Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Secure and Trustworthy Cyberphysical Microfluidic Systems

合作研究:SaTC:核心:中等:安全可信的网络物理微流体系统

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    2049311
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    美国
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 财政年份:
    2021
  • 资助国家:
    美国
  • 起止时间:
    2021-05-01 至 2025-04-30
  • 项目状态:
    未结题

项目摘要

The goal of this project is to ensure the security and trustworthiness of cyber-physical microfluidic systems. Microfluidics refers to the interdisciplinary study of fluid manipulation at nanoliter/picoliter volumes. Microfluidic lab-on-chip systems are integrated with sensors and intelligent control, networked for data analysis, and are being commercialized for use in medical diagnostics, environmental monitoring, and basic laboratory research. These systems are cyberphysical in nature and are unfortunately coming of age in an era of rampant cybersecurity issues. Consequently, we anticipate novel security and trust problems that need to be addressed using interdisciplinary expertise in microfluidics, microbiology, hardware design, and cybersecurity. This project is a collaboration between Duke University and New York University (NYU). It includes four thrusts: 1) understanding the security threats, motivations, attack surfaces, and their consequences for the research landscape, industry, and society, 2) developing security and trust techniques to prevent, detect, and mitigate these threats, 3) experimental validation on the benchtop using biomolecular protocols, and 4) fabrication of printed circuit board (PCB) lab-on-chip prototypes with security primitives. The methods used to realize the research goals will draw upon the multidisciplinary and synergistic expertise of the investigators: microfluidic biochips, threat analysis and countermeasures; bioprotocol synthesis; design automation; experimental microbiology. This project will foster multi-disciplinary research and education for students in hardware design, CAD, molecular biology, and security. Growth and investment in CPMS, adoption by end users, will be fostered by intellectual property protection. This project has the potential to pave the way for new tech companies. CPMS designed with security in mind will restore trust after the many recent publicized violations of diagnostic and research integrity. The attacks and defense techniques will be submitted to the annual embedded systems security challenge (ESC) held at NYU, where the strengths of the security techniques are being evaluated by student hardware hackers. All data related to this project will be disseminated through the DukeSpace repository, https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/. The papers are all in PDF. Supported formats for data and metadata include JPEG, PNG, GIF, TIFF, AIFF, MP3, DRM-free AAC MPEG, XML and CSV. Source code for testing, input/output files, and documentation are also being released as the project matures. All data and software will be maintained on a Duke website, and this data will be available for 5 years after the project is completed. Similarly, all data and software will be maintained on an NYU website for 5 years after the project is completed.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
该项目的目标是确保网络物理微流控系统的安全性和可信度。微流体是指在纳升/皮升体积的流体操纵的跨学科研究。微流控芯片实验室系统集成了传感器和智能控制,联网进行数据分析,并正在商业化用于医疗诊断,环境监测和基础实验室研究。这些系统本质上是网络物理的,不幸的是,它们是在网络安全问题猖獗的时代发展起来的。因此,我们预计新的安全和信任问题需要使用微流体,微生物学,硬件设计和网络安全方面的跨学科专业知识来解决。该项目是杜克大学和纽约大学(NYU)之间的合作。它包括四个重点:1)了解安全威胁,动机,攻击面及其对研究环境,行业和社会的影响,2)开发安全和信任技术来预防,检测和减轻这些威胁,3)使用生物分子协议在实验台上进行实验验证,以及4)使用安全原语制造印刷电路板(PCB)芯片实验室原型。用于实现研究目标的方法将利用研究人员的多学科和协同专业知识:微流控生物芯片,威胁分析和对策;生物协议合成;设计自动化;实验微生物学。该项目将促进硬件设计,CAD,分子生物学和安全方面的多学科研究和教育。知识产权保护将促进CPMS的增长和投资以及最终用户的采用。这个项目有可能为新的科技公司铺平道路。考虑到安全性而设计的CPMS将在最近许多公开的违反诊断和研究完整性的行为之后恢复信任。攻击和防御技术将提交给在纽约大学举行的年度嵌入式系统安全挑战赛(ESC),学生硬件黑客正在评估安全技术的优势。与该项目有关的所有数据将通过DukeSpace储存库https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/传播。所有文件都是PDF格式的。支持的数据和元数据格式包括JPEG、PNG、GIF、TIFF、AIFF、MP3、无DRM AAC MPEG、XML和CSV。随着项目的成熟,测试源代码、输入/输出文件和文档也将发布。所有数据和软件将在杜克网站上维护,这些数据将在项目完成后5年内可用。同样,所有数据和软件将在项目完成后在纽约大学网站上保留5年。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。

项目成果

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Ramesh Karri其他文献

Biochip-PUF: Physically Unclonable Function for Microfluidic Biochips
Biochip-PUF:微流控生物芯片的物理不可克隆功能
  • DOI:
    10.1109/itc51656.2023.00033
  • 发表时间:
    2023
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    N. S. Baban;A. Orozaliev;Yong;Urbi Chatterjee;Sankalp Bose;Sukanta Bhattacharjee;Ramesh Karri;Krishnendu Chakrabarty
  • 通讯作者:
    Krishnendu Chakrabarty
qTESLA
特斯拉
MaDEVIoT: Cyberattacks on EV Charging Can Disrupt Power Grid Operation
MaDEVIoT:电动汽车充电网络攻击可能会扰乱电网运行
Synthesis and Characterization of 1:2 Complex of Mercury(II) Chloride with 1,3-Dimethyl-1H-Imidazole-2(3H)-Thione
氯化亚汞与1,3-二甲基-1H-咪唑-2(3H)-硫酮1:2配合物的合成与表征
Protection of Endogenous Thiols against Methylmercury with Benzimidazole-Based Thione by Unusual Ligand-Exchange Reactions.
通过不寻常的配体交换反应,用苯并咪唑基硫酮保护内源硫醇免受甲基汞的影响。
  • DOI:
    10.1002/chem.201605238
  • 发表时间:
    2017
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    M. Banerjee;Ramesh Karri;Ashish Chalana;R. Das;R. Rai;K. S. Rawat;Biswarup Pathak;Gouriprasanna Roy
  • 通讯作者:
    Gouriprasanna Roy

Ramesh Karri的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('Ramesh Karri', 18)}}的其他基金

Collaborative Research: Research Infrastructure: CCRI:New: Data-Driven Cybersecurity Research Infrastructure for Smart Manufacturing
合作研究:研究基础设施:CCRI:新:数据驱动的智能制造网络安全研究基础设施
  • 批准号:
    2234973
  • 财政年份:
    2023
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: EAGER: SaTC-EDU: Dynamic Adaptive Machine Learning for Teaching Hardware Security (DYNAMITES)
合作研究:EAGER:SaTC-EDU:用于教学硬件安全的动态自适应机器学习 (DYNAMITES)
  • 批准号:
    2039607
  • 财政年份:
    2020
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
CCRI: ENS: Enhancement of Trust-Hub, a Web-based Portal to support the Cybersecurity Research Community
CCRI:ENS:增强 Trust-Hub,这是一个支持网络安全研究社区的基于 Web 的门户网站
  • 批准号:
    2016650
  • 财政年份:
    2020
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
EAGER: Collaborative: Secure and Trustworthy Cyberphysical Microfluidic Systems
EAGER:协作:安全且值得信赖的网络物理微流体系统
  • 批准号:
    1833624
  • 财政年份:
    2018
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: CI-EN: Trust-Hub: Development of Benchmarks, Metrics, and Validation Platforms for Hardware Security, and a Web-based Dissemination Portal
合作研究:CI-EN:Trust-Hub:硬件安全基准、指标和验证平台的开发以及基于 Web 的传播门户
  • 批准号:
    1513130
  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
TWC: Small: Belling the CAD: Towards Security-Centric Electronic System Level Design
TWC:小型:领先 CAD:迈向以安全为中心的电子系统级设计
  • 批准号:
    1526405
  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: CI-ADDO-NEW: TrustHub: Design of Trust Benchmarks, Hardware Validation Platforms and a Web-Based Dissemination Portal
合作研究:CI-ADDO-NEW:TrustHub:信任基准、硬件验证平台和基于 Web 的传播门户的设计
  • 批准号:
    1059328
  • 财政年份:
    2011
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: CI-ADDO-NEW: TrustHub: Design of Trust Benchmarks, Hardware Validation Platforms and a Web-based Dissemination Portal
合作研究:CI-ADDO-NEW:TrustHub:信任基准、硬件验证平台和基于 Web 的传播门户的设计
  • 批准号:
    0958510
  • 财政年份:
    2010
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Fault Tolerance in Crypto Hardware via Dynamic Assertion Checking
CT-ISG:协作研究:通过动态断言检查实现加密硬件的容错
  • 批准号:
    0831349
  • 财政年份:
    2008
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Cyber System:Collaborative Research: Security Aware Design for Test Methods
网络系统:协作研究:测试方法的安全意识设计
  • 批准号:
    0621856
  • 财政年份:
    2006
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant

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相似海外基金

Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Differentially Private SQL with flexible privacy modeling, machine-checked system design, and accuracy optimization
协作研究:SaTC:核心:中:具有灵活隐私建模、机器检查系统设计和准确性优化的差异化私有 SQL
  • 批准号:
    2317232
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Using Intelligent Conversational Agents to Empower Adolescents to be Resilient Against Cybergrooming
合作研究:SaTC:核心:中:使用智能会话代理使青少年能够抵御网络诱骗
  • 批准号:
    2330940
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: NSF-BSF: SaTC: CORE: Small: Detecting malware with machine learning models efficiently and reliably
协作研究:NSF-BSF:SaTC:核心:小型:利用机器学习模型高效可靠地检测恶意软件
  • 批准号:
    2338301
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Differentially Private SQL with flexible privacy modeling, machine-checked system design, and accuracy optimization
协作研究:SaTC:核心:中:具有灵活隐私建模、机器检查系统设计和准确性优化的差异化私有 SQL
  • 批准号:
    2317233
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: NSF-BSF: SaTC: CORE: Small: Detecting malware with machine learning models efficiently and reliably
协作研究:NSF-BSF:SaTC:核心:小型:利用机器学习模型高效可靠地检测恶意软件
  • 批准号:
    2338302
  • 财政年份:
    2024
  • 资助金额:
    $ 54.24万
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    Continuing Grant
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Using Intelligent Conversational Agents to Empower Adolescents to be Resilient Against Cybergrooming
合作研究:SaTC:核心:中:使用智能会话代理使青少年能够抵御网络诱骗
  • 批准号:
    2330941
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Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Small: Towards Secure and Trustworthy Tree Models
协作研究:SaTC:核心:小型:迈向安全可信的树模型
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    2413046
  • 财政年份:
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Collaborative Research: SaTC: EDU: Adversarial Malware Analysis - An Artificial Intelligence Driven Hands-On Curriculum for Next Generation Cyber Security Workforce
协作研究:SaTC:EDU:对抗性恶意软件分析 - 下一代网络安全劳动力的人工智能驱动实践课程
  • 批准号:
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Collaborative Research: SaTC: EDU: RoCCeM: Bringing Robotics, Cybersecurity and Computer Science to the Middled School Classroom
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  • 批准号:
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  • 财政年份:
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Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Understanding the Impact of Privacy Interventions on the Online Publishing Ecosystem
协作研究:SaTC:核心:媒介:了解隐私干预对在线出版生态系统的影响
  • 批准号:
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