表现良好。它试图制定规则,当投标人对拍卖物品的价值相同,但对确切价值有不同的信息时,这些规则将很好地发挥作用。该项目推进了拍卖理论的基础科学,并将导致更好的公共采购程序和更好的方法,从木材,石油和天然气等自然资源的销售中产生公共资金。该项目的方法部分可导致开发更有效的在线交易平台。因此,该项目有利于美国经济。该项目的目的是表征收入最大化拍卖时,投标人有一个共同的价值被出售的货物。本研究将发展新的最优稳健拍卖理论,在不同的投标人信念模型和不同类型的均衡行为之间提供有利的收入保证。现有的理论确定最优拍卖设计是高度敏感的建模假设。这个项目将开发拍卖设计,不太敏感的模型误指定。除了推进最优拍卖理论,该项目还将开发和演示在具有丰富信息或潜在复杂均衡策略的模型中设计机制的方法。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(1)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
具有共同价值观的最佳拍卖设计:一种信息稳健的方法
- DOI:10.3982/ecta16297
- 发表时间:2021
- 期刊:
- 影响因子:6.1
- 作者:Brooks, Benjamin;Du, Songzi
- 通讯作者:Du, Songzi
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Benjamin Brooks其他文献
Information density in bridge team communication and miscommunication—a quantitative approach to evaluate maritime communication
- DOI:
10.1007/s13437-013-0043-8 - 发表时间:
2013-03-28 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:2.400
- 作者:
Peter John;Benjamin Brooks;Christoph Wand;Ulf Schriever - 通讯作者:
Ulf Schriever
Comparisons of Signals
信号比较
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
- 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Benjamin Brooks;Alexander Frankel;Emir Kamenica - 通讯作者:
Emir Kamenica
Information Hierarchies
信息层次结构
- DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.3448870 - 发表时间:
2019 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Benjamin Brooks;A. Frankel;Emir Kamenica - 通讯作者:
Emir Kamenica
Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? Experimental Evidence from India
荣誉文化会导致效率低下的惯例吗?
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2016 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Benjamin Brooks;K. Hoff;Priyanka Pandey - 通讯作者:
Priyanka Pandey
Qualitative identification of volatile compounds in foods and flowers using passive headspace extraction with activated charcoal fabric
- DOI:
10.1016/j.foodres.2022.112130 - 发表时间:
2023-01-01 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:
- 作者:
Venita Totten;Jacob Willis;Stefka Eddins;Benjamin Brooks - 通讯作者:
Benjamin Brooks
Benjamin Brooks的其他文献
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{{ truncateString('Benjamin Brooks', 18)}}的其他基金
Collaborative Research: New Informationally Robust Approaches to Mechanism Design and Games of Incomplete Information
协作研究:机制设计和不完全信息博弈的新信息鲁棒方法
- 批准号:
2215475 - 财政年份:2022
- 资助金额:
$ 27.66万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: New Algorithims for Computing Equilibria of Stochastic Games
合作研究:计算随机博弈均衡的新算法
- 批准号:
1530823 - 财政年份:2015
- 资助金额:
$ 27.66万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
GPS Observations in Chile of Co-seismic and Post-seismic Deformation Associated with the 27 Feb, 2010 Mw 8.8 Maule, Chile Earthquake
智利 GPS 观测与 2010 年 2 月 27 日智利 Mw 8.8 Maule 地震相关的同震和震后变形
- 批准号:
1036065 - 财政年份:2010
- 资助金额:
$ 27.66万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Towards a Quaternary Spatial and Temporal Deformation History at the Central Andean Thrust Front
合作研究:了解安第斯山脉中部逆冲锋的第四纪时空变形历史
- 批准号:
0711530 - 财政年份:2008
- 资助金额:
$ 27.66万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
SGER Collaborative Research: Seismic and Geodetic Deployment in Anticipation of a Predicted Slow Earthquake at Kilauea Volcano
SGER 合作研究:预测基拉韦厄火山慢地震的地震和大地测量部署
- 批准号:
0712892 - 财政年份:2007
- 资助金额:
$ 27.66万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
Capturing Mauna Loa's Current Reawakening - Integrated Geodetic and Numerical Investigations of Magmatic and Volcanotectonic Processes, Mauna Loa, Hawaii
捕捉莫纳罗亚火山当前的复苏——岩浆和火山构造过程的综合大地测量和数值研究,夏威夷莫纳罗亚火山
- 批准号:
0440433 - 财政年份:2005
- 资助金额:
$ 27.66万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
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