Collapse of the Ngo Dinh Diem Government and the Vietnam War as U.S.-South Vietnamese Conflict

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Analysis of the Buddhist Crisis in South Vietnam in 1963, focusing on deep-rooted unpleasantness of the South Vietnamese people against the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, the government' s brutal way of handling their political demands, and the failed attempt of the Kennedy Administration for the solution of the crisis, showed that American pressure tactics upon Diem seldom functioned because the two countries had acted on vastly different premises and objectives, and also because Diem knew that the Americans had no alternative other than to support him. American policymakers, on the other hand, continuously blamed Diem for what had gone wrong with the politico-military struggle in South Vietnam, which contributed to their decision to acquiesce a military coup against him.Counterinsurgency strategy which the Kennedy Administration adopted to fight guerrillas was another failure for the Americans, owing to tremendous misgivings of the South Vietnamese government and armed forces, conflict between the two countries, and, above all, ungrounded American belief that their own method of fighting a war was unquestionably applicable to Vietnam. However, its deficiencies were already apparent even before American massive involvement in the war. Although many 'scholars have insisted that Kennedy' s intention of pulling out of Vietnam by 1965 was real and even possible, his plan of phased withdrawal of American military advisers was based on an unrealistic optimism. Kennedy' s presidency thus should be regarded an essential introductory period for American war in Vietnam.