Experimental analysis of Bayesian voting mechanisms, procedural choices and the acceptance of transfers (A07)

贝叶斯投票机制、程序选择和接受转账的实验分析（A07）

• 批准号: 251995104
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Collaborative Research Centres
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2013-12-31 至 2020-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/251995104?language=en
• 关键词: Experimental; analysis; Bayesian; voting; mechanisms

Decisions about political reforms are governed by many different rules. This project experimentally evaluates the performance of various decision-making rules and the selection of rules. Specifically, we experimentally analyze the political behavior of individuals who have private information about how they expect policies to affect their well-being. We experimentally investigate individual choices in Bayesian games in which players hold private information and know only about the distribution of other players’ information. Our focus is on institutional innovations that potentially increase the efficiency of the resulting social choice. These innovations include two-stage voting procedures, the bundling of decisions, the use of compensation payments, and hybrid decision procedures that use votes and transfers. During the third funding period, the project also experimentally investigated the possibility to buy welfare-enhancing reforms from two or more veto players.

关于政治改革的决定受到许多不同规则的制约。该项目实验性地评估了各种决策规则的性能和规则的选择。具体来说，我们通过实验分析了个人的政治行为，这些个人拥有关于他们期望政策如何影响他们福祉的私人信息。我们通过实验研究了贝叶斯游戏中的个人选择，其中玩家持有私人信息并且只知道其他玩家信息的分布。我们的重点是制度创新，有可能提高效率的社会选择。这些创新包括两阶段投票程序、决策捆绑、补偿支付的使用以及使用投票和转移的混合决策程序。在第三个供资期间，该项目还试验性地研究了从两个或两个以上的否决者那里购买福利改善改革的可能性。