Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informational Robust Approach

该奖项资助研究开发新的方法，以确定通过拍卖买卖商品的最佳方式。拍卖方式被政府和私营企业广泛使用。例如，联邦机构越来越多地使用基于网络的电子逆向拍卖作为一种采购方法。与此同时，联邦通信委员会、内政部和财政部等机构利用拍卖出售从国库券到石油和天然气租赁的一切东西。这个项目将使用博弈论来寻找拍卖规则，将在广泛的情况下表现良好。它寻求制定规则，当投标人对拍卖的商品给予相同的价值，但对确切价值有不同的信息时，这些规则将很好地发挥作用。该项目推进了拍卖理论的基础科学，并将导致更好的公共采购程序和从出售木材、石油和天然气等自然资源中获得公共资金的更好方法。该项目的方法部分可导致开发效率更高的在线交易平台。因此，该项目有利于美国经济。该项目的目标是，当投标人对出售的商品有共同的估值时，拍卖的特点是收入最大化。这项研究将发展最优稳健拍卖的新理论，这些理论可以在不同的投标人信念模型和不同类型的均衡行为中提供有利的收入保证。现有的理论确定了对建模假设高度敏感的最优拍卖设计。该项目将开发拍卖设计，不太敏感的模型错误指定。除了推进最优拍卖理论，该项目还将开发和演示在具有丰富信息或潜在复杂均衡策略的模型中设计机制的方法。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This award funds research to develop new methods for identifying the best ways to buy and sell goods via auctions. Auction methods are widely used by governments and private firms. For example, web-based electronic reverse auctions are increasing used as a procurement method by Federal agencies. At the same time, agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Treasury use auctions to sell everything from Treasury bills to oil and gas leases. This project will use game theory to find auction rules that will perform well in a wide range of situations. It seeks to develop rules that will work well when bidders place the same value on the auctioned good but have different information about the exact value. The project advances the basic science of auction theory, and will lead to better procedures for public procurement and better methods for generating public funds from the sale of natural resources such as timber, oil, and gas. The methodological component of the project could lead to the development of more efficient online trading platforms. The project therefore benefits the U.S. economy.The aim of the project is to characterize revenue maximizing auctions when bidders have a common valuation for the good being sold. This research will develop new theories of optimal robust auctions that provide favorable revenue guarantees across different models of bidder beliefs and across different kinds of equilibrium behavior. Existing theories identify optimal auction designs that are highly sensitive to modeling assumptions. This project will develop auction designs that are less sensitive to model misspecification. Besides advancing the theory of optimal auctions, the project will also develop and demonstrate methods for designing mechanisms in models with rich information or potentially complex equilibrium strategies.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.