权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Self-Induced Coalition Formation between Jurisdictions and Costs Allocation Rules for Development of Infrastructure

管辖区之间自发联盟的形成和基础设施发展的成本分配规则

基本信息

批准号：
11555138
负责人：
OKADA Norio
金额：
$ 4.35万
依托单位：
KYOTO UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B).
财政年份：
1999
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1999 至 2000
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-11555138/
关键词：
Multi-purpose Reservoir Development Environmental Use of water Cost Allocation Method Game Theory Externality Net Benefit Allocation 更新整備

项目摘要

Societal demand for water resources development is changing, and it is becoming necessary to incorporate environmental use of water as the purpose of multi-purpose reservoir development project, together with conventional uses such as flood control, irrigation, or municipal/industrial water. Cost allocation for multi-pupose reservoir development has been examined for practical use. The Results of theoretical research based on game theory has been also accumulated. However, multi-purpose reservoir development involving environmental use has some different characteristics such as(1)participation of users without its own reservoir capacib, (2)externality of coalition, (3)necessity of cost and benefit allocation(net benefit allocation), (4)inefficiency caused by self revelation on users' own benefits, and (5)cost allocation in case plural alternatives exist. These problems were not supposed in the past multi-purpose reservoir development. In this study, cost allocation problem is formulated by using game theory, and the proposal to improve conventional cost allocation method for multi-purpose reservoir development incooporating environmental use. First, characteristics of cost function in reservoir development including users without its own reservoir capacity is shown, and the applicability of conventional cost allccation method is evaluated. Second, cost allocation method is extended to reflect externality of coalition. Third, eiffciency under net benefit allocation mechanism based on self revelation in reservoir renewal is discussed. Finany, coordination mechanism is proposed for the case where the information on users' preferences is incomplete and polarized, and the mechanism is applied to the confict on the renewal of the reservoir for hydropower generation.

社会对水资源开发的需求正在发生变化，有必要将水的环境利用作为多用途水库开发项目的目的，与防洪、灌溉或市政/工业用水等常规用途结合起来。对多用途油藏开发的成本分配进行了实际应用研究。基于博弈论的理论研究成果也不断积累。然而，涉及环境利用的多用途水库开发具有一些不同的特征，如：(1)没有自身水库容量的用户参与；(2)联盟的外部性；(3)成本和效益分配的必要性（净效益分配）；(4)用户自身利益的自我启示导致的低效率；(5)存在多种替代方案时的成本分配。这些问题在以往的多用途油藏开发中是没有考虑到的。本文运用博弈论的方法对多用途油藏开发成本分摊问题进行了阐述，并提出了考虑环境因素对传统多用途油藏开发成本分摊方法进行改进的建议。首先，分析了包括非自有库容用户在内的油藏开发成本函数特征，并对传统成本分摊方法的适用性进行了评价。其次，扩展了成本分摊方法，以反映联盟的外部性。第三，探讨了基于自我启示的水库更新净效益分配机制下的效率问题。最后，针对用户偏好信息不完全和两极化的情况，提出了协调机制，并将该机制应用于水电站更新库区的冲突问题。