Empirical analysis of the economics of lobbying in European policy reforms (B10*)

政治改革的实施已经从国家政府转向欧洲机构。这些机构的权力分散为特殊利益集团提供了施加政治影响的多种机会。游说在布鲁塞尔是一种普遍现象，但其经济和政治后果尚未得到很好的理解。该项目收集数据，并开发计量经济学技术，以定量评估游说的私人回报，其对福利的影响及其对选民政治接受欧盟改革的影响。该应用程序将侧重于碳交易，欧洲的旗舰环境政策工具。

The implementation of political reforms has been shifting from national governments to European institutions. The fragmentation of power among these institutions provides special interest groups with multiple opportunities for exerting political influence. Lobbying in Brussels is a pervasive phenomenon, but its economic and political consequences are not yet well understood. This project gathers data and develops econometric techniques for quantitatively assessing the private returns to lobbying, its implications on welfare and its impact on the political acceptance of EU reforms among the electorate. The application will focus on carbon trading, Europe’s flagship environmental policy instrument.