CAREER: Fortifying Leaky Hardware Interfaces with Distinguishability Set Architectures

职业：通过可区分性集架构强化泄漏硬件接口

• 批准号: 1942888
• 负责人: Christopher Fletcher
• 金额: $ 47.91万
• 依托单位: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2020-07-01 至 2025-06-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1942888&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Fortifying; Leaky; Hardware; Interfaces

Computing on personal data is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it enables revolutionary new applications such as personalized medicine and disease prediction. On the other hand, it runs the risk of revealing said personal data to unwanted parties. For example, using personal data on today’s processor chips can reveal that data through traces that the processor leaves behind. To make matters worse, different processors leave behind different traces, revealing different information, depending on how they were designed. This project will develop techniques to prevent data leakage through processors, for existing and future processor chips.The technical approach is to design a Distinguishability Set Architecture (DSA) for existing and future processors. DSAs are peers to existing Instruction Set Architectures (ISAs). Whereas the ISA specifies the functionality of each instruction, the DSA specifies under what conditions each instruction reveals secret information. With a DSA, programmers or compilers can tune sensitive programs to avoid leaking secrets. The first project thrust will develop DSA foundations, answering questions such as what should a DSA look like and how to capture leakage through various processor optimizations. The second thrust will develop compilers and hardware that use DSAs to improve program security.By precisely describing when and how processors reveal secrets, DSAs will unlock innovation on both software and hardware fronts. On the software side, programmers can focus on applications while DSA-aware compilers translate those applications to secure variants fit to run on different processors. On the hardware side, architects can use DSAs to reason about the privacy implications of hardware optimizations. The project will train a new class of students and researchers who can work across formal specifications, micro-architecture and compilers to build secure systems and, in the future, apply the lessons learned to other privacy-related problems.The DSA project will store all publications, code, and data-sets on public-facing websites, hosted at the University of Illinois for at least 3 years after the end of the project. This information will be made available via commercial websites. Links to these websites will be mirrored at http://cwfletcher.net/dsa.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

个人数据计算是一把双刃剑。 一方面，它可以实现革命性的新应用，如个性化医疗和疾病预测。 另一方面，它有可能将所述个人数据泄露给不受欢迎的各方。 例如，在今天的处理器芯片上使用个人数据可以通过处理器留下的痕迹来揭示数据。 更糟糕的是，不同的处理器会留下不同的痕迹，揭示不同的信息，这取决于它们是如何设计的。 本项目将为现有和未来的处理器芯片开发防止数据通过处理器泄漏的技术。技术方法是为现有和未来的处理器设计可区分集架构（DSA）。 DSA是现有指令集体系结构（ISA）的对等体。 伊萨规定了每条指令的功能，而DSA规定了每条指令在什么条件下会泄露秘密信息。 使用DSA，程序员或编译器可以调优敏感程序以避免泄露机密。 第一个项目的重点是开发DSA基础，回答诸如DSA应该是什么样子以及如何通过各种处理器优化捕获泄漏等问题。 第二个目标是开发使用DSA来提高程序安全性的编译器和硬件。通过精确描述处理器何时以及如何泄露秘密，DSA将在软件和硬件方面开启创新。 在软件方面，程序员可以专注于应用程序，而DSA感知编译器将这些应用程序转换为适合在不同处理器上运行的安全变体。 在硬件方面，架构师可以使用DSA来推断硬件优化的隐私含义。 该项目将培养一批新的学生和研究人员，他们可以使用正式的规范、微架构和编译器来构建安全的系统，并在未来将学到的经验应用于其他与隐私相关的问题。DSA项目将在项目结束后至少3年内将所有出版物、代码和数据集存储在面向公众的网站上，托管在伊利诺伊大学。这些信息将通过商业网站提供。这些网站的链接将反映在http://cwfletcher.net/dsa.This奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并被认为值得通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估的支持。

项目成果

DVFS Frequently Leaks Secrets: Hertzbleed Attacks Beyond SIKE, Cryptography, and CPU-Only Data

• DOI: 10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179326
• 发表时间: 2023-05
• 期刊: 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
• 作者: Yingchen Wang;Riccardo Paccagnella;Alan Wandke;Zhao Gang;Grant Garrett-Grossman;Christopher W. Fletcher;David Kohlbrenner;H. Shacham

Augury: Using Data Memory-Dependent Prefetchers to Leak Data at Rest

Augury：使用数据内存相关的预取器来泄漏静态数据

• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
• 作者: J. Vicarte, M. Flanders

Hertzbleed: Turning Power Side-Channel Attacks Into Remote Timing Attacks on x86

• DOI: 10.1109/mm.2023.3274619
• 发表时间: 2023-07
• 期刊: IEEE Micro
• 影响因子: 3.6
• 作者: Yingchen Wang;Riccardo Paccagnella;Elizabeth Tang He;H. Shacham;Christopher W. Fletcher;David Kohlbrenner

SynthCT: Towards Portable Constant-Time Code

SynthCT：迈向可移植的恒定时间代码

• DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2022.24215
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: NDSS
• 作者: Dinesh, Sushant;Garrett-Grossman, Grant;Fletcher, Christopher W.
• 通讯作者: Fletcher, Christopher W.