Experimental analysis of Bayesian voting mechanisms, procedural choices and the acceptance of transfers (A07)

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Decisions about political reforms are governed by many different rules. This project experimentally evaluates the performance of various decision-making rules and the selection of rules. Specifically, we experimentally analyze the political behavior of individuals who have private information about how they expect policies to affect their well-being. We experimentally investigate individual choices in Bayesian games in which players hold private information and know only about the distribution of other players’ information. Our focus is on institutional innovations that potentially increase the efficiency of the resulting social choice. These innovations include two-stage voting procedures, the bundling of decisions, the use of compensation payments, and hybrid decision procedures that use votes and transfers. During the third funding period, the project also experimentally investigated the possibility to buy welfare-enhancing reforms from two or more veto players.