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Study of the auction system for public constructions

公共建筑拍卖制度研究

基本信息

批准号：
06630075
负责人：
YAMADA Masatoshi
金额：
$ 1.22万
依托单位：
Osaka University (1995)Nagoya City University (1994)
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1994
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1994 至 1995
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

This study intended, reviewing the fact that collusion (or dango) in many of the auctions for public construction and intervention by Diet-men and/or local governors into the auction/determination of the successful bidders had received a great attention and posed a big problem of reconsidering the system of public administration in Japan, to analyze causes of those collusions and also to consider alternative auction-administration system to secure a more efficiency in the auctions for public constructions. Especially, I searched more efficient auction systems from basic and theoretical point of view, noting first that dango is said to be very common in the auctions for public constructions irrespective of their importance in terms of both money amounts and significance in arranging infrastructure for the economy, and second that there seems to be little analyzes of the auction system taking account of the features in the public-construction auctions in Japan.While the study lasted two fiscal years, the first year study surveyed the history of the problem, made clear the main features in Japanese dango problems, and arranged the preceding analyzes to clarify the possibilities of theoretical studies reviewing the features of dango prblems in Japan.The second year study, based on the above, paid an attention to the fact that a central cause lies in high cooperativeness among constructive businesses, and analyzed the following : First, I surveyed how the collusion-dango problems are analyzed in the preceding auction literature. Second, reviewing the feature specific to the Japanese dango, I analyzed what kind of auction system and its surrounding conditions are effective for more efficient auction result, finding that disclosure of information in any auction and cost-sharing by the government to enlarge bidders will be most effective by increasing competitiveness among possible bidders.

本研究旨在回顾许多公共建筑拍卖中的串通（或dango）以及国会议员和（或）地方官员干预拍卖/确定中标者的事实，这一事实受到了极大的关注，并提出了重新考虑日本公共行政制度的一个大问题。分析这些合谋行为产生的原因，并考虑采用不同的拍卖管理制度，以提高公共工程拍卖的效率。特别是，我从基础和理论的角度寻找更有效的拍卖制度，首先注意到，据说在公共建筑的拍卖中，无论其在资金数额和经济基础设施安排方面的重要性如何，都非常普遍，其次，考虑到日本公共建筑拍卖的特点，对拍卖制度的分析似乎很少。研究历时两个财政年度，第一年的研究考察了问题的历史，明确了日本危险问题的主要特征，并对前面的分析进行了整理，以阐明理论研究回顾日本危险问题特征的可能性。在此基础上，第二年的研究关注到一个核心原因是建设性企业之间的高度合作，并分析了以下内容：首先，我调查了之前拍卖文献中如何分析共谋-危险问题。其次，回顾日本国债的特点，分析了什么样的拍卖制度及其周边条件对提高拍卖效率是有效的，发现在任何一种拍卖中，通过信息披露和政府成本分担来扩大竞标者是最有效的，可以提高潜在竞标者之间的竞争力。