SaTC: CORE: Medium: Provably Secure, Usable, and Performant Enclaves in Multicore Processors

SaTC：CORE：中：多核处理器中可证明安全、可用且高性能的 Enclave

• 批准号: 2115587
• 负责人: Srini Devadas
• 金额: $ 120万
• 依托单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-10-01 至 2024-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2115587&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Medium; Provably; Secure

In cloud computing and other popular modes of computer usage today, one physical computer is shared by different applications contributed by users who do not trust each other. The resources of the shared computer must be divided securely across the users; mistakes allow one user to learn another's secrets or influence another applications’ execution. A promising approach to address the challenge of protecting applications from one another is enclaves, best known through Intel's SGX architecture available since 2015, but SGX allows secrets to be leaked while applications execute. This project develops enclaves with strong protections, focusing on usability, performance, and assurance. First, enclaves have still been used relatively rarely in production, and the project therefore studies new interfaces that streamline the sharing of hardware resources. Second, to motivate adoption by the community, the developed enclaves encompass hardware optimizations so as not to affect runtime performance of applications. Third, the project develops techniques for mathematical proofs of hardware security. Planned approaches in software API design for enclaves include limited I/O channel interfaces (e.g., enforcing fixed or otherwise relatively predictable schedules) and new flexible means of allocating resources like cache lines across enclaves. New enclave-to-enclave communication primitives are realized through modifications to memory-management hardware. These mechanisms are being proved secure to the highest standards of mathematical rigor, through machine-checking of proofs with the Coq theorem prover. The technique is to prove that specific enclave systems cycle-accurately simulate groups of separate computers (one per enclave) connected by a basic network, and to prove such results modularly, via nonobvious decomposition of proof obligations into localized security conditions for different components (e.g., processor vs. memory system). This research produces usable enclave systems that the investigators make available to the public as images for Amazon's F1 cloud-FPGA system, facilitating easy bring-up for security evaluation or extending the work.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

在云计算和当今其他流行的计算机使用模式中，一台物理计算机由彼此不信任的用户贡献的不同应用程序共享。 共享计算机的资源必须在用户之间安全划分；错误会让一个用户了解另一个用户的秘密或影响另一个应用程序的执行。 解决保护应用程序免受彼此攻击的挑战的一种有前途的方法是飞地，最出名的是自 2015 年推出的英特尔 SGX 架构，但 SGX 允许在应用程序执行时泄露机密。 该项目开发具有强大保护功能的飞地，重点关注可用性、性能和保证。 首先，飞地在生产中的使用相对较少，因此该项目研究了简化硬件资源共享的新接口。 其次，为了激励社区采用，开发的飞地包含硬件优化，以免影响应用程序的运行时性能。第三，该项目开发硬件安全数学证明技术。 飞地软件 API 设计中的计划方法包括有限的 I/O 通道接口（例如，强制执行固定或相对可预测的调度）以及跨飞地分配资源（例如缓存线）的新的灵活方法。 新的飞地到飞地通信原语是通过修改内存管理硬件来实现的。 通过使用 Coq 定理证明器对证明进行机器检查，这些机制已被证明符合数学严谨性的最高标准。 该技术旨在证明特定的飞地系统循环准确地模拟由基本网络连接的独立计算机组（每个飞地一台），并通过将证明义务非明显分解为不同组件（例如处理器与内存系统）的本地化安全条件来模块化地证明这些结果。 这项研究产生了可用的 enclave 系统，研究人员将其作为 Amazon F1 云 FPGA 系统的图像向公众提供，从而方便安全评估或扩展工作。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优点和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。