Experimental analysis of Bayesian voting mechanisms, procedural choices and the acceptance of transfers (A07)

有关政治改革的决定受到许多不同规则的制约。该项目对各种决策规则的性能和规则的选择进行了实验评估。具体地说，我们对拥有私人信息的个人的政治行为进行了实验分析，这些个人知道政策将如何影响他们的福祉。我们对贝叶斯博弈中的个体选择进行了实验研究，在贝叶斯博弈中，玩家持有私人信息，并且只知道其他玩家信息的分布。我们的重点是制度创新，这些创新可能会提高由此产生的社会选择的效率。这些创新包括两阶段投票程序、捆绑决策、使用补偿支付，以及使用投票和转移的混合决策程序。在第三个资助期，该项目还实验性地调查了从两个或更多否决权参与者手中购买提高福利的改革的可能性。

Decisions about political reforms are governed by many different rules. This project experimentally evaluates the performance of various decision-making rules and the selection of rules. Specifically, we experimentally analyze the political behavior of individuals who have private information about how they expect policies to affect their well-being. We experimentally investigate individual choices in Bayesian games in which players hold private information and know only about the distribution of other players’ information. Our focus is on institutional innovations that potentially increase the efficiency of the resulting social choice. These innovations include two-stage voting procedures, the bundling of decisions, the use of compensation payments, and hybrid decision procedures that use votes and transfers. During the third funding period, the project also experimentally investigated the possibility to buy welfare-enhancing reforms from two or more veto players.