Experimental analysis of the role of higher-order beliefs about the cognitive abilities of others in coordination games

协调博弈中关于他人认知能力的高阶信念作用的实验分析

• 批准号: 268377548
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Christoph Kuzmics, Ph.D.
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2014-12-31 至 2016-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/268377548?language=en
• 关键词: Experimental; analysis; role; higher; order

With this project we aim to provide a better understanding of the possible reasons of coordination failure in strategic situations such as financial markets or bank runs.John Maynard Keynes (1936) in his famous beauty contest analogy argues that a good investment strategy not so much depends on having the correct assessment of the fundamental value of the various assets, but more so on what one believes others believe what the fundamental value is and what one believes others believe what others believe the fundamental value is, and so on, possibly ad infinitum. In short, the game investors play is foremost a coordination game and in such games "higher order beliefs" play a crucial role.There is a literature (cited in the proposal) that shows, in theory, how fragile the outcome of coordination games is with respect to small changes in individuals' higher order beliefs. On the other hand there is also an experimental literature (cited in the proposal) that demonstrates that most players in real life do not employ beliefs of high order. This latter literature focuses on two aspects, the tradeoff between risk-dominance ("less risky") and Pareto-dominance ("higher payoffs") and the role of imperfect information about the payoffs in the game.We want to add to the understanding of this problem by investigating a third source of strategic uncertainty based on imperfect cognition: not every player necessarily fully grasps all the possible choices at her disposal. Theoretically, a rational player's behavior then depends on all her higher-order belief about her opponents' cognitive ability (including her opponent's higher order beliefs about her own cognitive ability). In order to test whether players have higher-order beliefs of this nature, we propose to run an experiment tailored for this purpose that builds on the work by Blume and Gneezy (2000, 2010). In their experimental design subjects play coordination games, in which the optimal way to coordinate is not immediately obvious. They have two treatments: 1) a single player plays the coordination game against herself, 2) two players play the coordination game. They find that many subjects play optimally in 1) but not in 2). Their explanation is that subjects are overly pessimistic about their opponents' cognitive ability.We plan to add a third treatment 3) while her opponent plays the game against himself (as in treatment 1), the player of interest is asked to bet on her opponent's choices.A player with pessimistic beliefs about his opponents' cognitive ability will choose the suboptimal strategy in 2) and 3), while a player with non-trivial higher-order beliefs may choose the suboptimal strategy in 2) but bet that her opponent will choose optimally in 3). We can, thus, experimentally identify whether the main reason for coordination failure is that players have pessimistic simple beliefs, or whether it is because of their higher-order beliefs.

通过这个项目，我们的目标是更好地理解金融市场或银行挤兑等战略情况下协调失败的可能原因。约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes，1936）在他著名的选美比赛类比中指出，良好的投资策略并不主要取决于对各种资产的基本价值的正确评估，而更取决于一个人相信别人相信什么基本价值是什么，以及一个人相信别人相信别人相信什么基本价值，以及 依此类推，可能无穷无尽。简而言之，投资者玩的游戏首先是协调博弈，而在此类博弈中，“高阶信念”发挥着至关重要的作用。有一篇文献（提案中引用）表明，从理论上讲，协调博弈的结果对于个人高阶信念的微小变化是多么脆弱。另一方面，还有一个实验文献（提案中引用）表明，现实生活中的大多数玩家并不采用高阶信念。后者的文献重点关注两个方面，即风险主导（“风险较小”）和帕累托主导（“更高回报”）之间的权衡，以及博弈中关于回报的不完美信息的作用。我们希望通过调查基于不完美认知的战略不确定性的第三个来源来加深对这个问题的理解：并非每个玩家都必须完全掌握她所掌握的所有可能的选择。理论上，理性玩家的行为取决于她对对手认知能力的所有高阶信念（包括对手对她自己认知能力的高阶信念）。为了测试玩家是否具有这种性质的高阶信念，我们建议在 Blume 和 Gneezy (2000, 2010) 的工作基础上进行一项为此目的量身定制的实验。在他们的实验设计中，受试者玩协调游戏，其中最佳协调方式并不是立即显而易见的。他们有两种治疗方法：1）单个玩家与自己进行协调游戏，2）两个玩家进行协调游戏。他们发现许多受试者在 1) 中表现最佳，但在 2) 中表现不佳。他们的解释是，受试者对其对手的认知能力过于悲观。我们计划添加第三种治疗方法3），当她的对手与自己进行游戏时（如治疗1），感兴趣的玩家被要求对对手的选择下注。对对手认知能力持悲观信念的玩家将选择2）和3）中的次优策略，而具有非平凡高阶信念的玩家可能会选择次优策略。 在 2) 中选择次优策略，但打赌她的对手会在 3) 中选择最优策略。因此，我们可以通过实验来确定协调失败的主要原因是否是参与者具有悲观的简单信念，或者是否是因为他们的高阶信念。